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In this dissertation, I investigate the evolution of the methods and techniques through 
which UK life insurers calculate the economic worth of insurance contracts. The 
dissertation takes a historical perspective and examines how the calculative practices 
of life insurers have changed since 1971. Specifically, it focuses on how the 
emergence of novel practices of calculation shaped and was shaped by the broader 
context of UK life insurance. 
Life insurance typically involves the purchase of protection against the 
financial consequences of early death or, in the case of pensions, of long-lasting 
lives. Using their knowledge of mortality statistics, actuaries would calculate 
policyholders’ risk of dying; they then used those calculations to evaluate the 
economic worth of a given ‘promise’ (e.g. a pre-specified lump sum when the 
insured individual dies). To deal with uncertainty around the accuracy of their 
calculations, actuaries applied the principle of prudence ‒ that is, they incorporated 
implicit margins in their calculations that would allow their expectations to be some 
way off the mark without leading to large losses for the insurer. Actuaries, moreover, 
were responsible for distributing the often large financial surpluses thus accumulated 
across different groups of policyholders and, in the case of proprietary companies, 
shareholders. Actuaries, in other words, were the ‘custodians of surplus’. 
Since the early 1970s, however, insurers have increasingly sought to calculate 
new types of risk, different from traditional insurance risks such as mortality. This 
includes most notably, though not exclusively, financial risk – the risk that insurers’ 
investments generate less income than initially expected. Rather than dealing with 
this form of uncertainty though implicit margins, insurers started modelling financial 
markets to quantify how uncertain their returns on investments actually were and 
what level of reserves they needed to avoid economic catastrophe, reducing the role 
of ‘actuarial prudence’. Particularly important was the introduction of techniques 
from modern financial economics, techniques that up until the early 2000s were 
relatively foreign to the world of insurance. 
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In this study, I investigate the often subterranean but sometimes rather overt 
conflicts and tensions between different traditions of evaluation that thus emerged. I 
find that the changes in insurers’ calculative practices were intricately entangled with 
broader developments in life insurance. On the one hand, the introduction of the 
novel calculative techniques was facilitated by a decline in the authority of actuarial 
expertise, by competition among insurers, and by regulatory reform. On the other 
hand, the introduction of these techniques contributed to changes in the structure of 
contemporary life insurance arrangements, increasingly pushing the burden of 
financial risk to the level of the individual policyholder, and turning actuaries into 
technical experts rather than custodians of surplus. To understand how and why these 
changes came about, I argue, it is necessary to consider how the new techniques were 
used as strategic resources in the competitive struggles of companies in the market 






This dissertation examines the evolution of UK life insurance arrangements by 
investigating how the ways in which life insurers evaluate the economic worth of 
insurance contracts have changed since the early 1970s. It draws on a set of 44 oral-
history interviews, supplemented by an extensive set of documents, to describe how, 
in addition to traditional forms of ‘diversifiable’ insurance risk, insurers have 
increasingly sought to quantify forms of ‘non-diversifiable’ risk such as financial 
market risk. The central question is how changes in insurers’ evaluation practices 
shaped and were shaped by broader developments in UK life insurance. 
In addressing this question, the dissertation combines insights from field-
theoretical perspectives in ‘conventional’ economic sociology, the recent literature 
on the performativity of economics, the sociology of insurance and the sociology of 
scientific knowledge. Field theory is a useful tool for understanding how meso-level 
social orders emerge as a function of the strategic behaviour of actors in social 
domains such as markets. The assumption of ‘technological determinism’ prevalent 
in field-theoretical perspectives, however, conflicts with insights from the sociology 
of scientific knowledge and recent literature on the performativity of economics. 
This tension may be alleviated, I argue, by conceptualising both the market for life 
insurance and actuarial science as fields (a ‘market field’ and an ‘epistemic field’) 
and by investigating the interrelations between the two.  
In deploying this field-theoretical perspective, the dissertation finds, on the 
one hand, that developments in the market field may lead to new opportunities and 
challenges in the epistemic field. Particularly important in the epistemic field, for 
instance, was the ascendancy of modern finance theory’s no-arbitrage models as key 
exemplars for the modelling of insurance liabilities in actuarial science. However, 
only when the jurisdictional claims of the actuarial profession were threatened and 
when supervisors required insurers to evaluate their liabilities using techniques 
already used in banking did these models become dominant in the actuarial field. 
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On the other hand, I argue that the ways in which life insurers evaluate the 
economic worth of insurance contracts matters for what life insurance is and does. 
Evaluations of ‘value’ and ‘risk’ inform decision making about the distribution of 
financial surplus and risk across different groups of policyholders and shareholders, 
the types of products that life insurers choose to underwrite, and the way in which 
they invest their assets in capital markets. Since the 1970s, the emergence of novel 
evaluation practices has contributed to the individualisation of financial risk in 
insurance arrangements, a shift in insurers’ asset allocations from equities to fixed-
income investments, and a declining willingness from insurers to underwrite 
traditional mortality-related risks. The business of life insurance, in other words, 
increasingly revolves around investment intermediation rather than protection. 
The findings of this dissertation draw attention to the politics of seemingly 
technical issues such as the discounting of future cash flows to present values. 
Overall, I suggest that the evolution of UK life insurance can be fully understood 
only by paying attention to tensions and conflicts in the epistemic field of actuarial 
science, attempts to influence the ‘rules of the game’ in the market field and the 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
This dissertation is about the history of evaluation practices in life insurance from the 
early 1970s to the present, a period of large-scale change in global capitalism. The 
starting point for this dissertation is 1971, a year that is remarkable for several 
reasons. On August 15, 1971, the US president Richard Nixon suspended the 
convertibility of the US dollar to gold, signalling the end of the international 
monetary system with managed exchange rates that was designed at the Bretton 
Woods conference in 1944. The system’s collapse gave rise to a turbulent period, 
which saw the gestation of a new world order – a world order in which financial 
capital would take an increasingly prominent role (Arrighi, 1994; Helleiner, 1994; 
Krippner, 2011). The system of floating exchange rates gave rise to unprecedented 
financial market volatility in the three decades since the 1970s, particularly so in the 
US and the UK (Bank for International Settlements, 2006; Stockhammer, 2012), 
which led Susan Strange (1997) famously to describe global finance as a ‘casino’. 
Since the 1990s, descriptions of contemporary capitalism have proliferated, though 
perhaps none as provocative. Other epithets include, for instance, ‘investor 
capitalism’ (Useem, 1996), and ‘financial capitalism’ (Carruthers, 2015). More 
recently, some have suggested that with increased concentrations of wealth we might 
be experiencing the onset of the ‘age of asset management’ (Haldane, 2014), or 
‘asset management capitalism’ (Braun, 2016) ‒ a term coined to describe the fact 
that asset managers have taken up an increasingly important position in the 
‘investment chain’ (Arjaliès et al., 2017), particularly after the global financial crisis.  
The now large literature on ongoing processes of ‘financialisation’ has 
extensively documented the ascendancy of financial capital (Epstein, 2005; Krippner, 
2011; van der Zwan, 2014). Few (if any), however, have focused on how the nature 
of life insurance companies has changed in this period – even if life insurers are 
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amongst the most important investors in today’s capital markets when considering 
the sheer volume of assets they have under management. What life insurance is and 
does has changed drastically since the 1970s. The world of life insurance as 
portrayed in Hollywood noirs like Double Indemnity and, even further back in 
history, in Charles Dickens’s novels has faded. True, insurers still sell the traditional 
‘term assurance’ policies that provided a murder motive in stories like Double 
Indemnity, and insurance fraud is still an important concern for insurers, but these are 
now relatively minor aspects of what insurers do.  
Indeed, some argue that what life insurers do today is hardly recognizable as 
life insurance. A recent article in the Financial Times, for instance, claims that life 
insurers (and indeed insurers more generally) faced an ‘identity crisis’ (Ralph, 2018). 
In recent years, the article suggests, insurers have increasingly focused on providing 
services such as intermediating between customers and capital markets, rather than 
insuring risk. The most extreme example is Standard Life, an Edinburgh-based 
company founded as a life assurer in 1825. After its demutualisation in 2006, the 
company started selling predominantly ‘fee-earning, capital-light investment 
products that have more in common with asset management’ (Ralph, 2018). The 
company’s change of strategy was underlined in 2017 when it merged with Aberdeen 
Asset Management and sold its life insurance business to the Phoenix Group. 
Although in other cases the shift has been less pronounced, the tendency is similar. 
Even those life insurers who still offer protection against insurance risks such as 
mortality, longevity and morbidity, earn their profits mostly from investment, not 
protection.  
Changes in the structure of life insurance arrangements were accompanied by 
changes in insurers’ asset allocations. In recent decades, life insurers have 
increasingly divested from stock markets and have channelled their funds into fixed-
income investments (see figure 1.1), sometimes even via ‘direct lending’ to 
companies (Rule, 2018, 2019). This is a reversal of an earlier trend. Whilst for much 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, life insurers mainly invested their 
funds in government bonds and mortgages, since the early twentieth century insurers 




England has suggested that insurers’ recent shift in capital allocation has important 
implications for capital markets, most notably: downward pressure on investment 
yields on government bonds, and increased financial market fragility (Haldane et al., 
2014). In the words of Andy Haldane: ‘Equity does a much better job than debt of 
sharing risk between borrowers and lenders… [A] world without equity is likely to 
be one with poorer risk-sharing and weaker long-term investment’ (Haldane, 2014, p. 
11).  
  
Figure 1.1 Historical asset allocations of UK life insurance companies and pension 
funds (Haldane et al., 2014). 
In this dissertation, I examine how developments such as these are related to 
the ways in which life insurers evaluate the economic worth of insurance products 
and measure their risks. To see how, it is necessary to consider developments in 
British actuarial science. Within British actuarial circles, 1971 was also an important 
year, albeit less monumentally so. It was the year in which members of the British 
actuarial profession started debating the use of ‘stochastic simulation’ techniques to 
quantify financial risk.1 In so doing, they broached a topic that would feature 
                                                 
1 In contrast to the traditional actuarial ‘deterministic’ models, which seek to forecast the future 
through point-based estimates of key variables, stochastic models seek to forecast the future in 
probabilistic terms. Stochastic models, in other words, acknowledge that the future development of 
key variables is uncertain, and seek to capture this uncertainty in a range of possible outcomes rather 
than a single point-based estimate. In so doing, stochastic models allow for an expression in 
probabilistic terms of the degree of uncertainty and for the calculation of ‘non-diversifiable’ risk. This 
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prominently on the actuarial agenda in the decades to come and would lead to 
various controversies revolving around the question: how explicitly to measure and 
manage ‘financial risk’? Thus, while the demise of the Bretton Woods system set the 
stage for financial capitalism and ongoing processes of financialisation, financial risk 
emerged as an object of explicit actuarial calculation, which prefigured insurers’ 
lengthy struggle to deal with the uncertainty of expanding and increasingly volatile 
capital markets.  
Indeed, the changes in insurers’ epistemic apparatus did not just come about 
smoothly. They were the outcome of a long process mired with tensions, frictions 
and often subterranean, but sometimes rather overt conflicts within the epistemic 
field of actuarial science. Controversies emerged, for instance, about the utility of 
stochastic calculus, the potential advantages of computer-based simulation, and the 
role that modern financial economics should play in actuarial practice. Debates such 
as these were not just ‘technical’ debates; they were also debates about how life 
insurance schemes should be run and what life insurance should be. In this 
dissertation, therefore, I investigate the interrelations between the different faces of 
the changing industry: between the changing evaluation practices on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand on the characteristics of contemporary life insurance 
arrangements and the changing forms of competition. Central in this endeavour is the 
two-pronged question: how have evaluation practices in life insurance changed since 
the 1970s and how were these changes related to overall developments in the life 
insurance industry?  
Studying Insurance, Studying Finance  
Knowledge production is a crucial aspect of what life insurers do. For many of their 
products, the benefits of policyholders are contingent on future events, which 
presents an epistemological problem: how to know what these products are worth 
under conditions of uncertainty? An answer to this question, however convincing or 
otherwise it may be, is necessary for life insurers to go about their everyday business, 
                                                 





to make underwriting decisions, to distribute surpluses across policyholders and 
shareholders, and to invest their assets. Evaluation practices – in short, the practices 
through which insurers estimate the economic worth of insurance products – are thus 
a piece of the institutional arrangement that structures the relations among 
policyholders, shareholders, company management, and capital markets.  
There is a rich and voluminous body of historical and sociological literature 
on insurance. Studies of life insurance, and indeed insurance more generally, tend to 
focus on the practices through which life insurers make risk of the ‘diversifiable’ 
kind (van Hoyweghen, 2007). This is indeed what life insurance for most of its 
history has been about: reducing uncertainty by aggregating individual lives into risk 
pools (Ewald, 1991; Knights and Vurdubakis, 1993). In so doing, insurance turns 
uncertainty into ‘risk’. It makes risk calculable by relying on the logic of large 
numbers (Hacking, 1990). The larger the risk pool, the more reliable estimates of for 
instance average mortality may be, and the more the financial consequences of 
individual uncertainty may be reduced (Lehtonen and van Hoyweghen, 2014). 
Consequently, most of the sociological and historical literature on insurance has 
focused on the making of such risks and the epistemological problems it entails 
(Knights and Vurdubakis, 1993; Ericson, Doyle and Barry, 2003; van Hoyweghen, 
2007; Alborn, 2009; McFall, 2011). 
Most of the practices dealt with in this dissertation, however, concern non-
diversifiable risk: a type of uncertainty the magnitude of which is proportional to the 
value of the object ‘at risk’. The financial consequences of uncertainty, in this case, 
cannot be reduced through diversification, because the risks are not independent but 
correlated. They depend on the same underlying process. Non-diversifiable risk has 
always been part of the insurance business, in lines of business such as flood 
insurance (Collier, 2008; Christophers, 2019), reinsurance (Jarzabkowski, Bednarek 
and Spee, 2015), and even in life insurance (McFall, 2011). In recent decades, 
however, insurers have increasingly sought to make such risks as financial market 
risk and ‘longevity trend risk’ calculable – a development that occurred at the same 
time as the rise of ‘financialised capitalism’. As scholars of financialisation have 
argued, financial actors (and logics) have taken up an increasingly dominant role in 
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contemporary capitalism, raking in an increasingly large share of corporate profits 
(Krippner, 2005; van der Zwan, 2014; Carruthers, 2015). At the same time, however, 
financial market fragility also has increased, leading for instance to unprecedented 
volatility in financial markets in the three closing decades of the twentieth century 
(Stockhammer, 2012; van der Zwan, 2014). To address these new risks, actuaries 
have increasingly borrowed from modern financial economics, particularly so from 
the early 2000s onwards, even when alternative approaches had been readily 
available since the 1980s. As a recent contribution to the literature has pointed out, in 
today’s insurance markets insurers’ evaluation practices tend to conflate traditional 
diversifiable insurance risks and non-diversifiable risks such as financial market risk 
(François and Frezal, 2018). This not only matters because it may give insurers a 
false sense of security about non-diversifiable risks (as François and Frezal suggest), 
but also because it influences what insurance is and does, ingraining for instance a 
financial logic into it. This study, therefore, examines the evolution of insurers’ 
evaluation practices, with a specific focus on the introduction of techniques 
borrowed from financial economics.  
In so doing, this study draws on and contributes to the social studies of 
finance. Although the ‘social studies of finance’ broadly refers to the application of 
concepts and methodologies from the broader social-sciences to the study of finance 
(de Goede, 2005a), it is often associated with a specific approach to research, which 
is inspired by science and technology studies and focuses on the concrete, material 
details of financial market practice. Central in these studies is the notion of 
‘performativity’, or the notion that economic reality does not have an independent 
existence outside the practices that constitute it by making things calculable and 
tradable (Callon, 1998, 2007; MacKenzie, 2006; Muniesa, 2014). This study draws 
on this view because its main aim is to examine not whether insurers’ evaluation 
practices accurately reflect economic reality, but rather what the consequences are of 
evaluating the economic worth of insurance products in specific ways. Although the 
focus on materiality, which is key to much of the work in the social studies of 
finance, and the performativity of economics is by no means new to the sociology of 
insurance (van Hoyweghen, 2007, 2014; McFall, 2009b; Ossandón, 2014; Meyers 




recent changes in the financial management of life insurance firms. This study thus 
contributes to the social studies of finance by examining the calculative agency of 
life insurers as key participants in financial markets.  
Exposition of Main Contributions 
The expansion of subject matter for the social studies of finance is by no means the 
only intended contribution of this study. It also aims to contribute to recent attempts 
at integrating an analytical focus on the concrete details of financial market practice 
(as characteristic of the social studies of finance) with an understanding of the 
political economy of insurance and finance more broadly (Beunza and Ferraro, 2018; 
MacKenzie, 2018; Wansleben, 2018). In this context, I suggest, political economy 
may be understood as revolving around Harold Lasswell’s (1936) famous question 
‘who gets, what, when and how?’ Critics have argued that research in the social 
studies of finance has tended to neglect this question (Mirowski and Nik-Khah, 2007; 
Hardin and Rottinghaus, 2015), even if some of the key writings in this literature 
make a link between calculating capacities and distributional politics (e.g. Callon and 
Muniesa, 2005). This study seeks to reinforce this link by investigating how changes 
in the evaluation of insurance liabilities are related to the ‘who gets what, when and 
how’ of life insurance.  
My strategy to achieve this objective is to pursue a budding line of 
investigation in the social studies of finance, which seeks to integrate a focus on 
material market practice with the notion of markets as fields (MacKenzie, 2018) ‒ a 
notion that is prevalent in ‘conventional’ economic sociology (Bourdieu, 1997; 
Fligstein, 2001). Field theory provides a viable ontology of markets (and indeed of 
social domains more generally) alternative to the supply- and demand-schedule 
based view of economics (Fligstein, 2001; Beckert, 2009). It provides a relational 
view of economic agents as strategic actors that are positioned in a field, which is 
structured by institutions and networks that need actively reproduced. These 
structures shape competition among actors, who may abide by the rules or who may 
seek to influence the institutional structure of the field. Yet, field theorists typically 
rely on technological determinism, which perceives knowledge and technological 
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innovation as processes that provide strategic opportunities to actors in a given field 
from the outside. This determinism contradicts a central claim in the social studies of 
finance, which is the claim of ‘co-construction’ (a claim that has been imported from 
science and technology studies): knowledge and technology are not processes 
independent of society, influencing it from outside, but are intricately entangled with 
it (Jasanoff, 2004; MacKenzie, 2009). In line with the co-constructionist perspective, 
I propose to consider markets as fields that may be structured by various social 
forces including institutions, cognitive frames, networks, and, indeed, evaluation 
practices. In this view, explaining how a given market evolves requires an account of 
changes in adjacent epistemic fields (such as in this case actuarial science) and the 
interrelations between the two.  
Applying this perspective to the case of life insurance allows me to make 
three further contributions. The first contribution is to think about the link between 
evaluation practices and issues of political economy. As this study shows, evaluation 
is not simply a technical affair; evaluation practices play an important role in 
structuring the relations among stakeholders in a given market field, particularly so 
when they become institutionalised. Particularly important in the political economy 
of life insurance, for instance, is the discounting regime – the set of rules that define 
how insurers should ‘discount’ future cash flows into a present value. This study 
shows, moreover, that evaluation practices may also shape the boundaries of fields: 
in recent years, for instance, there has been a large scale transfer of pension promises 
from defined benefit pension funds to insurance companies – a transfer that involved 
a change in the mechanism through which those promises are secured. This process 
may be referred to as the ‘privatisation’ of pensions ‒an underappreciated dimension 
of what some have referred to as the financialisation of pensions (Hassel, Naczyk 
and Wiß, 2019). This ongoing process of privatisation, I suggest, is possible only 
because the epistemic machinery in both fields have converged towards an 
‘economic’ view of liabilities. 
Secondly, this study contributes to our understanding of what sometimes has 
been referred to as the ‘individualisation of risk’ (Langley, 2004, 2006, 2008; Berry, 




understood as the product of a neoliberal ‘governmentality’ that seeks to shift 
financial responsibility and risk to the level of the individual (Baker, 2000; Dean, 
2010; O’Malley, 2012; Rose, 2017). (In pensions, this is manifested by the shift from 
defined benefit to defined contribution arrangements.) The field-theoretical 
perspective developed in this dissertation draws attention to quite another factor in 
bringing about this change: the strategic behaviour of participants in the market field 
(including, e.g., state actors and academic actuaries). I argue that seen from such a 
perspective the individualisation of risk in contemporary insurance arrangements 
may be understood as the product of incumbent insurers’ response to the challenge of 
a new type of insurance (unit-linked insurance). Rather than contradicting earlier 
contributions to the debate, this study adds to our understanding of how forms of 
neoliberal governmentality are cemented into concrete insurance arrangements. 
This brings me to the third and final contribution that I wish to highlight here. 
This contribution relates to the ongoing debate about the hegemonic status of modern 
financial economics. A growing number of scholars link ongoing processes of 
‘financialisation’ ‒ broadly defined as the increasing influence of financial actors and 
logics on societies ‒ to changes in the calculative practices of financial markets 
(Chiapello, 2014; Lengwiler, 2016; Besedovsky, 2018), and, indeed, to the diffusion 
of ‘financialised calculation conventions’ to domains of social life outside of finance 
(Chiapello, 2014; Chiapello and Walter, 2016). Although some scholars have started 
addressing the question of why some of modern finance theory’s models have 
become so influential in financial market practice (e.g. MacKenzie, 2006, 2007; 
Svetlova, 2012), it still very much remains an open question.  
The present study cannot give a definitive answer to this question, but it 
nonetheless contributes to our understanding of the authority of modern financial 
economics by investigating its diffusion in the world of insurance (cf. Blyth, 2002; 
Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons, 2010). In so doing, I argue that the diffusion of modern 
financial economics was intricately entangled with a changing distribution of 
‘epistemic authority’. Traditional actuarial evaluation practices require the formation 
of expectations about an inherently unknowable future (Beckert, 2016), an activity 
that traditionally belonged to the professional jurisdiction of actuaries. The core 
10 
 
models of modern financial economics (the so-called ‘no-arbitrage’ models of option 
pricing theory), however, circumvent the need to forecast the future by analysing the 
value of a contract ‘synchronically’ (Langenohl, 2018). As I argue in this 
dissertation, the influence of such no-arbitrage modelling on insurers’ evaluation 
practices took place at the same time as the legitimacy of actuarial judgment became 
increasingly disputed, particularly so after the failure of the Equitable Life Assurance 
Society in the early 2000s. The hegemonic status of these models in the context of 
life insurance is thus at least partially constituted by their ‘objectivity’ (the formal 
absence of ‘judgment’, even if the specification of the models requires judgment 
nonetheless) ‒ a form of objectivity that, as I will show, needs to be actively 
constructed and maintained.  
Methodology 
[I]nterrogating the past allows us to make taken-for-granted social 
institutions in the present unfamiliar and strange. In other words, a 
historical analysis allows us to see other possibilities contained 
within current social arrangements; we realize that the world does 
not have to be as it is, that the world is mutable and changeable. 
(Krippner in: Krippner, Lemoine and Ravelli, 2017, p. 4) 
To explain the emergence of contemporary life insurance arrangements, this 
dissertation presents a historical sociology of life insurers’ evaluation practices. It is 
sociological because I seek to explain insurers’ evaluation practices as something 
that is shaped by specific social processes, not as a function of an internal logic. 
More specifically, as is good practice in the sociology of scientific knowledge, I 
adopt a ‘methodological relativism’, which is to say that ‘the same types of causes 
would explain, say true and false beliefs’ (Bloor, 1991, p. 5). The study is historical 
because I seek to identify those causes that shaped the evolution of insurers’ 
evaluation practices since the 1970s. Identifying the path-dependencies that 
characterise this evolution allows me to move beyond the taken-for-grantedness of 
the ways in which life insurers evaluate the economic worth of insurance liabilities 
today. In other words, by adopting a historical approach, I hope to achieve an effect 
similar to that described by Krippner in the quote above: to make today’s life 




The primary source material is a set of 44 semi-structured oral history 
interviews with people involved in the UK’s insurance industry (see Appendix A), 
oftentimes directly so, in other cases more indirectly so, e.g., through their 
involvement in international organisations. These include interviews with company 
actuaries, regulators and supervisors, consultants and model providers, academic 
actuaries, actuaries working for investment banks, and people who currently have 
another position, such as non-executive director or who are currently in retirement. 
Many of my interviewees have taken up at least two or more of the above positions 
in their career.  
Some of my interviewees have had long careers and they were involved in 
many of the events described in this dissertation. Others were at a relatively early 
stage in their career. The nature and length of the interviews varied accordingly. In 
some interviews, I asked my interviewees to walk me through their careers and to 
describe both routine practice and specific events that they considered pivotal in 
understanding the history of evaluation. These interviews tended to take up relatively 
more time, typically between 1.5 and 2 hours (the longest being 4.5 hours). In other 
cases, the interviews were more concise (typically between 45 minutes and 1.5 
hours). These interviews tended to serve a direct purpose. Although I still asked 
interviewees about their individual careers, I steered the interviews more intently 
towards specific events and asked interviewees about particular practices. Follow-up 
interviews were used to clarify some of the rather more technical aspects of 
evaluation, leading in four cases to a repeat interview. To ensure that interviewees 
were comfortable speaking about sensitive issues, I promised them anonymity, 
unless they explicitly consented to otherwise.2 Overall, this combination of interview 
styles allowed me to identify key events, situate them in a historical order and to 
grasp as adequately as possible the technical nature of the evaluation practices in 
which my interviewees have been involved.  
                                                 
2 A small number of interviewees preferred not to have quotes attributed to them; all but one of them 
were or are currently employed by government agencies. When quoted, they are referred to in an 
anonymised form, e.g. as ‘interviewee CJ’.  
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I used three different methods to identify relevant interviewees. First, I 
scanned the main actuarial journals to identify individuals that have been involved in 
key debates within actuarial science. Second, and perhaps most importantly, I used 
the method of snowball sampling. This was useful to identify interviewees who are 
regarded by peers as key figures, but who have not necessarily been involved in 
actuarial debates, either because they work outside the actuarial profession (as in the 
case of some of the supervisors and regulators), or because they have simply been 
less involved with professional affairs. Third and finally, I also scanned company 
websites to identify potential interviewees that were not put forward by their peers. 
This was to ensure that also ‘fringe’ perspectives were included. The resulting 
interview sample contains just two women, which largely reflects the fact that the 
actuarial profession was male-dominated for most of the twentieth century (Dennett, 
2004, p. 197). More women were contacted, but only two agreed to be interviewed. 
Overall, interviewees were selected to include leading voices in actuarial debates, 
people with specific expertise about certain topics, as well as a diversity of 
perspectives.  
One of the major pitfalls of oral history interviews is that memory tends to be 
rather fickle, which raises the issue of the validity and reliability of oral history data 
(Ritchie, 2003). A particularly important problem is that interviewees’ accounts of 
past events may be self-serving. I tried to ascertain the validity and reliability of 
interview data by various means. First, most of the interview questions concerned 
routine practice, memory of which tends to be more reliable than memories about 
specific events (Thompson, 1988). Second, where I was interested in specific events, 
I tried to gauge the extent to which interviewees had retold memories about specific 
events on earlier occasions. Although this is likely to make memories more reliable, 
it is also likely to decrease their validity, because the purpose of those earlier 
retellings may have influenced the account in ways that may serve interviewees’ self-
interest (Thomson, 2010). Third, and most importantly, I tried to corroborate key 
data points, firstly with the memories of other interviewees, and secondly with 





The set of primary documentary material, which supplemented the interview 
data, consists of documents from a variety of sources. A crucial set of documents 
includes articles published in the actuarial journals, the Journal of the Institute of 
Actuaries and the Transactions of the Faculty of Actuaries, which merged in 1993 to 
form the British Actuarial Journal. Conveniently, these journals publish 
transcriptions and summaries of professional debates alongside articles. This allowed 
me not only to trace the inception of new ideas but also to gauge their reception 
among peers. Other documents include regulatory communication (including, 
speeches, newsletters, briefings, consultation papers, ‘Dear CEO’ letters, etc.), 
articles in newspapers, magazines, and professional journals, occasional papers, 
consultancy reports, individual companies’ annual reports, and yearbooks of the 
actuarial profession (which include, e.g., actuarial exams). This material not only 
served to corroborate the interview data but also to fill the gaps left by it. The 
documentary material was particularly important in the analysis of the earlier 
decades of this history; less so for the later developments.  
Outline of the Dissertation 
The dissertation proceeds as follows. In chapter 2, I review relevant bodies of 
literature in economic sociology and suggest a way in which insights from two 
different streams of research in economic sociology (the field-theoretical 
perspectives prevalent in conventional economic sociology and the performativity 
literature in STS-inflected economic sociology) may be fruitfully combined. In 
addition to these bodies of literature, the chapter also reviews key arguments in the 
sociology of scientific knowledge (which are used to clarify what is understood as 
‘economic knowledge’), the sociology of insurance and, more briefly, the sociology 
of professions. The resulting framework guides the empirical analysis, which is 
presented in chapters 3-8.  
Chapters 3 and 4 address the emergence of new forms of insurance and their 
reverberations in actuarial science and the life insurance market. Chapter 3 deals with 
the debates that emerged within the epistemic field of actuarial science in response to 
the introduction of unit-linked insurance, a new form of insurance that in contrast to 
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conventional insurance arrangements directly tied policyholder benefits to 
investment performance. In the 1970s, debates about the appropriate methods to 
calculate the cost and risk of insurance guarantees on unit-linked policies emerged – 
a development that was fostered by increased financial market volatility. By the end 
of the decade, actuaries increasingly agreed that new ‘stochastic methods’, such as 
simulation modelling, were appropriate to do so. The application of these methods, 
however, remained confined to unit-linked insurance. Chapter 4 deals with a series of 
changes in life insurance arrangements in response to the challenge posed by unit-
linked insurance companies to insurers offering conventional with-profits 
arrangements. In the final decades, differences between unit-linked and with-profits 
insurance started to fade. While the structure of life insurance arrangements started to 
change, and competition among insurers increased, the actuarial approach to dealing 
with uncertainty did not change with it. When by the end of the century many 
insurers had gotten into significant financial trouble, and the worst affected among 
them, Equitable Life, was forced to stop writing new business, traditional actuarial 
methods came under increasingly large pressure.  
Chapters 5 and 6 describe the emergence of a new market order; how the 
governance of UK life insurance changed in response to the crisis of the Equitable 
Life and the concomitant changes in insurers’ evaluation practices. Chapter 5 deals 
with the development of ‘market-consistent’ valuation ‒ an approach to the valuation 
of insurance liabilities that draws on techniques borrowed from modern financial 
economics and the derivatives departments of investment banks (technical terms 
such as ‘market-consistent’ will be explained in the relevant chapters). Although 
there were already some actuaries within the profession who favoured this approach 
in the 1990s, it was only when actuarial expertise became heavily criticised and 
regulators imposed the use of new techniques that market-consistent valuation 
became prevalent. The chapter seeks to explain the ascendancy of no-arbitrage 
modelling as the dominant paradigm in the insurance field by investigating the 
strategic actions of actors in the epistemic field, and to describe the development of 
the market-consistent models for valuation purposes. Chapter 6 addresses another set 
of practices that emerged around the same time: risk-based capital modelling. In 




sought explicitly to quantify insurers’ risks. The chapter describes the evolution of 
these models, how risk modelling may be understood as a social (collective) activity, 
and how its emergence affected the financial management of insurance firms. In so 
doing, the chapter shows that the combination of market-consistent valuation and 
risk-based capital calculation (both driven by regulatory change) changed the nature 
of the relation among groups of policyholders and shareholders.  
Chapters 7 and 8 address the consolidation of this new market order. Chapter 
7 deals with the institutionalisation of market-consistent valuation and risk-based 
capital calculation at the level of the European Union. This institutionalisation took 
place in the form of Solvency II, a European framework for the regulation of 
insurance capital, of which UK actors were main proponents. The chapter shows how 
the translation of market-consistent valuation and risk-based capital calculation into 
an explicit set of rules was partly a consequence of the way in which epistemic and 
supervisory authority was distributed at the EU level. The chapter further shows how 
attempts to translate the paradigmatic knowledge of market-consistent valuation into 
an explicit set of rules became overtly political. Finally, chapter 8 describes the 
emergence of the ‘new life market’ ‒ a secondary market in which pension funds, 
insurance and reinsurance companies and other capital market participants buy and 
sell ‘pension liabilities’ and ‘longevity risk’. The emergence of this market, I argue, 
was in part facilitated by changes in the epistemic machinery (as described in earlier 
chapters) underpinning the fields of insurance and pensions. Because market-
consistent valuation puts a hypothetical ‘market price’ on pension liabilities and 
longevity risk, it makes it easier to conceive how they might be traded. This, in turn, 
changes the way in which pension promises are secured, from a relational 








Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
The focus of this dissertation on the seemingly technical details of the ways in which 
life insurers evaluate the economic worth of insurance products is not just for the 
sake of it, but because those ‘details’ are both shaped by and shape much ‘larger’ 
issues concerning the societal role of life insurance in contemporary capitalism. The 
Janus-faced nature of this endeavour, faced simultaneously towards the ‘big picture’ 
of life insurance and the ‘details’ of life insurance practice, means I will have to 
engage with several bodies of literature. These include the social studies of finance, 
the sociology of insurance, the sociology of markets, the sociology of scientific 
knowledge, and, more briefly, the sociology of professions. In reviewing these fields, 
I do not just seek to summarise their key arguments, but will also seek to suggest 
ways in which contemporary debates in economic sociology may be carried forward. 
In particular, I seek to build on recent attempts at bridging the divide between the 
STS-inflected economic sociology prevalent in the social studies of finance and the 
more conventional perspectives in economic sociology that pay closer attention to 
the politics and political economy of financial markets (Beunza and Ferraro, 2018; 
MacKenzie, 2018; Wansleben, 2018). This chapter argues that it is possible to 
conceive of evaluation practices as a ‘social force’ that, alongside, for example, 
institutions, networks and cultural frames, structures the market for life insurance, by 
integrating a finitist perspective on economic knowledge with an understanding of 
markets as strategic action fields.  
Making this argument requires three steps. First, I propose that a finitist 
perspective on economic theory ‒ a perspective that is prevalent in science studies 
and that underpins much of the social studies of finance ‒ provides us with an 
appropriate sociological understanding of what theory is and does. Second, I follow 
economic sociologists like Neil Fligstein to argue that a useful way of understanding 
the evolution of markets is to consider them as strategic action ‘fields’. Third, I 
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suggest that rather than perceiving ‘economic theory’ and ‘technology’ as external to 
the strategic action fields of life insurance (as field theory tends to do), we should 
consider the entanglements between the ‘epistemic field’ and the ‘market field’. In 
order to make these arguments, the chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I 
briefly review the role of evaluation in economic sociology, a field that acquired new 
impetus in the 1980s with the emergence of ‘new economic sociology’. I then move 
on to discuss literature in the ‘new, new economic sociology’, which has more 
explicitly paid attention to the role of knowledge practices in shaping economic 
relations, followed by a section in which I situate the dissertation in the sociology of 
insurance. Next, I briefly review the ‘finitist’ perspective of scientific knowledge, 
and indeed knowledge more generally, and consider how such a perspective might 
help to illuminate the evolution of actuarial evaluation practices. In the fifth section, I 
address a common critique on the social studies of finance (the critique that it tends 
to obscure politics) by arguing that a finitist understanding of economic knowledge 
provides additional tools for understanding the politics of evaluation, which, I 
suggest, does not need to detract from its ‘macro-politics’. In the final two sections 
before the conclusion, I review the ‘markets as fields’ perspective, describe some of 
the features of actuarial science as an epistemic field, and suggest some ways in 
which it is interlinked with the market field of life insurance more generally.  
Evaluation in Economic Sociology and the Sociology of 
Markets 
Contemporary reconstructions of the history of economic sociology tend to carve up 
this history in three periods: a classical period, in which economic sociology featured 
prominently in the work of classical sociologists like Durkheim, Weber, Simmel and 
Marx; a stale period commencing in the 1930s; and, starting in the 1980s, a period of 
‘new economic sociology’, which approached economic topics with renewed 
sociological vigour (Swedberg, 2003; Beckert and Janoski, 2006). For classic 
sociologists, economic sociology and the interrelations between the economy and 
society was an integral part of efforts to understand society as a whole. This also 




somewhat limited. Most notable in this respect is the role that Weber ascribed to the 
emergence of double entry bookkeeping. For Weber (2001), double entry 
bookkeeping contributed to the rationalisation of economic behaviour, by focusing 
agents’ attention on the 'bottom line’ of economic transactions. What mattered, he 
argued, is that ‘an actual adaptation of economic action to a comparison of money 
income with money expenses takes place, no matter how primitive the form’ (Weber, 
2001, p. xxxiii). The economic rationality of economic agents was a historical 
construct, not given by nature.  
As sociology matured and the disciplinary boundaries between economics and 
sociology strengthened (Ingham, 1996; Velthuis, 1999), the tendency to historicize 
economic rationality faded. The jurisdictional separation between economics and 
sociology, sometimes referred to as ‘Parsons’s pact’, implied an analytical separation 
between economic accounts of ‘rational’ action and sociological accounts of ‘value-
oriented’ action (Stark, 2009; but see Beckert and Janoski, 2006). Proponents of new 
economic sociology sought to eclipse this division of labour, and argued that 
sociology should offer ways of understanding economic action, actors and markets, 
alternative to hegemonic economic theory.  
It is no surprise, therefore, that the theoretical programme of new economic 
sociology was framed in opposition to neoclassical economics. Most influential was 
the embeddedness paradigm, notably articulated in Mark Granovetter’s (1985) 
landmark article ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness’. Although there were already some important publications that 
retrospectively can be considered part of new economic sociology (Granovetter, 
1973; Zelizer, 1979; White, 1981; Baker, 1984), many now see Granovetter’s article 
as its starting point. Granovetter argued that the ‘atomistic’ view dominant in 
neoclassical economics failed to account for how actors’ embeddedness in networks 
of durable social relations enabled and constrained particular courses of action. 
Economic sociology, according to Granovetter (1985), should offer an alternative to 
prevalent under- and over-socialised perspectives on economic action by focusing on 
how network relations shape economic action.  
20 
 
In subsequent years, the embeddedness paradigm generated large amounts of 
sociological inquiry, in which scholars identified a multitude of ways in which 
economic behaviour was socially embedded (Burt, 1992; Uzzi, 1997; White, 2002). 
There was little room for the problem of economic valuation, however; there was 
little questioning of the rationality of economic calculation itself. As critics have 
pointed out, the embeddedness paradigm leaves the core of the neoclassical model of 
the economic actor intact (Beckert, 1996; Krippner, 2001; Calnitsky, 2014). An 
economic sociology of this kind thus explains how economic action is structured by 
the networked relations in which it takes place but it does not provide an alternative 
model of how economic agency and its calculative capacities are constituted.  
The embeddedness literature represents by no means the only line of research 
that came out of (new) economic sociology. In the United States, a variety of 
approaches emerged, which included, for instance, cultural economic sociology 
(Zelizer, 1979, 2013; Wherry, 2012) and different varieties of institutionalism 
(Fligstein, 1990, 1996; Nee, 2005). Similar to the embeddedness literature, 
institutionalists tend to focus on how implicit and explicit rules stabilise patterns of 
behaviour and constrain and enable particular courses of action, but less so on how 
the rationality of economic action is constituted. They focus, for instance, on the 
‘context-bound rationality [which] serves as the foundation for examining the 
emergence, persistence, and transformation of institutional structures’ (Nee, 2005, p. 
49). Cultural sociologists arguably go furthest in tackling the problem of economic 
evaluation by claiming that cultural factors may play an important role in sanctioning 
the legitimacy of markets (Zelizer, 1979, 1981), or by showing how the price of 
commodities may be imbued with singular social meanings (Zelizer, 1997; Velthuis, 
2003). Their focus, however, remains on how economic action is oriented by social 
values, not on processes of calculation.  
Another important line of research emerged in Europe, particularly via the 
sociology (and anthropology) of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu (2005) explicitly 
recognises that the economic actor assumed in neoclassical economics ‒ the homo 
economicus ‒ is a historical product. The means (rational calculation) and ends 




features of human beings, Bourdieu argues, but acquired competences. Key in his 
theorisation of economic action are the notions of habitus and field. While ‘habitus’ 
refers to actors’ ‘cultural equipment’ and embodied dispositions, ‘fields’ refer to the 
situations in which they are acquired and deployed (Bourdieu, 1997, 2005). Much 
like a gravitational field, a social field is constituted by the elements (or actors) that 
populate it, whose position in the field is in turn determined by their relation to other 
actors and their differential access to resources (or ‘capital’ in its different varieties); 
their position, in other words, constitutes their capacity to act, or power (Bourdieu, 
1997; Fourcade, 2007). Field theory points to the strategies available to actors given 
the specifics of a given field: agents may act in accordance with the rules that define 
the structure of the field, contributing to their reproduction, or they may seek to alter 
them. For Bourdieu, then, economic action is a deeply cultural and relational 
phenomenon that requires historical and sociological explanation. 
The notion of fields has found wider resonance in economic sociology, 
particularly so amongst the economic sociologists of the institutionalist variety 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 2001; Beckert, 2009; Fligstein and 
McAdam, 2012). Many now regard it as a potent alternative to the ontology of 
markets prevalent in neoclassical economics (Fligstein, 2001; e.g. Beckert, 2009). 
Although I agree with this, it should also be noted that the notion of fields as 
articulated in both Bourdieusian and institutionalist economic sociology tends to 
focus on how ‘the social world is present in its entirety in every “economic” action’ 
(Bourdieu, 2005, p. 3), but less so on the role of economic models and other material 
devices therein. In other words, it perceives technology as a process external to 
society (see below). To see how this tension may be alleviated, it is necessary first to 
review literature that explicitly deals with the problem of economic calculation. 
Towards the late 1990s, a new research programme emerged ‒ dubbed the ‘new, new 
economic sociology’ (McFall, 2009a; McFall and Ossandón, 2014) ‒ that sought to 
tackle this problem head-on. 
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The ‘New, New Economic Sociology’ and the Performativity 
Thesis 
The ‘new, new economic sociology’ – or STS-inflected sociology as it is sometimes 
called ‒ finds its roots in Michel Callon’s (1998) introduction to the Laws of the 
Markets, which, like Granovetter’s article, has become a point of reference for 
economic sociology. In his introduction, Callon (who was one of the key figures of 
actor-network theory) argued that the central problem of economic sociology was to 
explain economic action under conditions of fundamental uncertainty ‒ an argument 
that was shared by other sociologists (cf. Beckert, 1996). The solution proffered by 
the embeddedness thesis, Callon suggested, fell short of doing so successfully 
because it unduly asserted a separation between agency and structure, and, in so 
doing, was stuck again between over- and under-socialised models of agency.3 
According to Callon, an economic agent should not be understood as having an 
innate and rational calculative capability that needs to take account of an ‘external’ 
environment, but as an agent whose calculating capabilities at least partially depends 
on (or, perhaps better still, is constituted by) the environment. 
The roots of the performativity thesis in actor-network theory are pertinent for 
understanding how Callon perceives the role of economics in the construction of the 
economy – ‘economics’ broadly conceived as all forms of knowledge involved in 
processes of ‘economisation’, not just ‘academic knowledge’ (Çalışkan and Callon, 
2009). In a sense, Callon (1998) simply reinterpreted the ‘network’ of new economic 
sociology in actor-network theory terms. While network theorists tend to perceive 
the network as providing the individual agent with ‘resources’, actor-network 
theorists perceive agency as constituted by networks, or, what are sometimes referred 
to as ‘material-semiotic networks’ – networks comprised of both human and non-
human entities (Latour, 2005; Law, 2008). Following this line of thinking, Callon 
(1998) argued that economic reality does not exist independently outside the 
knowledge and technology that contributes to its making. ‘Calculativeness’, he 
                                                 
3 Such a separation was not implied by Granovetter, according to Callon’s reading, but came with later 
association between the embeddedness thesis and the Bourdieusian notion of social capital (see: 




suggested, ‘couldn’t exist without calculating tools’ (Callon, 1998, p. 23), and that is 
precisely what economics supplies. Economics, in other words, does not just describe 
economic reality from an outside perspective but contributes to its making by 
formatting the ways in which economic agents calculate. 
Like the embeddedness thesis in new economic sociology, the performativity 
thesis has generated a wealth of research on the role that economic knowledge and 
technology play in the ‘performation’ of the economy, especially so in the social 
studies of finance. Some scholars, for instance, focused on the role that technological 
devices such as telephones (Muniesa, 2007), computer screens (Knorr-Cetina and 
Bruegger, 2002), and the stock ticker (Preda, 2006) played in the enactment of 
financial markets. Others focused on the role of ‘economic knowledge’ in the form 
of, for instance, classifications and categorizations (Zuckerman, 1999; Poon, 2009; 
Wansleben, 2013), accounting techniques (Miller, 2008; Vollmer, Mennicken and 
Preda, 2009), and, indeed, financial economic theory (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; 
MacKenzie, 2006; Svetlova, 2009, 2012, 2018a). What these studies share in 
common is their focus on the concrete materiality of financial markets in order to 
understand how the capacities of agents like traders (Beunza and Stark, 2004, 2012; 
Hardie and MacKenzie, 2007), supervisors (Williams, 2009; Coombs, 2016), or risk 
managers (Millo and MacKenzie, 2009) are constituted.  
The performativity literature has by no means been the only approach within 
economic sociology that grapples with the calculative core of economic agency. 
Another, more recent approach takes ‘expectations’ as the central unit of analysis 
(Beckert, 2016; Beckert and Bronk, 2018). Under conditions of fundamental 
uncertainty, Beckert argues, actors establish expectations about the future that have a 
‘fictional’ quality; that is, they are constructions of the future that combine ‘empirical 
facts’ with assertions that go beyond the realm of fact. Economic expectations are 
thus not futures waiting to be actualised, but ‘present futures’ that help to organise 
present action. Economic theory aids in the production of such present futures. But, 
Beckert warns, ‘the influence of theories is manifold and unpredictable’ (Beckert, 
2016, p. 11). Hence, it is necessary to investigate how ‘credible’ narratives about the 
future are constructed and the role that calculation devices play therein (Beckert and 
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Bronk, 2018). As shown in this dissertation, however, not all devices need to be 
‘credible’ to have the capacity to structure present action (cf. MacKenzie and Spears, 
2014a), and not all evaluation practices equally engage with the future. Indeed, one 
of the practices central in this dissertation ‒ market-consistent valuation ‒ precisely 
seeks to circumvent the need to forecast the future by proposing a ‘synchronous’ 
analysis of the present (Langenohl, 2018). To examine insurers’ evaluation practices, 
this study thus adopts an approach more akin to the performativity perspective 
prevalent in the social studies of finance: one that is focused on the material 
manifestation of different forms of evaluation and understands ‘cognition’ as a 
distributed process.  
Knowledge Practices in the Sociology of Insurance 
A focus on the materiality of knowledge practices is not entirely foreign to 
sociological and historical writings on insurance. Indeed, much of this literature has 
been concerned with the concrete practices of ‘making’ risks (van Hoyweghen, 
2007). Insurance is often understood as a way of managing uncertainty by spreading 
the cost of adverse events in individual lives across a larger ‘risk pool’ (Ewald, 1991; 
Knights and Vurdubakis, 1993). Grouping together largely independent individual 
lives allows insurers to reduce overall uncertainty through the ‘law of large numbers’ 
(Hacking, 1990). This is the ‘insurance logic’: the transformation of individual 
uncertainty into risk by calculating the likelihood of a particular event using wider 
population data (van Hoyweghen, 2007; Lehtonen and van Hoyweghen, 2014). 
While it may be difficult for a single individual to predict how long s/he will live, 
predictions for population averages will likely be more accurate. Insurance risk, in 
other words, is diversifiable risk, in which benefits may be obtained from pooling 
together statistically independent lives.  
As scholars in the sociology and history of insurance have extensively 
documented, insurers do not just ‘pool’ together individuals but also classify them 
(Knights and Vurdubakis, 1993; Ericson et al., 2003; Bouk, 2016). Insurers 
differentiate different risk categories and seek to ‘price’ risk accordingly. The most 




dispute that an individual, aged 80, buying a traditional ‘term assurance’ contract (in 
which the insurer pays a sum assured upon death) with a sum assured of £100 and a 
maturity of 10 years say, should pay a higher premium than a 20-year old individual 
buying the same contract. The core principle at work here is that of ‘actuarial 
fairness’ – the moral notion that, in contrast to some solidaristic conceptions of 
insurance, suggests that insurance premiums should reflect ‘individual risk’.  
In practice, the ideal of actuarial fairness is not attainable due to various 
epistemic problems (Baker, 2000; McFall, 2019). For premiums to be ‘actuarially 
fair’, the characteristics of the population on which the premium calculations are 
based and the population that is actually insured needs to coincide ‒ a condition that 
in practice is rarely satisfied (Heras Martínez, Teira and Pradier, 2016), and is 
complicated by ‘adverse selection’ and ‘moral hazard’ (Heimer, 1989; Baker, 1996, 
2003). Much of the history of insurance has therefore been devoted to, on the one 
hand, the development of statistical techniques to make risk calculable, such as the 
development of life tables and pricing algorithms (Clark, 1999; Alborn, 2009; 
Turnbull, 2017); and, on the other hand, the development of risk selection 
mechanisms in underwriting practice (Porter, 2000; Ericson et al., 2003; van 
Hoyweghen, 2007, 2014; Jauho, 2015) and other techniques for ‘devising’ markets in 
life insurance (McFall, 2015), including marketing (McFall and Dodsworth, 2009; 
Lehtonen and Liukko, 2010; Lehtonen, 2014). Most recently, sociologists have 
focused on insurers’ recent initiatives to design behaviour-based insurance schemes 
(Meyers and van Hoyweghen, 2018; McFall, 2019). 
A core theme in the sociology of insurance literature is the governmental 
rationality or ‘governmentality’ underpinning insurance (Defert, 1991; Ewald, 1991; 
Knights and Vurdubakis, 1993; Dean, 2010). In this perspective, insurance operates 
as a technology of government, a ‘moral technology’ (Baker, 2000), which 
manufactures specific forms of solidarity, and may be used to pursue particular 
political aims. Solidarity, in this sense, refers not so much to a specific sentiment, but 
rather denotes a particular feature of concrete insurance arrangements, namely the 
ways in which individuals are bound together in an insurance arrangement that 
provides them with financial security. Insurance schemes can thus involve more or 
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less ‘solidaristic elements’ (McFall, 2019), either by design, such as in many 
healthcare schemes (Ossandón, 2014) or by necessity, due to the practical 
impossibility of charging ‘actuarially fair’ premiums (Meyers and van Hoyweghen, 
2018; McFall, 2019). Viewing insurance in these terms thus allows one to trace how 
different political rationalities give expression to different types of insurance 
arrangement and forms of manufactured solidarity (Knights and Vurdubakis, 1993; 
McFall, 2007; Ossandón, 2014).  
Paul Langley and others (Langley, 2004, 2006, 2008; Langley and Leaver, 
2012; Berry, 2016) have adopted this analytical repertoire to investigate how pension 
arrangements in the UK (which have seen a shift from defined-benefit to defined-
contribution arrangements) have become increasingly individualised, pushing 
financial responsibility and risk to the level of the individual. I argue that a similar 
development has taken place in contemporary insurance arrangements. However, 
while Langley relates the individualisation of risk to the prevalence of a neoliberal 
governmentality that aims to cast individuals as responsible investment subjects, this 
dissertation focuses on the role of evaluation practices as strategic resources in a 
competitive dynamic that led to changes in contemporary insurance arrangements 
from ‘within’ ‒ a view that will be further elaborated below.  
The main emphasis of this dissertation is on those evaluation practices that 
involve techniques developed outside actuarial science, most notably in financial 
economics. While historically insurance has primarily revolved around the 
calculation of ‘diversifiable risk’, the techniques that are central in this dissertation 
seek to quantify forms of ‘non-diversifiable risk’ (François and Frezal, 2018). In 
contrast to diversifiable risk, non-diversifiable risk refers to a situation in which there 
is a strong correlation between the events that are grouped together. For example, 
when investing the premiums of two separate policyholders in the stock market, the 
chances are likely that the value of one investment will drop if the value of the other 
investment also drops (and vice versa). Investing policyholder premiums in capital 
markets always involves some degree of non-diversifiable risk. Since the 1970s, 
insurers have increasingly sought to make forms non-diversifiable risk calculable in 




machinery to quantify non-diversifiable risk ‒ in particular through techniques 
borrowed from modern financial economics ‒ has had important implications for the 
ways in which insurance, as a mechanism to distribute risk across populations, 
operates. To see how, I will draw on some of the core arguments from the sociology 
of scientific knowledge  
Paradigms, Finitism and the Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge 
The performativity literature provides useful conceptual resources for investigating 
the influence of ‘economics’ on the operations of financial and insurance markets. 
Often absent from debates about performativity, however, is a consideration of what 
is meant by ‘economics’. Two common issues, in particular, have led to conceptual 
slippage: 1) a conflation between economics and academic economic theory; and 2) a 
lack of regard given to the nature of economic theory, which in some cases leads to a 
rather rigid understanding of economic theory and provides limited scope for 
understanding processes of epistemic change. In addressing these issues, I discuss 
some concepts that will facilitate the analysis of the evolution of insurers’ evaluation 
practices.  
The first, and more straightforward of these issues arguably finds its origin in 
the ambiguity of the French term for ‘economics’, économie, which at the same time 
also means the ‘economy’ (Muniesa, 2016). As a corollary, ‘economics’ might be 
taken to refer to academic economics, or, more broadly, to any activity and thing that 
participates in the making of ‘the economy’. Scholars in the social studies of finance 
tend to adopt the latter definition (Callon, 2007), precisely because a narrow focus on 
‘academic economics’ quickly leads to a ‘linear model’ of innovation in which 
theory is first produced within academia and then ‘applied’ outside it (MacKenzie, 
2017) ‒ a model that I wish to avoid.  
This leads to the second issue with common interpretations of the 
performativity literature: a lack of regard of the nature of economic theory. Many 
interpretations of performativity resort to a common sense conception of economic 
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theory, as having an ‘intrinsic’ meaning, which comes with normative prescriptions 
that can either be followed or ignored. This view is not only at odds with the 
(sometimes implicit) conception of economic knowledge that underpins some of the 
key works on performativity (MacKenzie, 2006, 2009), but also coincides poorly 
with empirical accounts of economic theory in action (Svetlova, 2009; e.g. Beunza 
and Stark, 2012). As the anthropologist Horacio Ortiz (2014) for instance showed, 
key concepts of modern finance theory may in practice have a variety of different 
meanings, each of which may become dominant as the situation changes.  
A fruitful way of understanding what economic knowledge is made of can be 
found in MacKenzie’s (2006) study on the performativity of option pricing theory. In 
this study, MacKenzie argues that the Black-Scholes-Merton model for pricing a 
specific type of financial option provided an ‘exemplary problem solution’ that 
indicated how similar problems could be addressed. The model, in other words, 
became ‘paradigmatic’, and the development of option pricing theory proceeded 
through analogical extension from one case to the next. In order to have an influence 
on the world, moreover, the problem solutions of option pricing theory needed to be 
‘translated’ ‒ to borrow a term from actor-network theory (Callon, 1986; see also: 
Sundberg, 2007) ‒ into concrete practices that may involve the use of technical 
devices that format the calculating capabilities of their users. In the case of option 
pricing theory, for instance, the Black-Scholes equation entered the trading floor of 
the Chicago Board Options Exchange in the form of paper sheets that allowed traders 
quickly to compare options prices. This translation involved not just the application 
of theory to practice (as in the linear model of innovation), but the analogical 
extension of an exemplary problem solution that involves the mutual construction of 
‘economics’ and the problem at hand. The paper sheets, for instance, incorporated an 
extra parameter (future dividends), which had been abstracted away in Black, 
Scholes and Merton’s initial problem solution (MacKenzie, 2006, pp. 160–161).  
MacKenzie’s conception of theory as at core a set of exemplary problem 
solutions is rooted in a ‘finitist’ understanding of scientific knowledge – an 
understanding that is prevalent in the ‘sociology of scientific knowledge’ (Barnes, 




1995). Simply put, finitism suggests that the meaning of concepts and rules is not 
intrinsic but is generated by their concrete application to specific cases. This may 
have some counterintuitive implications. Rooted in Wittgenstein’s (1958) philosophy 
of language, finitism proposes, for instance, that any behaviour can in principle be 
interpreted as to be in accordance with a rule. In reality, of course, this is not the 
case; there are social forces that prevent us from interpreting a rule in any way we 
see fit. As David Bloor puts it: 
According to meaning finitism, we create meaning as we move 
from case to case. We could take our concepts or rules anywhere, 
in any direction, and count anything as a new member of an old 
class, or of the same kind as some existing finite set of past cases. 
We are not prevented by 'logic' or by 'meanings' from doing this… 
The real sources of constraint preventing our going anywhere and 
everywhere, as we move from case to case, are the local 
circumstances impinging upon us: our instincts, our biological 
nature, our sense experience, our interactions with other people, 
our immediate purposes, our training, our anticipation of and 
response to sanctions, and so on through the gamut of causes, 
starting with the psychological and ending with the sociological. 
(Bloor, 1997, pp. 19–20) 
If meaning is not intrinsic to language but determined by language usage, this 
poses potential problems for attempts to elucidate the meaning of specific terms 
through language. If we are pressed far enough to explain the meaning of a word, we 
may end up having to refer to concrete examples, not just other words. Explaining 
the meaning of a term by other words may lead us into an ‘infinite regress’ in which 
the problem of meaning may be repeated ad infinitum (Wittgenstein, 1958; Bloor, 
1997). This infinite regress, finitism suggests, can only be put to a halt by social 
processes, not intrinsic meanings (Bloor, 1997, 2007).  
Extending this notion to the case of economics, we might say that the 
meaning of an economic theory or accounting classification is not determined by 
specific interpretations of the theory or the rules that constitute the classification, but 
is created in the concrete application of those theories and rules (Hatherly, Leung and 
MacKenzie, 2008; MacKenzie, 2008). A sociological account of evaluation practices 
would thus seek to identify the ‘social causes’ that shape the application of concepts 
30 
 
and rules in specific cases, particularly those causes that may explain the variation of 
specific concepts and rules across time and space.  
Although it is perhaps easiest to see how finitism may apply to a sociological 
investigation of rule following ‒ which is indeed what most empirical investigations 
have done (e.g. MacKenzie, 2008; Pardo-Guerra, 2011; Milyaeva, 2014) ‒ finitism 
provides the foundations for a general theory of knowledge, not just rules-based 
knowledge. It also applies to knowledge conveyed by paradigms. Rules and 
paradigms are often recognised as different things; indeed, many argue that 
paradigms cannot be reduced to a set of rules (e.g. Barnes, 1982; Daston, 2016).4 
Whilst a rule encodes behaviour by appealing to ‘commonly known’ terms, a 
paradigm provides an exemplary problem solution that indicates how a problem may 
be addressed and through which the theory may be understood. There are, however, 
also some important similarities. Although, as Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1995, p. x) 
argue with respect to scientific knowledge, it is indeed ‘difficult to specify what a 
theory is as an historically situated entity, and it is quite impossible to identify it as a 
set of statements’, it is nonetheless possible ‘to think of a scientific theory as an 
evolving institution’. That is to say, as the list of appropriate applications of a 
specific theory evolves, so does the meaning of that theory.  
In order to see how insurers’ evaluation practices may change, it is useful to 
consider the role of paradigms in post-Kuhnian accounts of scientific change. Crucial 
in such accounts is the way in which scientific theory is ‘learned’. Indeed, scientific 
theory can only be learned by working through a set of exemplars, through which a 
prospective scientist ‘learns the accepted similarity relations (Barnes, 1982, p. 52). In 
normal science, scientists actively construct the meaning of concepts by extending 
exemplary problem solutions (paradigms) to new cases and classifying observed 
phenomena as instances of one concept or another. They may focus, in particular, on 
‘epistemic objects’ – objects that are characterised by ‘a lack in completeness of 
being’ (Knorr Cetina, 2001, p. 190), a lack that researchers may seek to fill. In the 
                                                 
4 Following finitism, it may be argued that there is no fundamental difference between rules and 
paradigms; the differences between them thus have to be traced to social causes that prevent us from 




finitist account of normal science, then, the underdetermined nature of concepts and 
theory turns scientific activity into a fundamentally creative activity, no matter how 
much it may appear like mere ‘puzzle-solving’.  
In Kuhn’s (1970) account of scientific change, periods of ‘normal science’ are 
interchanged with periods of ‘revolutionary science’. As Barnes (1982) and others 
have pointed out, however, the notion of revolutionary science is what turned Kuhn’s 
account of scientific change into a ‘functionalist’ one. In this account, the anomalies 
that accumulate in periods of normal science will ultimately lead to a functional 
necessity for revolutionary change. I agree with Barnes that such an account provides 
little analytical merit, for it provides no basis for understanding what constitutes 
‘necessity’ and what it is that changes in a revolution (e.g., is it the general world 
view of scientists, or is it the ascendance of a new dominant exemplary problem 
solution?). The notion of revolutionary science can, therefore, ‘at best be no more 
than an empirical description of some selected episodes in the history of science’ 
(Barnes, 1982, p. 57) ‒ a description that needs to be explained by factors other than 
intrinsic necessity. This is indeed part of what this dissertation seeks to achieve: to 
explain sociologically why a key paradigm in modern financial economics became a 
central paradigm in actuarial science too.  
In sum, acknowledging the underdetermined nature of knowledge thus allows 
not only for an investigation of the social factors that shape the emergence of 
particular calculative rationalities but also for an understanding of how those 
calculative rationalities may change over time. In other words, a finitist 
understanding of knowledge thus provides a useful starting point for examining the 
evolution of evaluation practices in insurance by focusing our attention on the social 
causes that shape how exemplary problem solutions are extended from one 
application to the next. Similarly, it provides a means for understanding the social 
and political dynamics that may emerge as ‘paradigmatic’ forms of knowledge are 
translated into an explicit set of rules ‒ a topic that will be further examined below. 
First, however, I examine the implications of a finitist account of economic 
knowledge for how we could think about the politics of evaluation.  
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The Macro- and Micro-Politics of Evaluation 
The performativity literature has not been without its critics. An important line of 
critique has been that research in the social studies of finance tends to pay 
insufficient attention to the institutional politics of finance. By focusing on how 
economic theory formats calculative agency, some of the critics argue, research in 
the social studies of finance tends to reinforce the hegemonic status of modern 
finance theory. Hardin and Rottinghaus (2015) assert for instance that the field 
‘cedes too much to the dominant discourses of financial economics. It assumes that 
financial models are idealized visions of what markets should be’ (pp. 549-550). In 
focusing on the minutia of market practice, the social studies of finance thus lose 
sight of, or ‘obscure’ the broader institutional and political dynamics that shape the 
adoption of some forms of economic theory and not others (Mirowski and Nik-Khah, 
2007).  
In my reading of the performativity literature, however, it opens up an aspect 
of politics that is less frequently discussed in political economy. By focusing on how 
paradigms are extended to concrete problems, it becomes possible to attend to what 
is sometimes called the ‘micro-politics’ of finance (Power, 2007; Beunza and 
Ferraro, 2018). It allows for an investigation of the role that e.g. ‘interests’ play in 
the analogical extension of exemplars to concrete problems. Such research may aid 
our understanding, moreover, of how the ‘performative power’ (Svetlova, 2012) of a 
given body of theory is constituted. In some cases, the concrete usage of theory may 
be rather non-committal and thus have little apparent agency (Ortiz, 2014). In others, 
however, the agency of theoretical constructs may seem rather more ‘durable’, for 
instance, because a given practice is entrenched in the materiality and organizational 
structures of market practice (MacKenzie, 2006, 2009; MacKenzie and Spears, 
2014a). The performative power of a specific exemplary problem solution may thus 
increase as it is translated into – and becomes part of – the ‘knowledge machinery’ 
(Knorr Cetina, 2007) underpinning market practice, regardless of how credible the 




Focusing on the micro-politics of ‘translations’ thus provides us with 
additional means of understanding the politics of evaluation. One of the pitfalls in 
such an endeavour is to focus primarily on those cases in which the use of economic 
theory contributes to a convergence between the postulates of a model and the world 
it purports to describe (Bamford and MacKenzie, 2018). To understand the politics 
of evaluation, however, it may be equally important to focus on cases of 
‘counterperformativity’ in which the use of a model leads to the undermining of its 
key postulates (MacKenzie, 2006; Bamford and MacKenzie, 2018). This 
undermining may be the outcome of a variety of social processes. For instance, the 
use of a model may invoke behaviour that conflicts with patterns of action assumed 
in the model. Similarly, counterperformativity may be the outcome of ‘gaming’: the 
optimisation of returns given ‘risk’ (as calculated through risk models) and a set of 
regulatory constraints (cf. Funk and Hirschman, 2014; Stellinga and Mügge, 2017; 
Stellinga, 2018); or, indeed, the deliberate use of a model in order to avoid certain 
outcomes predicted by a model (Bamford and MacKenzie, 2018). Model usage and 
agents’ observations of other agents’ model usage (Esposito, 2013) are thus an 
important dimension of understanding the micro-politics of evaluation.  
When it comes to the relation between economic theory and economic 
practice, it is thus possible to discern two ‘levels’ at which epistemic politics may 
take place. One is at a level that corresponds to the type of institutional politics on 
which institutionalist accounts may focus: a type of politics that focuses on the 
ascendancy of ‘ideas’ (Blyth, 2002; King, 2005; Mügge, 2011), or ‘policy 
paradigms’ (Hall, 1993; Henriksen, 2013) as hegemonic reference points for the 
definition and resolution of policy problems. The other is at the micro-political level, 
where actors may seek to influence how a specific paradigm is translated into 
concrete practices of calculation. A finitist understanding of economic theory thus 
leaves space for more politics, not less. In addition to understanding how social 
forces like ‘interests’ may shape the uptake of particular forms of paradigmatic 
knowledge, it also enables us to understand how the meaning of theory itself is 
shaped by those social forces.  
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Markets as Fields, Evaluation Practices as Institutions 
The fact that a finitist understanding of knowledge provides space for both the 
macro- and the micro-politics of evaluation does not mean that research in the social 
studies of finance so far has paid sufficient attention to the macro-politics of finance. 
It is the aim of this section, therefore, to integrate a perspective on evaluation 
practices with sociological accounts of ‘market order’, and particularly with the 
notion of markets as ‘fields’. Although it is often assumed that there are some 
irrevocable tensions between the two approaches, some scholars have recently 
argued that insights from both approaches may nonetheless fruitfully be combined 
(Fourcade, 2007; MacKenzie, 2019). In making this connection between evaluation 
practices and broader field relations, I exploit an analogy that was hinted at earlier in 
this chapter – an analogy between scientific theories and institutions (Barnes et al., 
1995).   
Field theory provides a meso-level account of how social order may emerge 
and evolve in a given domain of social life, such as markets (Bourdieu, 1997; 
Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). It presents a relational view of actors whose position 
in a field defines their interests vis-a-vis other actors ‒ a position that needs actively 
reproduced ‒ and focuses on the role of state agencies in shaping the institutional 
arrangements that enable and constrain their behaviour. The central analytical divide 
is that between ‘incumbents’ ‒ actors whose interests tend to be reflected in the 
institutional structure of the field ‒ and ‘challengers’, who may seek to influence the 
rules of the game (Bourdieu, 1997; Fligstein, 2001; Fligstein and McAdam, 2012, p. 
13). The crucial analytical advantage of the notion of fields is its ability to account 
for the relation between social structures and agency. For instance, challengers are 
not just passive agents that stick to the rules set by incumbents; they may seize on 
events ‘external’ to the field (a technological innovation, or a political event for 
example) as opportunities for undermining the existing rules of the game. If 
successful, an alternative structure may emerge, which redefines who is on which 
side of the divide between incumbents and challengers (Fligstein, 1996, 2001; 




A crucial factor in explaining the dynamics of stability and change in 
Fligstein and McAdam’s rendition of field theory (which is most directly applicable 
here) is the notion of adjacent fields. Many of the resources on which incumbents 
may rely for the reproduction of the institutional structure of a field may derive from 
their relations to actors in adjacent fields. Most obvious here is the role of the state, 
which may itself be conceived of as a set of strategic action fields (Fligstein and 
McAdam, 2012). The relations to incumbent actors in state fields often provide a 
crucial resource for incumbent groups in market fields to reproduce their dominant 
position. Under normal conditions, this relation will typically be based on a 
congruence of interests between the incumbent groups in state and market fields. In 
some pivotal moments, however, state actors may perceive it in their best interest to 
link up with the challengers in a market field and to help them to undermine existing 
institutional structures therein. This may for instance be the case when there are 
changes internal to the adjacent state fields, such as shifts in the relations between the 
different actors groups and their positions within the field. Adjacent fields such as 
states thus often play a crucial role in the production, reproduction and the dynamics 
of stability and change in the evolution of market fields by incumbents and 
challengers with resources for strategic action within the field of interest (Fligstein 
and McAdam, 2012).  
Another important aspect of fields in stabilising interactions between 
incumbent and challenger groups is the existence of ‘internal governance units’, the 
organisations or actors that ensure compliance with the rules of the game. Although 
as Fligstein and McAdam (2012, p. 95) argue the main role of internal governance 
units is thus to stabilize the ‘original settlement’ of the field, internal governance 
units may ‘serve many other specific purposes’ too, including for instance the 
dissemination of information, the representation of field actors in state fields, the 
certification of professionals or the mediation of conflicts between field actors. In 
many fields, internal governance units thus play an important role in structuring the 
positions of different groups of actors and are therefore important sites for struggle 
between incumbents and challengers. Even if their existence is often justified by 
reference to the general interest of the field, incumbents often (though not always) 
retain a strong degree of control over internal governance units.  
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One of the key elements of Fligstein and McAdam’s rendition of field theory 
is that in many cases the ‘internal’ dynamics of a field are driven by ‘external’ 
events. Such external events may invoke episodes of ‘contention’, which ‒ ‘at least 
for a period of time ‒ can often feed on itself’ (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012, p. 22). 
External events, in other words, spark a dynamic in which a number of ‘social 
forces’ (cf. Martin, 2003) ‒ such as networks, institutions, ‘local cultures’, and 
‘cognitive frames’ (Fligstein, 2001; Beckert, 2009) ‒ interact with one another in a 
prolonged period of struggle between different groups of actors that seek to shape the 
structure of the field in their favour. Although Fligstein and McAdam (2012, p. 85) 
acknowledge that it may be ‘hard to separate the more incremental shifts and 
positioning contests … “internal” to the field from what is going on outside’, they 
nevertheless maintain that it is important to sustain this distinction.  
Field theory’s distinction between ‘external events’ and ‘internal dynamics’ 
has important implications for its treatment of the role of technology, expert 
knowledge and techniques of quantification in the structuring of the relations that are 
constitutive of market fields. Maintaining such a separation leads to a tendency in 
field theoretical accounts to preclude an understanding of how techno-scientific 
innovation often takes place at least partly within specific fields of practice. It is 
therefore at risk of endorsing a linear model of innovation in which theory 
exclusively develops within the narrow confines of academic practice after which it 
is then simply applied outside of it. At the root of this problem is the deterministic 
understanding of technological change that underpins most of field theory (see for 
instance: Fligstein, 2001, p. 4). This is problematic for an investigation of the 
interrelations between the evolution of evaluation practices and the markets in which 
they are deployed, and makes field theory seem at odds with the performativity 
literature. One of the theoretical novelties of this dissertation is to free field theory 
from its ‘determinism’ and to consider the evolution of evaluation practices as 
endogenous to fields. After all, ‘all field struggles are also, always, performativity 
struggles’ (Fourcade, 2007, p. 1027). Evaluation practices structure the social 
relations in a given field, and, as such, incumbents and challengers may strategically 




To see how evaluation may be regarded as an endogenous social force in a 
market field, it is useful to consider economic theory as a kind of institution, as does 
the finitist perspective reviewed above. In this view, the meaning of ‘theory’ is 
determined by the set of problem solutions that are considered ‘legitimate’, that are 
central in the epistemic field, and that serve as the standard against which other 
applications are measured. Not all participants in a given field may perceive the 
dominant set of problem solutions as ‘legitimate’. In the epistemic field ‒ which 
similarly to Whitley’s (1984) notion of the ‘intellectual field’ denotes a ‘general 
social unit of knowledge production and coordination’ that includes but also goes 
beyond the university-based disciplines5 ‒ ‘challengers’ may seek to reorganise 
epistemic practice around a new set of exemplary problem solutions, replacing or 
providing an alternative to the currently dominant exemplars. The process of change 
that may emerge from this, however, cannot be understood entirely as an ‘internal’ 
phenomenon, especially not in the case of British actuarial science – a hybrid field 
that is populated mostly by practitioners and just a few academics. This relatively 
hybrid character of actuarial science brings to the fore the importance of the 
institutionalisation of particular evaluation practices (Millo and MacKenzie, 2009; 
Henriksen, 2013; MacKenzie and Spears, 2014a; François and Frezal, 2018). The 
institutionalisation of evaluation practices may be the result either of their routine use 
by market practitioners or because they are prescribed by market regulations. Change 
in the epistemic and market fields is thus intricately entangled: on the one hand, the 
development of new calculative tools may provide actors in the market field with an 
opportunity to further entrench their interests or, in the case of challengers, may be 
deployed in an attempt to undermine the social relations in a field; on the other hand, 
the institutionalisation of particular evaluation practices in the market field may 
affect the structure of the epistemic field.  
Another (strikingly parallel) weakness of field theory and indeed economic 
sociology more generally is its formalistic conception of law and its role in 
structuring field relations. As Edelman and Stryker (2005, p. 529) point out, 
                                                 
5 In this thesis, I deploy the notion of ‘epistemic field’ rather than ‘intellectual field’ (Bourdieu, 1968; 
Whitley, 1984) to avoid conflating the rather pragmatic field of actuarial science with the broader 
intellectual space dominated by public intellectuals.    
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conventional economic sociology tends to treat law ‘as an exogenous, determinative, 
and coercive force’ that opens up and closes down particular courses of action that 
strategic actors may pursue. This formalistic reading of law, however, precludes the 
‘endogeneity’ of law, or the idea that ‘the content and meaning of law is determined 
within the social field that it is designed to regulate’ (Edelman, Uggen and Erlanger, 
1999, p. 407). In this view, law is understood ‘more as a rhetorical and symbolic 
resource than as an articulate mandate’, the meaning of which is constructed 
dynamically by the actors involved in its enactment (Edelman et al., 1999, p. 407). 
What it means to comply with regulation, in other words, is not just determined by 
the words of the law but also by the interaction between regulators and supervisors, 
and the regulated (Thiemann and Lepoutre, 2017; Thiemann, 2018). For the field 
theoretical account developed in this thesis, this implies that we should not just take 
into account how incumbent market actors relate to those state actors involved in 
writing rules and regulations, but also their relation to those actors (or ‘internal 
governance units’) involved in determining their appropriate application.6 
In sum, then, if we discard the technological determinism that underpins many 
field-theoretical accounts and if we leave aside its somewhat formalistic conception 
of law, a field-theoretical approach provides a useful resource for examining the 
interrelations between the evolution of markets and evaluation practices. The key 
features of this approach are: 1) an analytical distinction between challengers and 
incumbents; 2) a focus on the role of state agencies as part of the fabric of market 
fields, and, more generally, an appreciation of the role of ‘adjacent fields’ in the 
evolution of a market field; 3) a sociological understanding of technology, ‘scientific 
knowledge’ and law, which perceives them as processes that are at least partially 
internal to the field; and 4) a focus on the entanglements between the epistemic field 
and the market field.  
                                                 
6 Note that supervisors are a special kind of ‘internal governance unit’: they are state actors and 
therefore do not just reflect the interests of incumbents but mediate between state and market interests. 
As Singer (2007) notes with respect to capital regulation, supervisors are typically caught between 
two aims: they seek to balance international competitiveness of the domestic industry with the aim of 
protecting domestic customers from economic catastrophe (see also: Mügge, 2006; Thiemann, 2014; 




The Actuarial Profession and Its Role in the Governance of 
Life Insurance  
Although I argued that there are important benefits to the analogy between actuarial 
science and science ‘proper’, there are also important differences between these 
fields. Many of the articles published in actuarial journals, for instance, are written 
by company actuaries, not academics, and although there are some actuarial science 
departments at UK universities (notably at Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh and 
at City, University of London), professional organisations are crucial agents in the 
epistemic field. The purpose of this section is to examine the social organisation of 
actuarial knowledge production. 
Knowledge production is at the core of what life insurers do, and it is 
therefore no surprise that the history of the industry is intimately tied up with the 
history of actuarial science (Alborn, 1994, 2009; Bolnick, 1999; Clark, 1999). Life 
insurers typically sell long-term promises, the value of which may be contingent on 
numerous factors like future stock market returns, mortality, morbidity and operating 
expenses. To ascribe a ‘present value’ to such promises, various judgments need to 
be made. The genesis of life insurance in its ‘modern’ form finds its roots in the 
development of techniques like life tables and compound interest rate formula. 
Although life insurance was a thriving business already sometime before such 
techniques were developed (Clark, 1999; McFall, 2011), the development of these 
techniques significantly altered the way in which insurance companies were run and 
the structure of the products that they sold (Alborn, 2009). Key moments included, 
for instance, the publication of Edmond Halley’s mortality tables in 1693, the 
consecutive developments in techniques for constructing life tables and the 
development of early pricing formulas (Turnbull, 2017, chapters 1 and 2).  
As actuarial techniques developed, so did the profession. Crucial in this 
development was the Society for Equitable Assurances on Lives and Survivorship 
(more commonly known as the Equitable Life Assurance Society), which was the 
first company to introduce the ‘whole-of-life’ policy – a policy that in contrast to 
earlier life insurance contracts (providing protection for a pre-defined term only) paid 
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a ‘sum assured’ with certainty, regardless of when the policyholder would die. Such 
‘whole-of-life’ policies thus ‘transformed life assurance into a form of long-term 
savings vehicle’ (Turnbull, 2017, p. 50). The Equitable, moreover, charged flat 
premiums that, in accordance with ‘scientific principles, were based on the age of the 
policyholder at the inception of the contract (Ogborn, 1962; Dennett, 2004; Alborn, 
2009). It was also the first company to refer to its chief executive, Edward Rowe 
Mores, as an actuary (Ogborn, 1956). In the first half of the 19th century, actuaries 
were increasingly recognised as a specific professional group, and the skills needed 
for insurance liability valuation and premium calculation became increasingly 
associated with them. The professionalization of actuaries was further facilitated by 
the founding of the London-based Institute of Actuaries in 1848 and the Edinburgh-
based Faculty of Actuaries in 1856 (Ogborn, 1956; Dennett, 2004).  
Jurisdictional struggles are crucial for any process of professional 
institutionalisation (Abbott, 1988); for the actuarial profession, things were no 
different. Central in the profession’s struggle was, on the one hand, an attempt to 
claim special expertise by relying on the scientific allure of probability theory, and, 
on the other hand, the need to differentiate actuarial expertise from that of 
statisticians (Alborn, 1994). While the development of mathematical statistics and 
actuarial science had been distinct throughout most of the 18th century, by the early 
19th century they started to converge. While actuarial science borrowed concepts and 
techniques from mathematical statistics, mathematicians perceived actuarial science 
as an appropriate field to demonstrate the usefulness of core ideas (Alborn, 1994) 
such as mathematical expectations, the central limit theorem and Bayesian inference. 
By the mid-19th century, however, competition amongst life insurers had surged, 
which led both companies and policyholders increasingly to ignore actuarial advice. 
Within this context, actuaries struggled to position their expertise between scientific 
objectivity (as expressed for instance in the notion of ‘natural laws of mortality’) and 
professional judgment (which was needed to mark off a role for actuaries in the 
management of insurance business). By the end of the century, the actuary was a 
figure whose expertise was legitimised by having knowledge of mathematics and an 
ability to form judgments about the appropriate application of such knowledge 




The success of the actuarial profession has thus been dependent on its ability 
to obtain ‘epistemic authority’, which (following Barnes’s [1986, 1988] conception 
of authority as ‘power minus discretion’) may be defined as a delegated capacity to 
perform routine epistemic operations like company valuations.7 A pivotal moment 
for the actuarial profession was the 1870 Life Assurance Companies Act, which 
created a statutory role for actuaries in the management of life insurance business 
(Daykin, 1992). The Act required insurers’ to perform an actuarial investigation of 
their financial position every five years, or, for companies established prior to the 
act, every ten. In so doing, the 1870 Act established a ‘freedom with publicity’ 
regime, in which the valuation actuary was free to decide on the appropriate 
valuation methods, provided that the methods and assumptions were publicised. 
Supervision of insurers by public authorities remained marginal (Daykin, 1992; 
Turnbull, 2017). With the 1870 Act, actuaries thus acquired a prominent role in the 
governance of life insurance, which was reflected by the distribution of authority: 
actuaries were responsible for deciding on the appropriate valuation methods 
(epistemic authority) as well as for scrutinising the companies’ financial position 
(supervisory authority).  
The actuarial profession thus played a key role in the governance of life 
insurance. With the 1870 Act, the epistemic field of actuarial science was ‘nested’ 
into the market field of life insurance. Concomitantly, professional journals have 
served not just for sharing ideas amongst actuaries, but also for establishing norms 
about appropriate actuarial methods. Hence, these journals publish transcripts of the 
debates at the Institute or Faculty’s sessional meetings, where authors present papers 
before publishing them. Most of the research, moreover, is facilitated by professional 
organizations, which set up working parties that bring together actuaries from 
different companies (and later academic actuaries) to perform research on specific 
issues. In the freedom with publicity regime, in other words, responsibility for the 
                                                 
7 Barnes’s definition of authority as ‘power minus discretion’ fits somewhat awkwardly with the 
notion of 'actuarial discretion' that practitioners use to describe the freedom actuaries have to decide 
on the appropriate methods to do, e.g., statutory valuations. The difference, however, is that Barnes's 
notion of power implies formally unrestrained discretion, whilst the ‘discretionary space’ of actuaries 
is formally defined by statutory requirements. Actuarial discretion, in other words, implies a rather 
more limited scope of 'discretion' than that implied in Barnes's definition of power. 
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governance of life insurance was delegated by public authority to the actuarial 
profession, which sought to legitimate its private authority by forming a strategic 
alliance with statisticians and by appealing to a set of epistemic standards and norms 
such as actuarial prudence, rational argument and ‘freedom with publicity’ (see 
chapter 3).   
Although the actuarial profession was the key actor in the governance of life 
insurance companies for much of the twentieth century, this situation started to 
change by the end of the century, when the capacities of public agencies started to 
expand. Initially, this expansion consisted primarily of an increase in the number of 
actuaries employed by the Government Actuary’s Department, which was the main 
supervisory agent in the 1980s and 1990s. By the end of the 1990s, however, the UK 
followed an international trend towards the integration of banking and insurance 
supervision, manifested by the establishment of the Financial Services Authority, 
which opened up the governance of life insurance to professional groups outside the 
actuarial profession. At the same time, moreover, competition from the accounting 
profession intensified due to a wave of demutualisations and mergers (see chapter 4), 
which in combination with the shift towards statutory regulation (see chapter 5), 
contributed to the erosion of the boundaries between the adjacent fields of life 
insurance and banking.   
When the boundaries between adjacent fields are porous and when actors can 
move more easily between different ‘professional ecologies’ (Abbott, 2005), scholars 
in the sociology of professions have argued, the importance of professional identity 
may weaken (Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009). Under these conditions, it becomes 
increasingly important to focus not just on the role of particular professional 
identities in the governance of a field but to focus on actors’ coalition-forming 
strategies (or ‘hinges’) that lead to the formation of alliances or coalitions spanning 
across different ecologies and fields (Abbott, 2005; Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009). 
The ability of actors to form alliances across different professional ecologies 
strengthens their capacity to make claims on specific policy ‘locations’. Because the 
erosion of boundaries between adjacent fields will provide actors within those fields 




may actively pursue ‘hinge’ strategies that contribute to the (partial) erosion of 
boundaries between fields.  
Putting actors’ coalition forming strategies across fields and ecologies at the 
centre of our analysis of the evolution of evaluation practices brings to the fore the 
competitive dynamics not just between different professional groups (Abbott, 1988), 
but also between what MacKenzie and Spears (2014b) refer to as ‘evaluation 
cultures’ – groups that cross-cut organisations and have  
… an at least partially shared set of practices, preferences, forms of 
linguistic or non-linguistic communication, meanings and beliefs, 
which perhaps includes an ontology or a distinctive set of 
assumptions about what ‘the economic world’ is made of, together 
with a mechanism of socialization into those practices and beliefs. 
(MacKenzie and Spears, 2014b, p. 395) 
A focus on the formation of coalitions between actors who operate in different but 
linked ecologies that are moreover located in multiple adjacent fields, provides a 
model for understanding the actuarial profession’s internal struggles and its 
dynamics of change. It provides, in other words, an additional tool for understanding 
why certain evaluation practices may become dominant by focusing on the strategies 
of what field theorists call ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ (Fligstein, 1996). Actors, for 
instance, may put forward a new set of evaluation practices (which may be 
construed, e.g., by borrowing elements from ‘evaluation cultures’ dominant in 
competing professions and neighbouring fields) as the most effective means to 
solidify the profession’s jurisdictional claims. Different evaluation cultures may 
occupy the same epistemic field, with proponents of each strategically seeking to 
elevate theirs as the dominant tradition (i.e. to the position of incumbents) by 
forming alliances across different fields and ecologies. This perspective, I argue, 
helps explain why the no-arbitrage models of modern finance theory became 
dominant exemplars in the epistemic field of actuarial science.  
In sum, then, to perceive actuarial science as an epistemic field ‘nested’ in the 
market field of life insurance allows for an investigation of the interlinkages between 
changes in the dominant evaluation cultures and the ways in which evaluation 
practices structure the market field. The incumbent-challenger structure characteristic 
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of field theory is applicable in both types of field, but plays out in slightly different 
ways: in the market field, actors struggle for control over competition, while in the 
epistemic field actors struggle for dominance in epistemic production, and may seek 
to bring about changes in the institutionalisation of evaluation practices in the market 
field in order to do so. As suggested by the sociology of professions, actors’ ability to 
form coalitions among different professional ecologies – coalitions that may straddle 
across market and epistemic fields – is a crucial factor in shaping the evolution of 
fields.  
Conclusion 
To conclude this chapter, the theoretical novelty of this dissertation may be 
summarised thusly: this dissertation integrates a focus on both the concrete technical 
dimension of evaluation with a focus on the politics of markets by drawing on the 
notion of markets as fields and conceptualising evaluation practices as a social force 
that participates in the structuring of such fields. This perspective allows for the 
analysis of the dynamics within the epistemic field, the market field and the 
interlinkages between them. Central in the conceptualisation of cultural change in the 
epistemic field is the Kuhnian notion of paradigms, which (following the finitist 
tradition) refers simply to the exemplary problem solutions that are central in an 
evaluation culture. The epistemic field is then construed as a social force in the 
market field, where it interacts with other social forces such as institutions, networks 












Chapter 3  
Financial Risk as Epistemic Object 
In 1971, the Staple Inn Society hosted a rather unusual sessional meeting of the 
Institute of Actuaries. The meeting revolved around a paper presented by the actuary 
Sidney Benjamin, an active and well respected member of the profession who 
worked as a consultant at the newly established insurance practice of the actuarial 
consulting firm Bacon & Woodrow. Unusually (it was a long established convention 
to publish the papers presented at the sessional meetings alongside the debates in the 
professional journals), Benjamin’s paper was never published in the Institute’s 
journal ‒ the Journal of the Institute of Actuaries (JIA) ‒ and neither was the 
discussion that followed its presentation. Ronald Skerman, the Institute’s president, 
had turned the public meeting into a private one. Skerman judged that the contents of 
the paper and discussion were too sensitive for it to be discussed publicly. In his 
paper, Benjamin proposed to use a novel approach to estimate the value of a 
relatively new type of product ‒ a unit-linked insurance contract with maturity 
guarantees (explained below). Seemingly to his own surprise, Benjamin’s model 
indicated that such policies were far more expensive and a lot riskier than was 
typically assumed, something that few present at the meeting were prepared to 
accept. One participant later described it as the ‘stormiest I have ever attended’ 
(Smith in Corby, 1977, p. 274). 
The sessional meeting was the starting point of a decade long controversy 
about the nature of financial risk and the possibility of modelling the stock market. In 
many ways, the meeting was a symptom of the ongoing substantive changes 
experienced by the UK’s life insurance industry. Unit-linked insurance ‒ a particular 
blend of investment and insurance products ‒ first appeared in the late 1950s as an 
alternative model of insurance that, according to its proponents, would eliminate 
some of the ‘social conflicts’ that were built into conventional life insurance 
arrangements. How available surpluses were distributed across policyholders was to 
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be determined by the market, not the actuary. Rather than reducing the role of the 
actuary, however, the combination of investment and insurance shifted the focus of 
the actuary towards financial risk as an epistemic object to be investigated by people 
like Benjamin. Moreover, the approach that Benjamin suggested ‒ computer-based 
stochastic simulation ‒ meant a significant departure from traditional actuarial 
practice. In this chapter, I analyse the controversy that was initiated by the meeting 
and explain how it was shaped by the diverging interests of those involved and how 
it was resolved; but before doing so, I will provide some background on the 
emergence of unit-linked insurance.  
The Emergence of Unit-Linked Insurance: ‘Nothing to Lose 
But the Chains of Actuarial Thinking’ 
On February 9th, 1973, another remarkable meeting took place, this time at the 
Institute of Actuaries Students Society. The insurance entrepreneur Mark Weinberg 
addressed a crowd of actuaries as follows: 
I see unit-linked assurance not as a vehicle for making the Actuary 
obsolete, but rather as an opportunity to use his unique qualities ‒ 
through an opportunity for him to employ himself in weighing up 
complicated mathematical relationships, rather than to use his time 
attempting to resolve conflicts of interest of his own making or 
exercising social judgments which he is no more qualified to assess 
than a layman. (Weinberg, 1973, p. 20) 
In his opening remarks, Weinberg admitted jokingly that he was ‘not sure 
whether I am brave to be here or whether you are brave to invite me here’ 
(Weinberg, 1973, p. 1). Weinberg was the founder of Abbey Life, the first UK 
insurer solely devoted to unit-linked insurance, and, at the time he gave this speech, 
was a director of the second unit-linked company he founded, Hambro Life. Both 
companies sold policies that were significantly different from the ones traditionally 
sold by UK life insurers. Their ‘accountant-designed’ policies, although 
‘mathematically less elegant’, nonetheless eliminated ‘virtually all the conflicts and 
rigidities of traditional actuarial forms’, Weinberg claimed. For Weinberg, who was 
invited to the Institute’s Students’ Society to talk about the role of actuaries in 




implications for actuaries: while in conventional insurance arrangements actuaries 
performed crucial management roles, Weinberg argued that the core competence of 
actuaries was mathematics, not management. His talk at the Institute’s Students 
Society anticipated major changes in the industry, in terms of policy design as well 
as the role of actuaries in managing life insurance.  
Up to the 1960s, life insurers typically sold a mixture of ‘non-profit’ and 
‘with-profits’ policies. Such conventional insurance had its roots in the late 
eighteenth century, when, as noted in chapter 2, the Equitable Life Assurance Society 
introduced ‘scientific insurance’. In contrast to pre-scientific insurance (which was 
typically short-term ‒ e.g. one year ‒ and based on ‘flat premium’ rates that were the 
same for all policyholders regardless of age and gender), the premium rates of 
‘scientific insurance’ were determined by the ‘net present value’ of expected 
policyholder claims that sometimes could take place decades into the future 
(Turnbull, 2017). Based on predictions of mortality (given e.g. age and gender) 
actuaries would then prudently estimate the economic value of the policy and the size 
of the premiums needed to pay for it. The long-term nature of such contracts and (the 
overly) prudent estimations of mortality and interest rates meant that the first 
‘modern’ insurers quickly accumulated large surpluses. To release this surplus, they 
adopted a with-profit system in which with-profit policyholders would ‘participate’ 
in the profits (and losses) of the company. How surplus should be distributed, 
however, was an open question, a question that, according to Weinberg, would lead 
to a ‘long dispute’ out of which ‘the actuarial profession was born’ (Weinberg, 1973, 
p. 9).  
Thus, quite apart from pricing and product design, actuarial techniques played 
a role in distributing surpluses across policyholders in an ‘equitable’ manner. This 
was (and still is) no easy task, because in so doing, according to Weinberg, ‘conflicts 
of interest’ emerged among different generations of policyholders, between 
policyholders and shareholders, between life offices and policyholders, and between 
agents and policyholders. ‘One of the considerable achievements of the actuarial 
profession over the years’, he argued, ‘has been to find ways of coping with and 
living with these various conflicts of interest’ (Weinberg, 1973, p. 10). Crucial, in 
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this respect, was the ‘reversionary bonus system’. To distribute any surpluses, 
insurers would periodically announce an increase in the sum assured of the 
underlying contract, expressed as a percentage increase per premium paid. The bonus 
announcements, which were based on rather laborious calculations and took place at 
best every five years, became ‘a potent marketing device’, creating a tension 
‘between the prudent social practice of well-regulated investment and the 
choreographed drama of public spectacle’ (Alborn, 2002, p. 69).  
Reversionary bonus practices came under significant pressure in the 1930s 
and 40s. Inflation and interest rates fluctuated wildly in the first half of the twentieth 
century and the market value of insurers’ investments was rather volatile. As a 
consequence, estimations of surplus could diverge significantly from year to year. 
Insurers, moreover, became increasingly invested in equities, which further 
exacerbated the problem of estimating the size of companies’ surpluses. It posed the 
question of how surplus emerging in the form of capital gains (as opposed to 
dividends) should be accounted for. Lacking a clear answer to this question, various 
companies rapidly accumulated large undistributed surpluses. Thus, on the one hand, 
there was a perceived need to increase reversionary bonuses bringing actual benefits 
more in line with policyholders’ actual share of surplus. On the other hand, the 
precariousness of surplus estimations required a system flexible enough such that, in 
a period of declining market values, companies would not be stuck with irreversible 
reversionary bonuses that had been promised in better times.  
To counter these problems, life insurers revised their reversionary bonus 
system to include, also, a bonus the size of which was to be determined at maturity ‒ 
a ‘terminal bonus’. Terminal bonuses provided companies with increased ‘elbow 
room’ to see ‘that each policyholder obtained a fair return as he went out’ (Blunt in 
Benz, 1960, p. 11). Actuaries had long recognised the need to use ‘something more 
stable than market values’ in the valuation of assets and tended to use such ‘elbow 
room’ to ‘smooth’ policyholder benefits (Turnbull, 2017). In this view, an ‘equitable’ 
surplus mechanism was one that would dampen market fluctuations such that 
fortunate generations of policyholders would contribute to enhancing the benefits of 




through which the degree of such smoothing was to be decided were less clear. How, 
after all, should actuaries know whether capital markets were in a good or a bad 
state? Indeed, those less sanguine about terminal bonuses pointed out that ‘there had 
been virtually no explanation, either by companies to their policyholders or within 
the profession as to how those bonuses were determined’ (Barton in Melville, 1970, 
p. 347). 
The tensions in conventional insurance were further exacerbated by the 
increased post-war emphasis on life insurance as a ‘savings and investment vehicle’. 
Indeed, as Langley points out, investment apparatuses have increasingly displaced 
the calculative machinery and performances of ‘insurance and thrift’ (Langley, 
2008).8 But whereas Langley sees neoliberal government reforms as a catalyst of this 
shift, it appears that many of the necessary substantive transformations in UK life 
insurance already took place in the 1960s and 70s. Since then, insurance companies 
have increasingly diversified into selling ‘investment’ and pension products 
(Lehtonen and Liukko, 2010). Conventional insurance, a 1969 Economist article 
comparing different forms of insurance suggested, has an important weakness when 
used primarily for saving and investment: 
The conventional policyholder gets no assurance that all the profits 
earned on his share of the fund will go to him, after a fair 
allowance for the cost of covering the risk that he might die early. 
True, he shares in the profits earned on the without-profits policies. 
True, the benefits from income on reserves built up in the past. But 
he is not told how much of these combined profits have been 
stacked away for the future, instead of being allocated to him. 
(Anon., 1969, p. 14) 
The shift in emphasis from protection to saving and investment entailed a changing 
conception of ‘equitable’ surplus distribution, which reflected poorly on the role of 
the actuary as the final arbiter in surplus distribution mechanisms. Thus, quite apart 
from mitigating the epistemic problem of surplus distribution, unit-linked insurance 
                                                 
8 While Langley (2008) emphasises that post war insurance became increasingly focused on 
investment and less so on protection, it is important not to downplay the savings and investment 
function of early life insurance. Indeed, as Alborn argues, life insurers were amongst the ‘first fund 
managers’, whose investment practices formed an important aspect of attracting new business. 
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was presented as more ‘equitable’ and ‘fair’ mechanism for saving, while benefitting 
from the advantages of investment.  
The first insurers to sell unit-linked insurance contracts collaborated with unit 
trust companies – companies that were becoming increasingly dominant in the 
adjacent field of investment management. Unit trusts are the UK equivalent of 
American ‘mutual funds’, which first emerged in the 1920s, but would take off after 
the Great Depression. In contrast to investment trusts, unit trusts were seen as 
‘transparent’ investment pooling mechanisms, particularly in the US, that allowed 
small-time savers to dip into capital markets. Investors could purchase ‘units’, each 
comprising a basket of investments; hence ‘unit trust’. The first unit trust in the UK 
was Municipal & General, founded in 1931 and later became a subsidiary of 
Prudential. While unit trusts enjoyed great success in the US, they remained a fringe 
phenomenon in the UK well into the late 1950s (Morecroft, 2017, chapter 7). In 
1959, total assets under management by UK unit trusts amounted to £100 million, 
not much of an increase compared to the £84 million twenty years earlier in 1939 
(Morecroft, 2017, p. 250); in 1960, however, this figure increased to £191 million, 
and, in 1965 increased further to £500 million (Grant and Kingsnorth, 1966, p. 17).  
The increase in unit trust investments happened around the same time as the 
appearance of unit-linked insurance. The first unit-linked policies appear to have 
been offered in 1957, when Unicorn Trust offered 500,000 units that were eighty 
percent invested in ‘well-spread ordinary shares’ with the London and Edinburgh 
insurance office ‘offering an endowment policy based on the price of Unicorn units’ 
(Anon., 1957, p. 437). Not much later, in 1958, Northern Assurance started offering 
an in-house unit-linked scheme, albeit only to existing customers as a top-up to their 
existing pension plans (Anon., 1958). Over time, due to both marketing and tax 
advantages ‒ e.g. UK unit trusts were not allowed to market their policies door to 
door (Melville, 1970, p. 312) ‒ the contracts were typically sold by life offices, some 
incumbent, others, like Weinberg’s Abbey Life and Hambro Life, newly established. 
Designs of unit-linked policies diverged significantly, not only in terms of 
their underlying investments (linked to a portfolio of equities, property, bonds, or a 




The divergence, as described in an early actuarial paper on the topic, was 
characterised by ‘degrees of unorthodoxy’ (Bailey, 1962). Some actuaries opined 
that unit-linked contracts should closely resemble ‘orthodox’ policies and provide, 
for instance, protection against fluctuations in the market value of units by 
guaranteeing a sum assured of at least a fixed percentage of total premiums paid. 
Others, like Weinberg, argued that such ‘orthodox’ unit-linked policies contained 
‘most of the conflicts of interest and rigidities which had … been built into the 
traditional life assurance industry’ (Weinberg, 1973, p. 17). Galfrid Melville, who set 
up the insurance branch of the unit trust group Save and Prosper, similarly 
emphasised that unit-linked policyholders preferred unit-linked policies because it 
avoided such conflicts:  
In effect, intending unit-linked policyholders are saying to the life 
office involved 'We don't want your guarantees on investment. We 
don't want either you or your actuary to have to be bothered about 
the future of interest rates, nor about future capital appreciation (or 
depreciation), nor about short-term fluctuations in the market, in 
making your decisions about premium rates or surplus distribution. 
We just want you to credit the “savings elements” of the premiums 
we pay to your unit fund (or funds), invest these to the best of your 
ability, tell us exactly what you are doing and why, and give us 
exactly our share of whatever happens, good or bad, as determined 
in the market place. We want you to concentrate your thoughts on 
investment management rather than on its subsequent distribution.’ 
(Melville, 1970, p. 313)  
The unit-linked approach as envisioned by people like Melville and Weinberg 
thus ‘rejected’ the ‘reversionary bonus method of distributing surplus’ and it rejected 
‘the traditional role of the actuary as the all-important and mysterious custodian of 
such surplus, distributing it in amount and in form according to his judgment alone’. 
The unit-linked approach, in other words, would take ‘the market place to be the sole 
arbiter as to when and how interest and capital surplus should be distributed’ 
(Melville, 1970, p. 313). While some of the incumbent insurers started selling unit-
linked policies akin to conventional insurance, the management of several unit trust 
companies, which were typically run by accountants, set up their own life insurance 
companies. The accountants, according to Weinberg, tended ‘to be pretty hard-
headed, straightforward chaps, with a solid knowledge of arithmetic but no algebra’, 
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and, he added, in designing their policies, their ‘reasoning’ was ‘simplistic and 
mathematically unsophisticated’ (Weinberg, 1973, p. 18).  
Nevertheless, even the challenger firms did not completely adhere to 
Melville’s ideas. For example, Melville’s own office, Save and Prosper, had written 
unit-linked business containing ‘maturity guarantees’ (i.e. promises to pay at least a 
nominal amount roughly equal to the total sum of premiums at maturity). In his 
speech, Weinberg noted that ‘if you must introduce guarantees into unit-linked 
policies, you should make sure that they are guarantees which are so remote that it is 
almost inconceivable that you will ever be called upon to pay out under them’ 
(Weinberg, 1973, p. 17).  
At the time of Weinberg’s speech (February 1973), the guarantees offered by 
challenger firms indeed seemed remote. In the two years that followed, however, 
stock markets slumped, which made maturity guarantees seem much more likely to 
‘bite’. As a consequence, the emergence of unit-linked insurance did not limit 
actuarial enquiries to issues of mortality and expenses, as suggested by people like 
Weinberg and Melville, but rather expanded its scope to include financial risk 
embedded in maturity guarantees, a topic first explicitly discussed in Sidney 
Benjamin’s 1971 paper.  
Benjamin’s Probabilistic Approach to Reserving  
Benjamin’s paper departed significantly from traditional actuarial studies. Up to 
then, actuaries had not made any significant attempts at quantifying financial risk. In 
the nineteenth century, insurers invested primarily in fixed-income assets (Scott, 
2002), the major risk being ‘roll-over’ risk ‒ the risk that they would not be able to 
invest incoming premiums at interest rates sufficiently high to match the interest rate 
assumed in the ‘premium basis’ (the set of assumptions used to determine 
premiums).9 To protect themselves from this risk, actuaries treated it in the same way 
                                                 
9 Actuaries used a different valuation basis for different purposes. The basis used to determine 





as mortality risk, with actuarial prudence. In deciding on a valuation basis, they 
would pick ‘cautious’ assumptions for both interest rates (used to discount future 
cash flows to a ‘present value’) and mortality rates. When using a ‘best estimate’ for 
the likelihood of certain cash flows arising, one expects that in half the cases the 
premium income would suffice to cover the outgoing claims. When using a ‘prudent 
basis’, however, the perceived likelihood of income exceeding outgo increases, 
leading in most cases to the emergence of additional surplus that could then be 
distributed across with-profits policyholders. 
As noted above, the way in which insurers invested their assets changed 
significantly in the first half of the twentieth century, primarily because they started 
investing increasingly in equities (Dodds, 1979; Scott, 2002; a topic that is further 
discussed in chapter 4). Equity investments introduced a mismatch between insurers’ 
assets and liabilities. The timing and size of cash flows arising from equity 
investments (dividends and the capital proceeds of selling a share) are uncertain. This 
was not necessarily considered to be a problem for the solvency of conventional 
insurers (although, as noted above, it was considered problematic for the distribution 
of surpluses) if they invested only a relatively small share of their assets in equities. 
At least initially, it was also considered not to be a problem for unit-linked insurance, 
the underlying assets of which were sometimes fully invested in equities. The risk 
that claims would arise at a point when stock markets were in a dip was almost 
entirely owned by the policyholder, whose benefits were tightly linked with the 
investment performance of the underlying trust. The maturity guarantees on these 
policies were considered sufficiently remote.  
In his paper, Benjamin suggested otherwise. He argued that a different 
approach to valuation was needed to assess the degree of caution in the valuation 
basis, noting that the typical actuarial approach of choosing an interest rate for 
valuation ‘on a cautious basis’ had its weaknesses when applied to guarantees. In the 
actuarial approach, the valuation basis would be strong if the likelihood that real 
interest rates would fall below the chosen discount rate was considered small and 
vice versa. However, he continued,  
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It is not so clear what is meant by a strong or weak basis of 
valuation in a situation where the benefit is sharply dependant (sic) 
upon a fluctuating situation, but a corresponding approach can be 
built by using the concept of a ‘probability of ruin’ which is 
familiar from text-book examples of probability games and which 
is a central idea in ‘risk theory’ as developed especially by 
continental actuaries. (Benjamin, 1971, p. 5) 
Risk theory is a mathematical approach to evaluation problems that first 
emerged in Scandinavia.10 While in the nineteenth and twentieth century, British 
actuarial science had become relatively isolated from statistical theory, ties between 
insurance and academic mathematicians in Scandinavian countries were quite strong, 
particularly in the early twentieth century. At this time it was, for instance, ‘quite 
common for prominent university professors to work part-time as actuaries for life 
insurance companies’ (Martin-Löf, 2014, p. 8). Two of the most well-known 
mathematicians, Filip Lundberg and Harald Cramér, developed a modelling approach 
to evaluate surplus in general insurance business that pivoted on the calculation of a 
company’s ‘probability of ruin’ ‒ defined as the probability of a company’s reserves 
dipping below zero at any given point over the timespan of the contract. Crucially, 
they sought to do so by modelling the surplus of the company, subject to premium 
income and claims outgo, as a continuous random process. Benjamin sought to apply 
a similar approach to the modelling of equity-linked guarantees. As Benjamin noted, 
however, ‘the problem of long-term business has not received much attention [in risk 
theory]’ (Benjamin, 1971, p. 5).  
Using risk theory as an exemplary problem solution, Benjamin wanted to 
know what levels of reserve were needed to render the probability of the company 
ending up with a shortfall (i.e. the ‘probability of ruin’) less than 1/50. To do so, he 
sought to produce a model of the ‘fluctuating situation’ of the stock market that 
could be used to project forward future stock market returns. Rather than defining a 
model in statistical terms, however, Benjamin argued that, for his purposes, future 
stock market returns could be adequately modelled as a continuation of past annual 
                                                 
10 Apart from some ‘internalist’ histories, little is known about the sociological conditions in which 
risk theory emerged. Considering its later influence on insurance practice, this is a topic that merits 




returns recurring in random order. Using the De Zoete stock market index, he 
produced 50 simulations each projecting stock market returns forward over a period 
of 20 years, by randomly picking annualised return experiences from a pool of 51 
historic periods derived from stock market data over the period 1919-1970. Out of 50 
different simulation paths, he then picked the one that produced the worst result 
(corresponding to the 2% ‘probability of ruin’ threshold), arguing that firms’ reserves 
needed to be large enough to cover such a shortfall. For a ten-year unit-linked policy 
with a simple maturity guarantee, Benjamin concluded, ‘a suitable reserve [for the 
guarantee] … would be equal to approximately 25 percent of the present value of all 
future basic premiums in force’ (Benjamin, 1971, p. 29), a significant reserve that to 
most actuaries seemed rather excessive. 
As noted at the start of this chapter, Benjamin’s 1971 was never published. In 
1976, however, Benjamin would present an updated version of the paper at the 
International Actuarial Congress in Tokyo, which suggested an even stronger 
‘starting reserve’ of 30 percent. Benjamin acknowledged that the model’s results 
seemed ‘unexpectedly high’. Nevertheless, for Benjamin the results indicated that the 
combination of unit-linked insurance and maturity guarantees was ‘probably not a 
commercial proposition’ (Benjamin, 1976; Turnbull, 2017).11 Many remained 
sceptical and sometimes even hostile to Benjamin’s approach; his paper, however, 
did raise significant doubt about the adequacy of actuarial prudence in the 
management of unit-linked insurance and succeeded in putting financial risk on the 
actuarial agenda. 
‘A Drunken Stagger Around a Random Walk’ 
In the early 1970s, the Institute of Actuaries set up two consecutive working parties 
on maturity guarantees both led by Brian Corby, an actuary at the influential 
company Prudential. The goal of the first working party was to scrutinise Benjamin’s 
                                                 
11 In economic terms, maintaining such large reserves is considered to carry an ‘opportunity cost’. The 
firm’s owners could have used that capital differently, perhaps getting a better return on capital than 
when total capital investments for unit-linked business are considered. The amount of capital needed 
to finance particular lines of business is thus an important aspect of considering the commercial 
viability of such activities.  
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assumption that annual stock market returns were independent. The second working 
party was set up to recommend appropriate reserving practices. Neither of these 
working parties came to an agreement on these issues and their reports were never 
published. However, the issues they were formed to address ‒ how to model long-
term stock market returns and how to determine appropriate reserving levels ‒ 
provide a good indication of the two major dividing lines within the profession on 
the topic of maturity guarantees.  
The first issue revolved around the two-pronged question of the stock 
market’s behaviour and the possibility of modelling it. Benjamin’s suggestion that 
annual stock market returns were independent and thus followed a ‘random walk’ ‒ 
an assumption that by the 1970s was hegemonic in modern financial economics ‒ 
conflicted with prior actuarial beliefs. Although actuaries tended to have diverging 
beliefs about investments, most agreed that investment was more akin to arts than 
science (see, e.g., discussion in Day, 1966). Perhaps the dominant intellectual 
tradition within the actuarial profession was ‘fundamentals analysis’ (Day, 1966). 
Fundamentals analysis maintains that the value of investments is determined by the 
future cash flows that it generates and should, therefore, be analysed by looking at 
the companies in detail. The price of an asset, in contrast, depends on other factors 
such as investors’ expectations; because expectations may vary quite considerably, 
the asset’s price may diverge from its value. An emphasis on ‘fundamentals’ has 
important implications for the usefulness of historical information. Although in this 
view, past company performance may be considered a useful (though insufficient) 
guide for expectations about future profitability and estimations of value, historical 
prices are not. Indeed, as Day (1966, p. 259) noted, actuaries ‘find it very difficult to 
accept an approach depending on the past, for in so many instances the past can give 
no fair guide to the future, especially when Government policy and technical change 
can have such far-reaching effects’.  
Occasionally, actuaries also drew on quite a different intellectual tradition, 
that of ‘technical analysis’ (or ‘chartism’). Rather than focusing on stocks’ intrinsic 
values, technical analysts search for patterns and trends in stock price movements, 




future price movements (Preda, 2007). The chartist focus on stock price movements 
independent from fundamentals is quite contradictory to fundamental analysts’ 
approach. In contrast to financial analysts, however, actuaries are interested in long-
term aggregate stock market dynamics, which allowed elements from both 
approaches to be combined through the concept of economic cycles. While economic 
theory provided possible causal explanations for economic cycles (referring, for 
instance, to political cycles or processes of technological change), techniques akin to 
those used by technical analysts provided a means to analyse them (see Pepper and 
Thomas, 1973).  
Drawing on early statistical research on stock markets, Benjamin sought to 
analyse economic cycles statistically, not with chartist techniques. It failed to 
convince most actuaries. Members of the first working party tasked with 
interrogating Benjamin’s assumption of statistical independence argued, for instance, 
that ‘[i]ndependence is not a meaningful concept. … Statistical tests are essentially 
shades of probability, they cannot in general confirm or reject a hypothesis with 
certainty’ (The working part as cited in Corby, 1977, p. 260). For many, the 
hypothesis of independence did not match visual evidence provided by stock market 
charts. ‘All we need’, one actuary commented at a sessional meeting, ‘is to look at a 
long-term chart of the equity price index. Traditionally … the equity price index 
shows a cyclical formation … with something like a four-yearly cycle between the 
peaks’ (Plymen in Scott, 1977, p. 401).  
Some actuaries went ever further in their rebuttal of Benjamin’s approach. 
They rejected not only his assumption of statistical independence but also questioned 
the possibility of adequately modelling stock markets wholesale. Francis Wales, for 
example, commented that: 
it is one thing to postulate a mathematical model of the stock 
market in an attempt to determine the extent of the risk exposure, 
but quite another to claim that it is possible to simulate future stock 
market price movements. … [L]ike the first working party I am 
totally convinced that it is a fruitless exercise to attempt to find a 
satisfactory model of stock market behaviour. … [S]tock markets 
operate in a constantly evolving environment. That means that the 
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rules are always changing and thus the appropriate models must 
always be changing… (Wales in Corby, 1977, p. 288) 
Similarly, another actuary asked: ‘Is it really right to use the history of 1920 
to 1970 to assess future changes in prices? Or have things changed fundamentally 
during and since this period? I suspect that circumstances are different enough now 
in Britain to urge great caution in this’ (Grant in Scott, 1977, p. 394).  
Both fundamental and technical analysis thus provided intellectual resources 
from the adjacent field of investment management to refute Benjamin’s model. In 
subsequent years, alternative models were put forward. Two main approaches can be 
distinguished. The first accepted the need for a new approach to value maturity 
guarantees but rejected both the assumption of statistical independence as well as the 
more general probabilistic modelling framework. Dick Squires, actuary at the unit-
linked fund Save and Prosper, said for instance that ‘it may well be impossible to 
define a model to the extent of giving numerical values to the parameters that 
underlie it’; he argued therefore that ‘an extremely simple model’ would give 
‘adequate results’ (Squires, 1974, p. 20). In his alternative model, not the unit price 
itself, but a ‘trend line’ was deterministically projected forward at an expected rate of 
return. At each point in time, the actual unit price would be equal to the expected unit 
price in 50% of the cases and would be 30% above or below the expected unit price 
in 25% percent of the cases respectively.  
A similar approach was put forward by Corby (1977), who decided to publish 
his own suggested approach after his two working parties failed to reach consensus. 
Corby similarly suggested using a trend-line approach, but with the additional 
assumption that units were bought at the top of the range and sold (at maturity) at the 
lower end. The results produced by the model strongly depended on both the rate of 
return assumption as well as the size of the range within which the unit price was 
allowed to vary. The model was therefore rather flexible, allowing its user to adjust 
assumptions according to his or her expectations about economic fundamentals.  
Both Squires and Corby thus suggested using a heuristic approach that would 
not be realistic, but that would be simple, flexible and transparent. The trend-line 




quite considerably. Some noted that the assumption of ‘buying high, selling low’ was 
too conservative. Others argued that the model was based on the assumption of 
continued economic growth; when looking at economic fundamentals, however, it 
‘does not require much imagination to admit the possibility of negative growth’ 
(Taylor in Corby, 1977, p. 281). Most adamant in rejecting the trend-line approach 
was David Wilkie, whose objections were based neither on a fundamentalist basis 
nor on chartist grounds. A trend-line model, Wilkie argued, was ‘a malevolent 
deterministic model’; it was ‘as ludicrous a way of predicting share prices as to quote 
immediate annuity values on the assumption that everybody lives for precisely three 
score years and ten’ (Wilkie in Corby, 1977, p. 280). Elsewhere, he noted for 
instance that under the trend line approach ‘after some number of years … the 
probability of the price being lower than the price at the outset was zero’, which, 
according to Wilkie, was ‘obviously nonsense’ (Wilkie in Squires, 1974, p. 44). 
The second alternative approach, however, was not quite as radical in its 
rejection of Benjamin’s model ‒ it stuck to his ‘probability of ruin’ approach ‒ but 
did divert from the independence assumption. William Scott conceded that ‘chart 
studies of the type popular with financial journalists are of real value in detecting 
longer-term stock market trend’ (Scott, 1977, p. 373). Such charts were proof, for 
him, that stock market returns were not random, which he sought to corroborate 
using further statistical tests. Where Benjamin did not find any correlation between 
consecutive index values, Scott did find evidence for it and concluded that ‘yearly 
stock market movements are not random, but negatively correlated’ over a period of 
two years (Scott, 1977, p. 366) ‒ that is, the probability of an above average return 
diminished if the return two years earlier exceeded expectations. He noted, however, 
that a ‘mathematical model’ with negative correlation ‘becomes so complicated as to 
be, in our view, of dubious practical worth’ (Scott, 1977, p. 375). While Scott’s own 
model elaborated Benjamin’s approach by fitting a lognormal distribution to the 
historically observed stock market returns (rather than drawing from a pool of 
historically experience returns), he did not seek to include negative autocorrelation in 
the model. Instead, he simply decided to lower the model’s standard deviation to 
account for the difference between observed market values and the ‘true price’ of a 
stock, the latter ‘very likely to be less erratic’ (Scott, 1977, p. 375). Rather than using 
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a standard deviation of 19% under the assumption of independence, Scott proposed 
to use a standard deviation of 10%.  
Wilkie elaborated Scott’s model. He noted that he was glad to see Scott stuck 
to Benjamin’s general modelling framework but also noted that some aspects of it 
were not justified. In particular, he criticised Scott’s assumption that negative auto-
correlation could be approximated by simply reducing the standard deviation of a 
lognormal model. Scott justified this by arguing that such dampened variation would 
be closer to ‘true prices’. Wilkie dismissed this justification by asking: 
Do any of the companies that issue these policies and pay out 
claims buy and sell units at true prices? I thought that they bought 
units at market price and sold units at market price and what true 
prices ‒ whatever they may be ‒ have got to do with this I don’t 
know’. (Wilkie in Scott, 1977, p. 409) 
In a brief research note published in response to Scott’s paper, Wilkie updated 
the former’s model to accommodate for autocorrelation, noting that ‘to include this 
relationship into the simulation program is a trivial exercise’ (Wilkie, 1977, p. 20). It 
was an adjustment that made the model more palatable to the broader actuarial 
community. He furthermore incorporated additional stock market data to include data 
from the rather volatile period 1971-1975, which implied a significantly higher 
standard deviation.  
The results produced by the different models diverged greatly. For an 
endowment policy with a maturity of ten years, Benjamin’s model indicated required 
reserves at inception between 20%-25% (a later version of his paper presented at the 
International Actuarial Conference in Tokyo rather suggested reserves of 30%). Both 
Squires and Scott’s model indicated somewhat lower reserves of around 15%. Corby 
suggested using calibrations of his model that would bring it in line with Benjamin’s 
1971 paper. Even though Wilkie allowed for negative correlation of stock market 
returns (which would suggest reduced reserves), his model produced the strongest 
reserves, significantly in excess of those put forward by Benjamin around 40%-50%.  
In 1977, the issue was far from settled. A new joint Institute and Faculty 




reasonable standards of caution and coherence’ (Ford et al., 1980, p. 114). The 
Maturity Guarantees Working Party made every attempt at tackling the approach as 
rigorously as possible, or, at least, convince others they had done so. In its final 
report published in January 1980 (commissioned to be published in August 1978), 
the working party noted that ‘the amount of paper work produced, excluding 
enormous quantities of computer output, is well over a foot high’ (Ford et al., 1980, 
p. 103). The report itself was considered quite important and was published with 
some haste: it was published ahead of schedule in a dedicated issue of the JIA.  
The working party continued along the lines set out in Benjamin, Scott and 
Wilkie’s earlier work, which is not surprising considering that both Wilkie and 
Benjamin took part in it.12 Nevertheless, the working party’s proposed model 
differed from earlier work in important respects. Instead of modelling stock market 
returns as a single stochastic process, the working party opted for a ‘two-model 
approach’, in which dividends would be modelled as a ‘random walk’ with a non-
zero mean, and yields would be represented by an autoregressive model, fluctuating 
‘around a fixed mean’. The net result was a model that represented prices as ‘a 
drunken stagger around a random walk’ (Wilkie interview). Not everyone agreed the 
model was suited for practical use. Nevertheless, it quickly became the main industry 
standard for evaluating maturity guarantees on unit-linked products.  
Simulation Modelling and the Broader Epistemic Field of 
Actuarial Science 
The emergence of unit-linked insurance thus raised a series of questions about how 
stock market behaviour should be modelled – questions that were relatively new in 
the field of actuarial science in the 1970s. The topic, moreover, touched upon several 
broader issues within actuarial science, including, for instance, the role of computing 
power in actuarial work and, as indicated in Weinberg’s speech, the place of actuarial 
discretion in the management of life insurance business. In order to understand how 
                                                 
12 The working party was chaired by Hambro Life’s Alan Ford, and further included Ford’s colleague 
Phil Smith, David Hager, who was a colleague of Benjamin from Bacon & Woodrow, David Loades, 
who was a delegate from the Government’s Actuary Department, and three others. 
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the model of the Maturity Guarantees Working Party became the dominant exemplar 
for unit-linked guarantees, but not for conventional insurance, it is necessary to place 
the debate about maturity guarantees on unit-linked insurance within broader debates 
in the epistemic field. I argue, for instance, that the diverging views on the maturity 
guarantees issue can (at least partially) be explained by actuaries’ commitment to 
computing technology, and their familiarity with mathematical statistics and risk 
theory.  
As documented in great detail for the US actuarial profession by JoAnne 
Yates (1999, 2004) and in slightly less detail for the UK’s profession by Laurie 
Dennett (2004, pp. 63–70), life insurance companies were amongst the ‘early 
adaptors’ of computing technology, even though in prior decades they had been slow 
to adopt tabulating equipment. Actuaries played an active role in advocating the 
benefits of computing technology. In 1953, the Institute of Actuaries set up an 
Electronic Computers Committee chaired by Kenneth Usherwood, an actuary at 
Prudential. While the committee sought to explore the potential capabilities of the 
various computer designs, it also ‘sought to make the manufacturers aware of the 
needs of the actuarial profession with a view to influencing design’ (Dennett, 2004, 
p. 66). Two years later, the Institute set up seven separate study groups, one of which 
was tasked with maintaining links with British computer manufacturers. Yates (1999, 
2004) explains this early interest in computing technology by looking at the 
conditions in which many companies found themselves in post-war times. While 
business volumes grew significantly and the need for clerical capacity to process 
information increased with it, the labour market had grown increasingly tight with 
surging labour costs as a result. Similar conditions prevailed in the UK. In the period 
1937-1953 annual premium incomes of both ordinary and industrial life assurance 
more than doubled (Johnston and Murphy, 1957, p. 111). Within this context, 
computing technology was primarily perceived as a means to speed up work and to 
reduce operational costs (Lewin et al., 1989; Yates, 2004).  
The two major proponents of simulation modelling, Benjamin and Wilkie, 
were also advocates of computing technology. Particularly Benjamin’s professional 




Benjamin, who was employed by Prudential, went back to Cambridge (where he, like 
many fellows, had obtained his first degree in mathematics) at the insistence of his 
mentor Kenneth Usherwood to take a course in programming. He later briefly 
worked for Ferranti Computers as a contributor to the Cambridge University Atlas 
project to ‘develop his knowledge of computing’, before moving in 1962 to the 
actuarial consulting firm Bacon & Woodrow where he would remain an active 
advocate of computing technology (Lever, 1992, p. 383). In 1961, Benjamin set up 
and ran a programming course at the Institute’s Students Society, consisting of ‘12 
fortnightly lectures each of two hours, with several hours of homework between 
lectures, and a final practical of two sessions on a machine’ (Benjamin, 1964, p. viii). 
Hoping to ‘fill perhaps 25 to 30 places’, the course was oversubscribed with ‘over 70 
applications’ (Benjamin, 1964, p. viii). Wilkie had ‘worked with programming on 
computers one way or another’ ever since the company he worked for at the time, 
Scottish Widows, had purchased a computer in about 1960. A few years later, he 
would publish a rather bulky paper describing the ‘procedures adopted by [his] 
company in setting up a computer system with magnetic tape files to provide 
valuation and other statistical information for ordinary assurances’ (Wilkie, 1964, p. 
89). Although less active as an advocate of computing technology within the 
profession, Wilkie did have specialist knowledge of statistics, which aroused his 
interest in the affordances of the computer: he had taken ‘a specialist course on 
statistics’ and had therefore done ‘a lot more statistics than most actuaries’ (Wilkie 
interview). After having met Benjamin in the latter’s employment at Ferranti, the two 
became friends. As Wilkie recalls, Benjamin ‘was very good at seeing what you 
could use the computer for’ and Wilkie soon ‘started noticing’ that you could ‘do a 
lot of mathematical things that were … obviously not impossible to do by hand, but 
that were not worth doing by hand’ (Wilkie interview).  
Initially, the impact of computing technology on life insurers’ organisational 
practices remained limited. As Yates (1999) puts it, pre-existing practices 
‘structured’ how computers were adopted. In the early years, the costly and bulky 
mainframe computers were mainly used as ‘data processing’ devices. In so doing, 
computing technology often struggled to live up to the promise to reduce the cost of 
clerical work. As Benjamin noted: ‘at any point of time a conventional costing has 
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usually shown that a changeover to computers is at best only marginally worth while’ 
(Benjamin, 1966, p. 134). This raised questions about the usefulness of computing 
technology and urged advocates to find novel uses. In 1963, Benjamin published 
what he called ‘a propaganda attempt to counterbalance the emphasis on data-
processing applications which there has been in the past’, which he regarded ‘an 
unfortunate mistake’; indeed, he continued, ‘[c]omputers can be regarded as glorified 
desk calculators or high-speed punched-card machinery but this misses the real 
potential of the qualitative difference between computers and earlier machinery’ 
(Benjamin, 1963, p. 7). Wilkie similarly ‘started looking around for ways of using it 
[computing technology], rather than just replicating the previous clerical systems’ 
(Wilkie interview). Advocates of computing technology thus perceived simulation 
modelling as a potential justification for expenses; the maturity guarantees on unit-
linked policies appeared as an important problem that could validate the need for 
simulation modelling.  
Benjamin and Wilkie’s proposals fitted somewhat awkwardly with the 
profession’s emphasis on expert judgment and the discretionary space typically 
afforded to actuaries. The two actuaries perceived ‘formalisation’ as an advantage 
because it allowed for the degree of actuarial prudence to be measured explicitly. 
When the Maturity Guarantees Working Party published its report, most actuaries 
accepted there were some benefits to simulation modelling. Yet, many remained 
sceptical about extrapolating history into the future. Such an approach depended on a 
‘belief’ in the ‘uniformity of nature’, the ‘belief that everything that has happened or 
will happen is an instance of some general law to which there are no exceptions’ 
(Limb in Benjamin et al., 1980, p. 228). Actuaries tended to agree, however, that at 
least some of the observed variation was non-random. In replying to Benjamin’s 
1966 paper, Bobby Beard, a general insurance actuary (this was rather uncommon) 
from Pearl Assurance who had co-authored a textbook on risk theory, argued that 
Benjamin’s enthusiasm for computing was ‘reason for a cautious approach to his 
ideas’. According to him, actuarial judgment had previously served an important 




Actuarial techniques, as developed for life insurance purposes, had 
been developed on the principle of making calculations on the 
basis of expected values of the various functions entering into the 
calculations and relying on judgment to allow for variables not 
specifically included in the underlying models. It had generally 
been considered that the non-random variation was considerably 
more significant than the random variation in the functions used, 
for instance, mortality, and thus judgment was a necessary part of 
an actuarial knowhow. (Beard in Benjamin, 1966, p. 181) 
Beard hit upon a crucial point. Diversifiable risk, such as mortality risk, had 
traditionally been the bigger risk in insurance (see chapter 2). With the emergence of 
unit-linked insurance, however, non-diversifiable risk became increasingly 
important. Although variation in capital market returns seemed random, the question 
remained to what extent actuarial judgment was needed to account for non-random 
variation. It was a question that concerned not just the maturity guarantees but also 
the nature of actuarial expertise and the constraints on actuarial discretion that came 
with it.  
This picture was further complicated by the practical need for company 
actuaries to decide on appropriate levels of reserve. Many of the actuaries working at 
unit-linked companies initially responded to Benjamin’s paper by emphasising that 
past experience could not simply be extrapolated into the future and that reserving 
therefore required expert judgment about what the future would hold. This is not 
surprising, considering the fact that the new simulation models implied that reserves 
had been inadequate ‒ a message that many actuaries were not keen on delivering to 
company management.  
In the 1970s, moreover, few actuaries were familiar with the simulation 
techniques deployed by Benjamin and the ‘risk theory’ from which it derived. The 
first English textbook on risk theory was published in 1969 and was co-authored by 
Bobby Beard and two Finnish colleagues, Teivo Pentikäinen and Erkki Pesonen. 
Risk theory was first discussed at the Faculty of Actuaries in 1970 when the 
statistician Robin Plackett exposed some of its elementary concepts in an address to 
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the profession.13 In response to Plackett’s talk, one speaker expressed a feeling he 
suspected some of the other actuaries present would share with him: ‘the feeling of 
being lost in this particular subject’ (McKinnon in Plackett, 1970, p. 352). The fact 
that the mathematics underpinning risk theory and the techniques required for its 
implementation through computer simulation were foreign to many actuaries also 
surfaced repeatedly in the sessional meetings at which the maturity guarantees were 
discussed. In response to Scott’s paper, for instance, one actuary noted that 
‘mathematical concepts beyond my comprehension are used’ (Russell in Scott, 1977, 
p. 400). At the Institute, Colin Seymour recalled, how in the early 1970s the 
‘Scandinavians with their modern risk theories were an unheard-of mystery’, and 
‘perhaps’, he continued, ‘many of us are still rather daunted by such high level 
statistics’ (Seymour in Corby, 1977, p. 284). 
Actuaries’ unfamiliarity with the mathematical and computational techniques 
used by Benjamin led many to use the more familiar ‘deterministic’ approaches. 
Dick Squires, for instance, was in need of a quick, practical solution to the problem 
that he could use to convince the management of his firm, Save and Prosper, of the 
need for additional reserves. He therefore preferred a model that was ‘not intended as 
an accurate representation of market behaviour, [but] simply as a tool for estimating 
premiums and reserves’. Nevertheless, despite the relative absence of familiarity 
with simulation modelling and risk theory and opposing views on the modelling of 
unit-linked guarantees, the modelling work of the Maturity Guarantees Working 
Party became widely accepted in the actuarial field as the dominant problem 
solution. In the next section, I examine the strategies that were deployed to achieve 
this.  
Generating Consensus in the Epistemic Field 
The entanglements between the epistemic field of actuarial science and the market 
field of life insurance provide a strong push towards resolving conflicts such as the 
                                                 
13 British actuaries might have also encountered risk theory in an international context: the 
International Actuarial Assocation founded a group focused on general insurance (ASTIN) in the 




one about unit-linked guarantees. As noted in chapter 2, with the emergence of the 
‘freedom with publicity’ regime in the late 19th century, the actuarial profession 
acquired ‘epistemic’ and ‘supervisory’ authority and actuarial science became 
‘nested’ into the market field of life insurance. The legitimacy of actuaries’ authority 
was grounded in their ability to check opportunistic behaviour with the development 
norms through rational argument. 
The issue of maturity guarantees posed a potential threat to the legitimacy of 
actuarial expertise. Pressure on the actuarial profession had mounted by the mid-
1970s. After a stock market slump, several insurance companies that had sold 
‘guaranteed income bonds’ got into trouble. In particular, the collapse of the mid-
sized life insurance fund Nation Life contributed to public pressure on the lack of 
formalised actuarial knowledge. For example, The Economist (Anon., 1974, p. 86) 
cited the ‘absence of an actuarial code of practice’ as an ‘important reason why these 
companies boomed and bust’. It also led to pressure from the Department of Trade 
and Industry, which was the formal insurance regulator, and the Government 
Actuary’s Department, which carried out the limited supervisory activities and 
advised on regulation (see: Daykin, 1992; see also chapter 5). Representatives from 
the Government Actuary’s Department participated in the profession’s sessional 
meetings, where they emphasized the need for closure, but refrained from advocating 
a particular approach. In an exemplary case, for instance, the Government Actuary 
Edward Johnston commented in the discussion of Corby’s paper that: 
that there is no general agreement on the mechanical models which 
should be used for assessing … reserves. I am certainly not going 
to venture any opinion on which mathematical model is right, but 
there does have to be a practical answer to this question because 
companies do have to set up reserves of some size or other. 
(Johnston in Corby, 1977, p. 284) 
The issue of maturity guarantees potentially threatened not only the 
legitimacy of actuarial expertise but also the financial wellbeing of companies that 
had little to do with them. Wilkie estimated, for instance, that maturity guarantees 
were indeed a collective problem. He estimated that roughly £2,000 million worth of 
maturity guarantees had been written and that companies were ‘short of around 
£1,000 million of reserves’. The maturity guarantees that had already been written, 
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he continued to argue, therefore posed a ‘practical problem’ for both the ‘Department 
of Trade’ as well as for ‘other life assurance companies because … they are going to 
foot the bill when the companies writing this business ‒ if they go bust ‒ do go bust. 
So it is up to all life offices as well to think about how it should be done’ (Wilkie in 
Corby, 1977, p. 412). This further emphasised the need for closure. 
Many also agreed, however, that a resolution should be based on the merit of 
argument. Hambro’s actuary Phil Smith argued, for instance, that ‘regulations should 
not be made until we have solved the problem’ (Smith in Corby, 1977, p. 275); 
similarly, Peter Turvey expressed the hope that ‘common agreement’ would be found 
‘before we are compelled by new regulations’ (Turvey in Corby, 1977, p. 287). To 
understand how the debate was resolved, therefore, it is important to take a closer 
look at the discursive interactions taking place in the sessional meetings. Many of the 
arguments that were put forward did not only address the content of the mechanical 
models in themselves, but placed such models in the broader context of actuarial 
practice and sought to extend existing norms and practices through analogical 
reasoning in an assessment of the proposed methods.  
Consider for example this common defence of the deterministic approach by 
Andrew Wilson. Wilson argued that there was much to be said for the simplicity of 
the deterministic approach. Reserve valuations, after all, were at least partly intended 
to convince external stakeholders of the adequacy of a firm’s reserves. A ‘method 
that is readily checked by another actuary’, which allowed ‘the relative strengths of 
two offices’ to be compared ‘easily’, and which could be ‘understood by lay 
observers’ was to be preferred above more complex simulation models. Furthermore, 
Wilson argued that a simulation approach would have important implications for 
how funds were managed: the necessary reserves would fluctuate with changes in the 
stock market index, forcing insurers to increase reserves in times when the index was 
low and allowing them to decrease them when the latter was high. In contrast, a 
simpler deterministic approach ensured that ‘reserves are stable and do not fluctuate 
violently’ and allowed them to ‘increase gradually while the market is high and 




Wilson, it was primarily the simplicity of evaluation that should be retained when 
extending actuarial knowledge to the issue of maturity guarantees.  
In sanctioning the simulation modelling approach, proponents also tended to 
appeal to recognised professional norms. In the discussion of Corby’s paper, for 
instance, Benjamin appealed to the norm of actuarial prudence to persuade others of 
the need to adopt a ‘random walk’ model: 
When doing research there is a duty to be cautious. The profession 
is faced with one model and method ‒ that is to say the random 
walk approach ‒ which has been written up, and other methods 
which have not been subjected to publication and which, from a 
brief description, do not sound coherent in the way that I have 
defined. The random model is apparently more cautious and hence 
it seems to me to be the only one which is professionally justifiable 
in this situation. Unfortunately, it leads to very large reserves and it 
is sometimes condemned as over-cautious, for that reason, but that 
of course is nonsense; it is inverted logic. (Benjamin in Corby, 
1977, p. 280) 
Similarly, Wilkie drew an analogy with existing actuarial practices in 
criticising Scott’s adjustment to the standard deviation of annual stock market returns 
to account for long-term autocorrelation. He proclaimed that: 
there is an awful lot of literature, mostly American but also quite a 
lot of British literature, about the movements of prices of ordinary 
shares. There has been some criticism of using the period 1919-
1970, or indeed any past history to forecast the future. Now, I 
would suggest that this is equivalent to saying that it is a very bad 
idea using past experience for mortality rates; what we should do is 
take a guess at what mortality rates are going to be and then, as Dr 
Scott has done [in the case of stock market returns], should just 
halve them to allow for forecasting!' (Wilkie in Scott, 1977, p. 409) 
Actuarial knowledge had attempted to understand the future by looking at past 
statistics ever since it started using mortality tables, Wilkie suggested, and there was 
no good reason to do so otherwise when looking at investment returns.  
Crucial in sanctioning the simulation modelling approach, also, was its 
affiliation to statistics. Historically, Alborn (1994) argues, actuarial science’s alliance 
with statistics enhanced the status of the actuarial profession. To the extent that this 
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status has provided (and continues to provide) a resource for the profession to defend 
its jurisdictional claims in the context of life insurance, it also allows for the 
sanctioning of particular practices within the profession. For example, proponents of 
the simulation modelling approach, such as Wilkie, argued that adherence to 
deterministic techniques threatened the profession’s credibility: ‘We still teach life 
contingencies in a purely deterministic way’, he noted, ‘and if we continue to do so 
we shall be ridiculed by statisticians in every country’ (Wilkie in Corby, 1977, p. 
280). Elsewhere, Benjamin said that the scientific criteria of statistics should apply 
also (albeit perhaps in weak form) to actuarial practice: ‘any solution which the 
profession were to adopt should be reasonably acceptable from a statistical point of 
view’ (Benjamin et al., 1980, p. 229). However, Benjamin noted, ‘it would be very 
unfortunate if a statistician outside the profession were to come along with a solution 
which the profession would then examine in arrears’. In other words, the issue was 
not simply one of whether actuaries would be able to understand the mathematics 
involved: they were the experts whose task it was to translate general statistical 
theory into practical applications, not the statisticians. If statisticians would beat 
them to it, Benjamin implied, it would harm the profession’s status.  
Even though Benjamin borrowed techniques from the relatively ‘foreign’ risk 
theory, statisticians’ approval of those techniques meant they were considered 
legitimate, albeit perhaps in need of revision. By the time the Maturity Guarantees 
Working Party published its paper, an important concession was made: its model 
allowed for negative correlation and modelled stock market returns as two separate 
processes of dividend yields and capital gains. The model successfully convinced 
some of those who had previously been opposed to the simulation approach 
(although some would have undoubtedly retained their initial scepticism). At a 
sessional meeting at the Institute, Francis Wales, who had ‘criticised previous 
attempts to construct accumulation unit price models for failing to differentiate 
between the components of price movements, i.e. capital values and dividend yields’, 
now said that the working party’s suggested model seemed ‘eminently reasonable, 
and certainly overcomes my objections to earlier work by Messrs Benjamin and 




Living in a Stochastic World 
It is not easy to assess what the impact of the Working Party’s report was and to what 
extent its approach was accepted as being appropriate, but the available evidence 
suggests that although maturity guarantee business was eventually recognised as 
prohibitively expensive, uptake of the working party’s model remained, at least 
initially, only marginal. In opening the discussion of the working party’s report at the 
Faculty of Actuaries in October 1980, ten months after it had been presented at the 
Institute, one of its members, Ben Rowe, noted that he had studied the regulatory 
returns of 22 companies and found that only two companies had used the working 
party’s method. Many actuaries appeared to have been concerned with the limited 
practicality of the model ‒ for instance because they had insufficient familiarity with 
programming or the model’s underlying mathematics so that they could adjust it to 
the specific characteristics of different portfolios ‒ and preferred some deterministic 
approximation of the model over the stochastic one. For Rowe, however, the fact that 
two companies had succeeded in implementing it was proof that ‘the method is a 
practical one’ (Rowe in Benjamin et al., 1980, p. 214).  
The working party’s model would nonetheless have important effects. First, 
the working party’s model provided an ‘exemplary problem solution’ to investigate 
financial risk in contexts different from maturity guarantees. The financial market 
volatility of the 1970s and 80s raised new questions about the feasibility of different 
investment strategies. In the years after publication of the 1980 Working Party 
model, Wilkie continued its development it in a series of papers. His model ‒ the 
‘Wilkie model’ ‒ was the first ‘stochastic model’ of financial risk that was widely 
used across the industry. Part of its success was that the model was specifically 
designed for long-term actuarial applications, ‘was relatively easy to apply ‒ it could 
be coded into a spreadsheet’ and was ‘consistent’ with the ‘prior belief’ that stock 
markets follow a mean-reverting process (Jakhria et al., 2019). 
A second effect was that after the publication of the working party’s report, it 
became widely accepted that unit-linked contracts with maturity guarantees ‒ at least 
in their present form ‒ were much more costly than was initially assumed (and 
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indeed more costly than implied by Benjamin’s initial modelling work). 
Consequentially, the volume of such policies diminished rather quickly. Although it 
is likely the working party’s model contributed to this, the precise extent in which it 
did so is uncertain. David Wilkie suspects, for instance, that the decisive moment 
was not the publication of the working party’s report itself, but would come later 
when Standard Life ‒ Wilkie’s new employer after he left Scottish Widows ‒ 
declined to participate in the underwriting of one of the major unit-linked offices 
founded by Weinberg, Hambro Life. At the time, Wilkie noted, it was common 
practice for institutional investors to take small stakes in a company when it could 
not sell all its shares to the public. When Standard Life’s investment manager asked 
Wilkie for his opinion on Hambro Life, the latter replied: ‘“I think we shouldn't 
touch it”, because Hambro had a lot of this [maturity guarantee] business, I knew that 
it was risky.’ Wilkie suggests that ‘since it was Standard Life’ ‒ a leading Scottish 
life office ‒ ‘those in the market thought that there might be something serious about 
it – one insurer not being sure about another’ (Wilkie in personal communication). It 
is, of course, difficult to assert the precise extent to which this incident influenced 
general market practice.  
While this was intended, the model also produced an unintended effect. The 
maturity guarantees were an important component of the marketing of unit-linked 
insurance. Unit-linked offices, therefore, started looking for an alternative, less costly 
means of providing such guarantees. In a paper presented to the Society of Actuaries 
in Ireland, the Irish actuary Colm Fagan (1977) suggested that it would be possible to 
adopt an investment strategy that would ‘immunise’ the risk embedded in the 
maturity guarantees, an approach that some would later recognise as remarkably 
similar to models in modern financial economics to price options (see chapter 5). 
Several actuaries picked up on Fagan’s suggestion and his ‘immunization’ approach 
was, indeed, studied by the Maturity Guarantees Working Party. The latter 
concluded, however, that it ‘does seem to have serious practical disadvantages 
because it depends upon several underlying assumptions … [but] merits further 
investigation’ (Ford et al., 1980, p. 112). As discussed in more detail in chapter 5, the 




insurance with maturity guarantees anticipated later developments in the actuarial 
machinery.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the introduction of simulation modelling as a 
means to evaluate financial risk was the result of a series of contingent 
circumstances. The rapid proliferation of unit-linked insurance ‒ a particular blend of 
insurance and investment ‒ in the 1960s and 70s posed a series of epistemic 
problems to the actuarial profession, which actuaries initially sought to solve by 
drawing on traditional techniques of deterministic, expected value calculations. 
Within this context, Benjamin’s proposal to approach things differently led to a 
series of heated controversies in which actuaries debated the appropriate place of 
mathematical statistics, computer-based simulation and risk theory in the epistemic 
field of actuarial science. Crucial in these debates were considerations of the 
professional jurisdiction of actuaries and how to best strengthen its claims (Abbott, 
1988). The modelling work of Wilkie and Benjamin was eventually accepted as a 
problem solution for the issue of maturity guarantees, and even though Wilkie’s later 
models became widely used for some specific purposes, its influence on the 
epistemic field remained somewhat limited, at least initially so. Actuaries thus 
retained their role as custodians of surplus in a period where increased financial 
market volatility was beginning to raise new questions about actuaries’ ability to 
know the future.  
Quite apart from its empirical relevance, this chapter shows how, in a 
profession-based model of governance, where the epistemic authority of the actuarial 
profession is bestowed upon it by the state, actuarial expertise contributes to 
mitigating the financial consequences of uncertainty. Within this model, actuaries 
retain epistemic authority as they have the power collectively to determine how 
insurance liabilities should be evaluated. In exercising this discretion collectively, 
actuaries seek to establish a degree of commonality in knowledge practices by 
communicating through specific channels that are given shape to represent such 
scientific norms and values as ‘publicity’, ‘universality’ and ‘rational argument’. 
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Individual actuaries may deviate from standard practice but might lose status in so 
doing. Although regulators retain political power (they can decide what courses of 
action are allowed and which ones are not), their epistemic role is reduced to that of 
auditor: they review firms’ actuarial reports. When novel objects of concern emerge 
(such as unit-linked policies with maturity guarantees), regulators may push actors in 
the epistemic field to decide how particular objects are to be accounted for and do 
not decide on this themselves; it is a power they have delegated to the profession. In 
exercising their epistemic authority, actuaries thus contribute to making and 










Chapter 4  
Competition, Change, and the Making of a Crisis 
In the previous chapter, I argued that technological developments allowed new unit-
linked insurance companies to challenge the dominant position of conventional life 
insurance arrangements. The main aim was to describe key debates in actuarial 
science that emerged in response to the introduction of unit-linked insurance. In this 
chapter, I examine how the emergence of unit-linked insurance and the novel 
practices of evaluation that came with it influenced competition in the market field. I 
argue that the challenge posed by the newly established unit-linked offices fostered 
changes in the epistemic machinery underpinning conventional insurance 
arrangements that would ultimately contribute to their decline and perhaps even 
demise (see figure 4.1).  
Key in this chapter is the story of the Equitable Life Assurance Society (or 
simply ‘Equitable’), which (as noted in chapter 3) had been the first life insurance 
company to adopt ‘scientific principles’ as the basis for its management in the late 
eighteenth century. By the mid-twentieth century, Equitable was a mid-sized 
company, selling primarily pensions related products. The company’s fate, however, 
was intimately entangled with the fate of conventional insurance arrangements, even 
if many of its practices appeared somewhat idiosyncratic by the end of the twentieth 
century. The company’s downfall, which was heavily reported on in British media, 
raised important questions about the legitimacy of conventional actuarial practice, 
and ultimately fostered the adoption of new techniques such as those borrowed from 
financial economics. Even if Equitable’s practices were considered somewhat 
idiosyncratic, its story says much about wider changes in the life insurance industry. 
This chapter, then, examines how the challenge of unit-linked insurance 
shaped conventional insurance practice. First, I describe some of the institutional 
features central in the field of life insurance and show how unit-linked insurance 




Figure 4.1 Mathematical reserves backing different lines of business, 1985-2010. 
Source of data: Almezweq (2015). 
organised, and the role therein of specific ‘devices’. Next, I describe how increased 
competition led to a wave of mergers and the ‘demutualisation’ of long-established 
mutual offices, which strengthened insurers’ focus on shareholder value. Finally, I 
move to the story of Equitable, which is divided across two sections. First, I describe 
the evolution of its practices throughout the second half of the twentieth century; 
and, second, I investigate the immediate causes of the company’s financial problems 
and describe how it was interpreted as a failure of traditional actuarial methods.  
New Entrants and Shifting Market Barriers 
Competition is one of the main threats to profitability. As field theory suggests, firms 
thus have an important incentive to attempt to control competition (Fligstein, 2001). 
For much of the nineteenth and early twentieth-century incumbent life insurers have 
done so with remarkable success, which is reflected in the relative stability of the 
market. In this period, there were a large number of offices in operation, many of 
which were already established in the early decades of the nineteenth century. In the 
first half of the twentieth century, some degree of consolidation took place. Although 




business transacted by the ten largest offices increased from 46.4% in 1913 to 57.8% 
in 1953.  
The market for life insurance, however, was geographically dispersed; many 
offices were closely tied to specific locations, which was reflected in names like 
London and Lancashire Life, Manchester Life, and Edinburgh & Glasgow. There 
was some degree of nation-wide competition, but the competition was strongly 
regulated and occurred among well-established offices with long histories (see table 
4.1). The relative stability of the UK life insurance market that continued into the 
second half of the twentieth century was also reflected in a relative stability in 
actuarial expertise, which is well captured by Frank Redington, one of the most 
prominent British actuaries in the twentieth century, who wrote in the early 1980s 
that ‘[t]he actuary of 1945 was closer in spirit to the William Morgan of 1800 than to 
the actuary of today’ (Redington, 1981).  
This relative stability suggests that there were important market barriers and 
mechanisms that stabilised competition. Formal barriers, however, were initially very 
small. Before 1967, there was no formal system of ‘authorisation’. Anyone with 
access to £50,000 starting capital wishing to sell life insurance could do so in 
principle. Legal requirements became more stringent only towards the latter decades 
of the twentieth century, first, in 1967, and later with the Insurance Companies Act 
of 1974. The new requirements were, however, relatively mild: new entrants were 
required to have paid-up capital of at least £100,000 and needed to have their 
business plan approved by supervisors from the Department of Trade. It needed to 
show, moreover, that its management was ‘fit and proper’ (Franklin and Woodhead, 
1980). 
Although formal requirements were low, there were nonetheless important 
barriers to entry. For instance, life insurers organised themselves collectively in the 
Life Offices Association (the forerunner of the contemporary Association of British 
Insurers), which functioned as an ‘internal governance unit’ (Fligstein and McAdam, 
2012) by regulating sales commissions. It set an upper limit to sales commissions, 
which prevented individual offices from aggressively expanding their market share 
by paying sales agents in excess of market commissions (Carter and Falush, 2009, 
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pp. 154–155). Another contributing factor was that actuarial claims to the technical 
expertise required for running a life office are likely to have contributed to the 
industry’s stability. Actuarial training was provided to students in their employment 
at companies. Although there were a small number of actuarial consultants advising 
pension schemes (most schemes subcontracted pension contracts to life insurers), 
most actuaries were therefore trained at established life offices, with the total number 
of qualified actuaries not exceeding a thousand until the 1960s (Dennett, 2004, pp. 
196–197). The fact that actuaries were trained at companies and few in numbers is 
likely to have complicated the acquisition of actuarial expertise for new entrants.  
Table 4.1  The ten largest life offices measured by total sums assured in 1913 and 
1953.  
Top ten in 1913 Est. Type Top ten in 1953 Est. Type 
Prudential 1848 Prop Prudential 1848 Prop 
Scottish Widows 1815 Mutual Legal & General (previously 11) 1835 Prop 
Alliance 1824 Prop Norwich Union 1808 Mutual 
Norwich Union 1808 Mutual Sun Life (previously 12) 1810 Prop 
North British 1823 Prop Standard Life 1824 Prop 
Commercial Union 1862 Prop Pearl (previously 21) 1857 Prop 
Scottish Provident 1837 Mutual Co-operative (previously 63) 1867 Mutual 
Standard Life 1824 Prop Scottish Widows 1815 Mutual 
Gresham 1848 Prop Commercial Union 1862 Prop 
Phoenix 1782 Prop Refuge (previously 16) 1864 Prop 
Rankings were derived from Johnston and Murphy (1957, p. 136). Information about the 
offices was obtained from Alborn (2009, Appendix 1). 
Economists have pointed to some important economic barriers too. First, life 
insurance is characterised by increasing economies of scale (Hardwick, 1997). The 
expenses of large offices are relatively small compared to the cost of running a 
smaller one, for instance, because it is relatively more expensive for smaller 
companies to sustain a distribution network (Ward, 2002). A second economic 




traditional ‘regular premium’ business (as opposed to ‘single premium’) only 
materialises over long periods ‒ and are uncertain ‒ the costs of such business (e.g. 
commission to sales agents) tend to be concentrated at the contract’s inception. 
Writing large volumes of new business can thus be rather costly, which dampens 
companies’ growth potential (Franklin and Woodhead, 1980, pp. 94–95). Combined, 
the new business strain and economies of scale put larger offices at a structural 
advantage, while smaller offices were left to target specific niches.  
 
Figure 4.2  New entrants in the UK market for life insurance, 1950-1977. CrossEntry: 
firms already underwriting insurance either domestically in general 
insurance, or abroad. EstbEntry: entrants owned by parent companies 
previously not involved in insurance. NewEntry: entrants without already 
established parent companies. Reorg: firms that are the product of a 
reorganisation of a life office. These are strictly not new entrants. 
FriendlySoc: companies previously underwriting industrial insurance 
entering the ordinary life insurance market. Source of data: Franklin and 
Woodhead (1980), p. 97.  
A final barrier was formed by the economic advantages derived from having 
an ‘estate’. Estates were reserves that belonged to no group of policyholders in 
particular, but to the company as a whole, and were built from taking ‘tiny slices’ of 
a company’s profits on non-profit business. An interviewee who had been apptointed 
actuary of a large mutual office said for instance that before the company was 
‘demutualised’ (a topic that will be discussed below), it had an estate of £3bn while 
84 
 
having total assets under management of £10bn. The estates were, in a sense, passed 
on from previous generations of policyholders to the next; the responsible actuary 
therefore not only had a duty, in law, to the current generation of policyholders but 
also to future generations. This interviewee, moreover, felt a sense of ‘loyalty’ to ‘his 
predecessors’, who he said through ‘careful husbandry’ had ‘built up the estate’ 
(Forfar interview). Estates provided companies with several advantages, including 
increased flexibility in bonus distribution policies and the ‘smoothing’ of 
policyholder benefits, and thus put incumbent insurers at a structural advantage 
versus younger challenger firms that did not have the benefit of legacy estates.  
The relatively stable structure of competition, however, would be shaken in 
the 1950s and 60s. As shown in figure 4.2, the number of new entrants in the UK’s 
life insurance market surged in the 1960s and 70s, particularly due to the emergence 
of new subsidiaries either of companies already writing insurance business or of 
already established companies not involved in the insurance business. Particularly 
the emergence of unit-linked insurance, which formed an increasingly large share of 
total life business, had a strong impact on the industry. In 1968, the largest share of 
new business premiums went to Abbey Life, the first unit-linked office founded by 
Mark Weinberg (see chapter 3). Save & Prosper and International Life ‒ two of the 
other major unit-linked offices ‒ similarly featured among the top ten companies 
with the highest premiums deriving from new business (Richards and Colenutt, 1975, 
p. 157). Seven years later, in 1975, the picture had changed even further. The ten 
companies accumulating the largest shares of new business was now spearheaded by 
Hambro Life, the second of Weinberg’s companies, and further included Abbey Life, 
Hill Samuel and Property Growth ‒ all selling unit-linked insurance (Richards and 
Colenutt, 1975, p. 158). 
An important factor in the success of unit-linked insurance was the fact that 
life insurance enjoyed several significant tax advantages through the ‘Life Assurance 
Premium Relief’. It meant that it was relatively more attractive to save via life 
insurers rather than putting the money directly in a unit trust. It also raised questions, 
however, to what extent unit-linked insurance should be treated as insurance and to 




was the insurance regulator at the time, commissioned a report by Hilary Scott, a 
non-executive director of Equity & Law and the Bank of Scotland. When presenting 
the committee’s findings to the Faculty of Actuaries in 1973, Scott (1975) noted that 
a third of life insurers’ total annual premium income was generated by unit-linked 
insurance. One member of the committee argued that the insurance and investment 
component of unit-linked insurance should be regulated separately. Other members 
of the committee, however, agreed that unit-linked insurance should remain under 
the auspices of the actuarial profession, the Department of Trade and Industry and, 
indeed, the Government’s actuarial department (Scott et al., 1973). The tax 
advantage that for a long time had worked to the advantage of incumbent life 
insurance companies now facilitated the emergence of the challenger firms.  
Crucially, the structure of unit-linked insurance allowed challenger firms to 
circumvent some of the market barriers described above. Because unit-linked 
insurance pushes much (though as seen in the previous chapter not always all) of the 
investment risk to the level of the individual, it is argued to be much less capital 
intensive than some forms of with-profits insurance. This was one of the reasons, 
according to Weinberg, why Abbey Life was able to grow rather fast. In the 1973 
lecture quoted in the previous chapter, Weinberg said: 
The first unit-linked policy introduced in this country was 
introduced not for any technical actuarial reason but for a very 
valid marketing reason, namely that a newly established life office 
… recognised that in a savings-orientated market it was difficult 
for it to compete in the absence of an estate which enabled it to 
quote competitive with-profits bonuses, and this problem was 
neatly finessed by linking the policy to units of a Unit Trust. 
(Weinberg, 1973, p. 16)  
Weinberg also noted that if it were not for the sum of starting capital required 
(the £50,000 threshold) to be relatively small, his company would not have been 
founded in the first place. The sum would indeed have been rather low for new life 
offices writing conventional business, he conceded. Ten years earlier, a paper 
entitled ‘The Problems of a New Life Office’ was presented at the Institute, which 
argued that a shortage of capital resources was the ‘most important of all the 
problems’ of a new office (Crook, 1963, p. 226). The lower need for capital to 
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support unit-linked business, however, meant that new companies were enabled to 
write more business on a smaller capital basis. To take the example of Abbey Life 
again, it managed to grow significantly without having to increase its capital base, 
which it did once it was ‘taken over … only because it looked rather off to be writing 
quite a lot of business on a very small issued capital’ (Weinberg, 1973, p. 6).  
Unit-linked insurance also circumvented the problem of new business strain. 
While in conventional insurance, expenses were typically spread out over the life 
span of a policy, most of the new unit-linked offices would deduct all or most of the 
initial expenses from the first premium(s) paid, leaving only a rather small amount of 
it for the purchase of units. This practice, known as ‘front-end loading’, reduced the 
initial cash flow strain produced by the issuance of long-term contracts.  
Unit-linked insurance thus allowed challenger firms to undermine key market 
barriers, which – strengthened by their ties to actors in adjacent fields (banks and unit 
trust funds) – were relatively uninhibited in so doing. At the same, a series of policy 
reforms reshaped the regulatory structure of UK’s long-term savings markets, 
particularly the market for pension savings, which created new business 
opportunities for long-term insurers (Hannah, 1986; Waine, 1992; Langley, 2006; 
Langley and Leaver, 2012). In the first half of the twentieth century, insurance 
companies became important providers of retirement annuities (a post-retirement 
product that typically provides a guaranteed income until death) and investments to 
occupational pension schemes, which provided an attractive vehicle for saving ‒ due 
to tax advantages ‒ to an increasing share of the population, a market that was 
dominated by Legal & General (Hannah, 1986, p. 37). Only a few of the larger 
schemes were self-administered and these would purchase annuities from insurers to 
pass on the mortality-related risks of the post-retirement phase. The market for 
insurance products in retirement income provision expanded in 1956 when the right 
to tax relief on retirement annuities was extended to self-employed workers, which 
included such professionals as solicitors, doctors and accountants; in the following 
year, many companies started offering individual retirement annuity policies. In 




market’ (i.e. from companies different from the ones that provided the pension), 
competition among insurers strengthened (Hannah, 1986).  
Another significant change occurred under the UK’s new right government 
and the implementation of its 1986 Social Security Act. While previous Conservative 
governments had sought to promote saving through occupational pension schemes, 
the Thatcher administration steered towards increased individual control over 
pensions and sought to strengthen competition in the long-term savings industry 
(Waine, 1992). The Social Security Act, therefore, provided strong incentives to opt 
out of the redistributive, government-led State Earnings Related Pension Scheme, 
gave workers the possibility to opt out of previously compulsory occupational 
pension schemes and introduced ‘personal pensions’ as an alternative. Overall, 
changes in the UK’s retirement income system had important implications for the 
insurance market: while the total market for pension savings increased significantly, 
increased individual control over pensions since the 1980s strengthened competition 
among insurers seeking to benefit from it.  
These changes in government policy strengthened competition amongst life 
insurers for new business. Some see the increased competitive pressures as an 
important contributing factor to the ‘pensions misselling scandal’ of the late-1980s, 
for which insurers were fined over £10bn (Black and Nobles, 1998; Brannan, 2017). 
Insurers were accused of having induced policyholders to give up attractive defined-
benefit pensions in exchange for much riskier personal pension plans. Although the 
precise causes for the pensions misselling scandal are complex and besides the focus 
of this chapter, it nevertheless indicates that the existing institutional arrangements 
through which competition was historically stabilised were increasingly undermined 
from the late 1980s onwards.  
Market Devices and Competition 
The challenge posed by unit-linked insurance firms and changes in the UK’s 
retirement income system thus fostered increased competition amongst insurers. In 
this section, I examine the organisation of competition among insurers and the role of 
specific devices therein. The term device is used here in the same sense as it is used 
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in STS-inflected sociology – as ‘a simple way of referring to the material and 
discursive assemblages that intervene in the construction of markets’ (Muniesa, 
Millo and Callon, 2007, p. 2). These assemblages produce attachments to particular 
products and aid in the creation and sustenance of market boundaries. The point of 
focusing on the material devices of competition is to show not only that the 
introduction of new insurance arrangements may foster competitive pressures and 
may thus lead to lower prices, but also that it may lead to changes in the nature of 
already existing life insurance arrangements. 
Among the most important devices in conventional life insurance is the 
reversionary bonus, which (as noted in chapter 3) became a potent ‘marketing 
device’ after its inception in the late eighteenth century, even if it was simply 
intended as a tool for distributing surplus (Alborn, 2002, 2009). Operating bonus 
schemes was, however, no small task and the necessary calculations required the 
labour power of substantial clerical machinery. Bonus declarations thus necessarily 
occurred with long intervals, which, somewhat ironically, contributed to life offices’ 
increased emphasis on investment. The infrequent bonus declarations, as Alborn 
notes (2002, 2009), were ‘dramatic events’, which had several unintended 
consequences. The marketing role of bonus declarations, for instance, put pressure 
on life offices to sustain attractive bonus rates, leading some offices to ignore 
actuarial reports of deteriorating financial positions ‒ reports that in early years were 
kept confidential. After the 1870 Assurance Companies Act, however, periodical 
valuations were to be made public, allowing interested policyholders to scrutinise in 
more detail the meaning of such declarations. The increased scrutiny reduced the 
importance of bonus declarations as marketing devices, which was reflected in a 
reduction of bonuses, the degree of fluctuation therein and, with the introduction of 
new arithmetic technology, the length of the intervals between them (Alborn, 2002).  
While the importance of reversionary bonuses as marketing device declined, 
the emphasis on bonus rates remained. From the mid-twentieth century onwards, for 
instance, comparison of insurers’ performance was facilitated by media outlets such 
as The Economist and Which?, a magazine founded in 1957 by the Consumers’ 




by providing information about company performance (Aldridge, 1994). 
Intermittently, these outlets would compare the performance of different funds on 
different policies (see figure 4.3). Insurers, in turn, increasingly started using 
investment yields as a ‘competitive weapon’ as manifested, for instance, in 
advertising (Scott, 2002, p. 80).  
  
Figure 4.3  An example of a comparison of the performance of different life companies, 
published by The Economist (Anon., 1970).  
The increased emphasis on investment, facilitated by such devices as industry 
comparisons, the adoption of bonus distribution policies and a series of surges and 
slumps in stock market prices, contributed to life insurers’ shifting investment 
practices. Over the course of the twentieth century, for instance, there was a gradual 
rise of the ‘cult of equity’ ‒ the belief that insurers’ should primarily invest in shares. 
The cult of equity finds its roots in the interwar period when ‘investment philosophy’ 
started moving away from conservative fixed-income strategies towards equity 
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investments (Scott, 2002). Struggling to maintain the real value of surpluses 
available for distribution in the face of competition from deposit-taking institutions, 
insurers increasingly perceived investment in stocks as a means to protect the value 
of their assets against inflation and currency depreciation. The cult of equity gained 
momentum in the 1950s and 60s. The equity-backing ratio of with-profits funds rose 
from 20/30% in the late 1950s and early 1960s to more than 50% in 1976 (Dodds, 
1979; Turnbull, 2017); anecdotal evidence suggests that in 1981 at least some with-
profits funds were fully equity-backed (Redington, 1981; Turnbull, 2017). 
Consequentially, insurers were among the largest stock owners of UK’s capital 
markets. In the 1950s, they owned no more than 10% of all stocks outstanding; in the 
1980s, however, insurers owned around 20%, retaining that level (with a high point 
in 1997 of 23.6%) until the early 2000s (ONS, 2017).  
Another crucial market device is the sales arrangements that insurers have at 
their disposal. Due to the complex and long-term nature of life insurance products, 
sales strategies play a pivotal role in competition. Historically, and with a few 
exceptions, life insurers did not own any distribution channels, but made use of 
independent sales agents, often working for local bank branches, who would sell 
policies only of a limited number of companies. In contrast, some of the new 
entrants, such as Abbey Life and Hambro Life, started selling unit-linked policies 
through commission-based direct sales forces, a costly but effective means to gain 
market share. The affiliations of the challenger firms with actors in adjacent fields 
were also important here. The banks with which these companies were affiliated 
prohibited their local branch managers from selling policies from other companies, 
restricting insurers’ access to banks and building societies’ branch network (Gupta 
and Westall, 1993). The 1986 Financial Services Act, which introduced 
‘polarisation’, further added to insurers’ strain (Black and Nobles, 1998). The Act 
compelled sales agents either to be tied to specific companies (selling the policies of 
those companies only) or to be fully independent (offering the whole range of 
policies available in the market). Its consequence was a significant reduction of 
independent agents. Insurers were therefore forced to compete over access to ‘tied 




insurers merged with or were acquired by banks (Gupta and Westall, 1993; Carter 
and Falush, 2009, pp. 68–71).  
While the introduction of unit-linked insurance thus contributed to changing 
insurers’ sales apparatus, the introduction of another device ‒ that of ‘asset shares’ ‒ 
drew on unit-linked insurance as an exemplar for how bonuses should be distributed. 
Asset shares, like units, are policy-specific measures of the share of total assets in a 
with-profits fund obtained by investing (and reinvesting) the premiums of a specific 
policy, minus the expenses that have been attributed to it. An asset share, in other 
words, is a ‘retrospective’ or backwards-looking measure of policyholder benefits 
that is similar to the benefits of an equivalent unit-linked policy. Asset shares were 
increasingly used by with-profits funds as a guide to determining appropriate 
terminal bonus policies since the 1970s (sometime after the terminal bonus 
mechanisms were introduced to allow for the distribution of ‘unrealised capital 
gains’ on equity investments), albeit not by all offices. With-profits policies were 
traditionally understood to offer more stability than equity-linked investment 
products; they were subject to a degree of smoothing. Some argued, therefore, that 
the usefulness of the retrospective method of asset shares to determine terminal 
bonuses was limited if policyholders expected insurance benefits to be stable from 
year to year. As some actuaries suspected, however, due to the proliferation of 
market devices like stock market indexes and benefit comparisons across with-profits 
funds, ‘it is possible that policyholders … expect rather less smoothing of with-
profits payouts than in the past’ (Eastwood et al., 1994, p. 501). In such cases, asset 
shares, being loosely analogous to the unit-linked principle, could be useful in 
deciding on the level of terminal bonuses, whilst ‘smoothing’ could be achieved, for 
instance, by limiting the annual change in terminal bonuses to a fixed percentage 
level threshold.  
The emergence of the asset share device not only provided a resource for 
with-profits funds to compete with the challenger firms selling unit-linked insurance 
but also contributed to the emergence of a new type of insurance: unitised with-
profits insurance, a hybrid type of insurance that combined elements from 
conventional and unit-linked insurance. After the 1973-74 stock market slump, unit-
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linked actuaries started arguing that prospective policyholders demanded more 
security than unit-linked insurance had offered.  
For a number of years [policyholders’] concern had been to 
participate in the profits of equity investment, and the concomitant 
risk was generally ignored. Suddenly the risk was seen as more 
important than the potential gain, and the demand was for stability 
and guarantees. (Squires and O’Neill, 1990, p. 281) 
As seen in the previous chapter, however, actuaries employed by challenger firms 
also increasingly agreed that guarantees on unit-linked policies were costly. While 
unit-linked offices could compete with with-profits offices by providing a different 
‘type’ of insurance, they could not compete by offering with-profits contracts 
themselves, partly because they did not have the benefit of an estate. The reserves 
needed to back the guarantees were therefore provided not by past generations of 
policyholders, nor by shareholders, but rather by future policyholders. In case the 
guarantees would bite, prospective terminal bonuses of continuing policyholders 
could be reduced.14 While unitised with-profits provided a means for the security of 
with-profits insurance to be combined with unit-linked insurance’s emphasis on 
investment, it also reintroduced some of the ‘conflicts’ that Weinberg had argued 
unit-linked insurance to circumvent (see chapter 3). The introduction of asset share 
methodology was thus an important catalyst of hybridisation of unit-linked and 
conventional life insurance.  
The introduction of asset share methodology coincided with another important 
‘device’ that had important implications for the degree of authority imputed on the 
actuarial profession by the state: the regulatory requirement for insurers to ensure 
that policyholders’ ‘reasonable expectations’ are met. The term ‘policyholder 
reasonable expectations’ was part of the 1973 Insurance Companies Amendment 
Act, which was intended to strengthen insurance supervision after several (general) 
insurers had failed in the 1960s and early 1970s (Daykin, 1992). The Act endowed 
the Secretary of State with the discretionary power to intervene in the affairs of a 
                                                 
14 To reduce risk, moreover, unitised with-profits funds typically invested the underlying units in 
‘managed units’, the primary aim of which was to reduce the likelihood of the guarantees to ‘bite’ and 




company if it threatened to fail on its contractual obligations, ‘or, in the case of long 
term business, to fulfil the reasonable expectations of policyholders or potential 
policyholders’ (Insurance Companies Amendment Act 1973). It was, in other words, 
a device intended to undercut opportunistic and perhaps fraudulent behaviour in the 
search for market share. 
The Act, however, left unspecified what constituted policyholders’ 
expectations as reasonable and the precise meaning of the phrase became subject to 
significant debate within the actuarial profession. In his 1986 Presidential Address, 
the then President of the Institute Marshall Field decided to take this ‘notorious 
phrase’ as a central topic and noted that there were ‘perhaps two separate meanings 
of the phrase’ (Field, 1987, p. 2). The first one, he noted, was statutory and referred 
to the level of benefits to which policyholders were reasonably entitled. Although 
this meaning was ‘for the lawyers to determine’, Field was unconvinced that it was 
possible to quantify policyholders’ reasonable expectations satisfactorily in ‘legal 
terms’. The second meaning of the phrase was actuarial, Field argued, and referred to 
policyholders’ expectations of future bonus declarations. In contrast to the regulatory 
meaning of the phrase, the actuarial meaning took such expectations as one of the 
‘objectives’ of valuation rather than being a principle of valuation in itself. As such, 
Field argued, there were circumstances in which ‘policyholders’ expectations as 
regards the level of bonus declarations ought not to be realised’ (Field, 1987, p. 2). 
The ‘justifiable expectations of a policyholder’, Field argued, should therefore not 
refer to any quantifiable amount, but rather to the fact that policyholders should be 
able to trust the actuary as custodian of a company’s surplus.  
Not only the question of the methods through which discretionary benefits in 
with-profits business were to be determined was at stake, but also the extent of 
actuaries’ professional freedom in applying those methods. In addition to increasing 
regulatory powers, the 1973 Act created the function of the Appointed Actuary, a 
designated actuary responsible for continuously monitoring that statutory obligations 
were met (Daykin, 1999). To outline what this meant, the actuarial profession 
published its first Guidance Note, outlining some standards to which the appointed 
actuary should conform in so doing. Although the function of the appointed actuary 
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strengthened the position of actuaries within firms ‒ the actuarial jurisdiction was 
now enshrined in legislation ‒ the issuance of such practical standards threatened to 
impose constraints on the ‘freedom’ that actuaries had traditionally enjoyed. To dull 
the effect of these constraints, the standards were phrased in rather an equivocal 
language, a point that was emphasised in various sessional meetings. At an Institute 
discussion of the Guidance Note, for instance, the actuary Gerald Barrow ‒ who had 
prepared an introductory note ‒ said that: ‘Each of the 30 separate clauses could give 
rise to a differing emphasis of opinion even among those who are in general 
agreement with the guide’ (Barrow, 1976, p. 138). Both the legal meaning of 
‘policyholder reasonable expectations’ and the interpretation of the standards to 
which Appointed Actuaries should conform in safeguarding such expectations were 
thus not generally agreed upon.  
Restructuring Mutuals: The Emergence of a New Market 
Order 
By the early 1990s, the capital base of conventional insurance arrangements had 
significantly eroded, which was due to a combination of management actions taken 
as a function of competitive pressures and increased values of insurance liabilities 
due to declining interest rates. Competitive pressures pushed insurers to pay out 
relatively high benefits, sustaining, for instance, high reversionary bonus rates and 
turning out substantial terminal bonuses, while, at the same time, business volumes 
expanded significantly in the 1980s, causing significant new business strain for 
conventional insurers (Dumbreck and Sanders, 1993). Insurers’ expenses rose too. In 
competing for new business, companies often resorted to expensive distribution 
channels, increasing the overall cost of insurance provision. After the 
implementation of polarisation, moreover, these distribution channels had become 
harder to access for smaller funds, which led to increasing concentration of new 
business (Needleman and Westall, 1991).  
Regulatory changes further contributed to the worsening of insurers’ capital 
position and strengthened the focus on capital management. Since the mid-1980s, 




assess the impact of a 25% stock market decline and a 3% rise or fall of interest 
rates, and, subsequently, had to hold capital reserves against that (Fine et al., 1988). 
Together with falling interest and mortality rates, this further diminished insurers’ 
‘free assets’. The deteriorating capital position of conventional insurers put pressure 
on insurers’ management. ‘A relatively modest fall in share prices in the summer of 
1992’, the actuaries noted, ‘left a number of companies with solvency margins close 
to the minimum level, and put them under pressure to rearrange their investment 
portfolios in order to preserve statutory solvency’ (Dumbreck and Sanders, 1993, p. 
30).  
To resolve the capital strain, Dumbreck and Sanders continued, companies 
pursued several strategies. A first option was, of course, to cut back some of the 
bonuses. Some of the companies were paying policyholders in amounts exceeding 
asset shares and by reducing payments to slightly below asset shares, companies 
could replenish reserves. This, of course, was a precarious measure, because the 
reduced bonuses could repel potential customers as well as already existing ones. 
Nevertheless, Dumbreck and Sanders noted, some companies pursued this strategy 
and ‘found the market surprisingly receptive to their prudence in doing so’ 
(Dumbreck and Sanders, 1993, p. 30). A second option was to increase the 
proportion of unit-linked or unitised with-profits business in their portfolio, which 
could reduce the problem of bonuses in excess of asset shares and new business 
strain – a strategy, as the evidence suggests, few companies pursued before 1995, but 
was widely embraced since then (O’Brien, 2009). 
Many mutual companies pursued a third option: demutualisation. Mutual 
companies were owned by their with-profits policyholders, who by accepting a 
degree of uncertainty in future benefits provided the company with reserves. The 
reserves further included the ‘estate’, or the ‘free assets’ that were ‘inherited’ from 
previous generations of policyholders. When both pools of reserves were depleted 
due to, for instance, adverse market conditions, the company could get in significant 
financial trouble and might eventually become ‘technically insolvent’, a situation that 
could only be resolved through premium income in excess of claims and expenses 
outgo or an increase in the market value of assets. In a competitive environment, 
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however, free capital was needed to allow a company to pursue different strategies 
(Needleman and Westall, 1991). Demutualisation provided an effective means to 
alleviate capital strains on stressed mutual funds. When a company would 
demutualise, it would receive an additional capital injection from new shareholders 
who could, moreover, provide future capital injections if necessary.  
Many of the demutualising funds were distressed and in need of new capital 
or access to distribution channels. Some mutual funds, however, demutualised from a 
‘position of strength’ (Eastwood interview). Opinions about the desirability of highly 
capitalised mutual offices to demutualise diverged greatly. While some actuaries 
considered demutualisation to be a ‘fad’, a strategy that some companies pursued 
simply ‘because everybody was demutualising at the time’ (Forfar interview), others 
considered it a ‘one-off opportunity’ for policyholders (Eastwood interview). A 
'disciplined application of a properly-tested' asset share and bonus methodology, 
Eastwood argued, reduces the level of capital required to back with-profits liabilities. 
In that case, having a large estate provided little additional benefits for existing and 
future customers, whose ownership of the estate, moreover, would only be 
temporary. In a demutualisation transaction, part of a company’s ‘orphan estate’, as it 
was sometimes referred to, could be distributed across policyholders, providing them 
with potential one-off windfall payments, particularly when the orphan estates were 
large.  
Demutualising appeared very attractive indeed to policyholders of strong 
mutual companies with large estates. The perceived advantages (they were promised 
large windfall payments) far outweighed costs (loss of ownership and the estate), 
which was partly due to the fact that the advantages of having an estate were diffuse 
(they were spread out over generations), while the benefits of distributing it were 
concentrated, directly benefitting the current generation of policyholders. The 
demutualisation of Scottish Provident, for instance, entailed an average £4,000 
windfall payment to policyholders (Bachelor, 2001). Similarly, Scottish Widows 
made one-off payments to its policyholders of £5,500 on average, with the maximum 
windfall payment amounting to £116,000 (Jones, 1999). It is little surprise, therefore, 




the case of Scottish Provident, for instance, 97% of more than 200,000 voting 
policyholders voted in favour of the deal.  
The demutualisation wave brought to the fore some of the social tensions that 
were built into conventional with-profits insurance. In an early discussion of the 
subject at the Institute, it was noted that several questions needed to be addressed in 
designing a demutualisation transaction (Field et al., 1991). First, what exactly 
constituted policyholder reasonable expectations? As noted above, the interpretation 
of the clause had remained rather vague since its implementation. The context of a 
demutualisation transaction, however, required a practical interpretation, because 
demutualising insurers had to show how they intended to make sure the interests of 
policyholders were protected before getting regulatory approval to do so. Second, 
how should compensation for demutualisation be allocated across different 
policyholders? Although it was clear that such an allocation mechanism should 
roughly reflect the contribution that each policyholder had made to the existing 
surpluses, for several technical reasons it was not clear how exactly this should be 
done. Third, but not least important, what should be the size of compensation? In a 
demutualisation transaction, policyholders forfeited their property rights as well as 
the estate and a share of future profits. How much compensation was appropriate, 
however, was difficult to say. In the early 1990s, there were several cases in which 
the orphaned assets of proprietary with-profits funds were at stake in a struggle 
between shareholders and policyholders (Penrose, 2004, p. 428), a tension in 
conventional with-profits insurance that was now introduced in some of the formerly 
mutual companies too.  
In addressing these questions, the demutualisation issue established a link 
between ‘policyholder reasonable expectations’ (PRE) and asset shares, two devices 
that had theretofore remained separate. In order to protect policyholders’ interests, 
there was a perceived need to define more clearly what constituted policyholders’ 
reasonable expectations. The Institute subsequently set up a working party to this 
end, chaired by the actuary Bernard Brindley, which concluded that at the very 
minimum PRE consisted of the expectation that guaranteed benefits (including any 
reversionary bonuses already rewarded) were met in full and that the company would 
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be managed ‘ethically and competently’ (Penrose, 2004, p. 436). Many recognised, 
however, that PRE should include something more than just guaranteed benefits and 
competent management. After all, with-profits policyholders expected to be 
compensated (through bonuses) for paying premiums in excess of equivalent non-
profit premiums and accepting a degree of uncertainty. In seeking to define how 
much policyholders could reasonably expect this compensation to be, it noted that ‘in 
the normal day-to-day actuarial management of a life policy, PRE is synonymous 
with equity and the almost universal method for measuring it is asset share 
calculation’, but added that ‘it is, naturally, widely accepted that there are differing 
ways of calculating asset shares’ (Brindley 1990 as quoted in Penrose, 2004, p. 437). 
By establishing equivalence between the two terms, the equivocal meaning of PRE 
was thus replaced with the almost equally equivocal meaning of asset shares. The 
inability to determine the meaning of PRE points to a core feature of conventional 
with-profits arrangements: namely, the role of actuarial discretion as a mechanism 
for dealing with uncertainty ‒ a feature that sat uncomfortably with the logic of 
private property and ‘equity’. Nevertheless, with the introduction of asset shares, 
with-profits policyholders were increasingly seen as a type of shareholder with 
equity stakes.  
The restructuring of the life insurance industry that took off in the 1990s had 
some important implications for the industry. By the end of the noughties, there were 
almost no mutual life offices left. Although mutual offices were not insulated from 
the social tensions embedded in conventional insurance, the absence of shareholders 
meant there was at least one less tension. Actuaries with experience of working at 
mutual offices believed ‒ in varying degrees ‒ that ‘being able to look after the best 
interests of policyholders with no concern for shareholders leads to better investment 
performance, actuarial management and general strategy’ (Eastwood et al., 1991, p. 
173). After demutualisation, many of the offices were acquired by non-insurance 
companies looking to enter the insurance market, some of whom were banks. In such 
cases, a demutualisation transaction could have a significant impact on insurers’ 
investment practices. When Scottish Widows was acquired by Lloyd’s TSB, for 
instance, the latter required the former to ‘hedge’ its exposure to fluctuations in 




which were typically invested in equity shares, contributed to an overall decline in 
insurers’ equity holdings.  
In sum, the wave of demutualisations brought to the fore some of the social 
conflicts that were woven into the structure of conventional with-profits insurance 
and, in so doing, constituted pressure on the actuarial profession to formalise the 
interpretation of PRE. Reluctant to formalise the meaning of PRE, however, the 
almost equally equivocal concept of ‘asset shares’ was taken as a placeholder. 
Although many companies applied ‘asset share’ methodology in practice, thus 
providing ‘instances’ from which the meaning of the term could be inferred, 
applications of the concept diverged greatly. Thus, while some degree of 
formalisation was achieved, it remained possible to interpret the concept in multiple, 
often contradictory but equally valid ways. Nevertheless, efforts to interpret PRE in 
the context of demutualisation had led to emphasise the similarities between with-
profits policyholders and shareholders and the efficiency of companies’ capital 
structure.  
‘With Profits, Without Mystery’ 
When investment conditions further deteriorated in the early 2000s, many UK life 
insurers experienced severe stresses. After an initial drop in the early 1980s, interest 
rates continued to decline throughout the 1990s. Subsequently, with the bursting of 
the Dotcom bubble, stock markets slumped in the period 2000-2003. Although US 
stock markets were most severely struck, the FTSE-100 index based on the top 100 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange nearly halved in this period. Many 
insurers (though not all) got into significant financial trouble, and some of them, like 
Pearl Assurance, Royal Life and Sun Alliance, closed for new business. Most 
troubled of all was Equitable Life. After a ruling by the House of Lords (discussed in 
more detail below) the company had to put itself up for sale. When it failed to find a 
buyer, the company closed its doors to new entrants. Soon after, it became known 
that the company’s shortfalls were much more substantial than had initially been 
assumed and the affair turned into a major scandal. The government eventually put 
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£1.5bn into a compensation scheme for Equitable’s policyholders and estimated total 
policyholder losses at £4.1bn (HM Treasury, 2016).  
In many ways, the story of Equitable Life is exemplary of the above-described 
developments, although ‒ as some of my interviews pointed out ‒ some of its 
practices were regarded as rather unconventional and idiosyncratic. The story is 
entangled with that of pension provisioning for university staff. In the 1960s, the 
Equitable Life ran a rather small with-profits life insurance fund, highly dependent 
on pensions business from the Federated Superannuation Scheme for Universities, 
which amounted to more than half of the company’s business (Penrose, 2004, p. 69). 
When the Federated Superannuation Scheme for Universities had to restructure due 
to tax reforms and Equitable, as a consequence, lost a large chunk of its business, the 
company changed tack. From the 1960s onwards, ‘Equitable embarked on a 
programme of branch expansion in the middle of the 1960s, revised its marketing 
policy and adopted a more aggressive approach to sales’ (Penrose, 2004, p. 69). In 
the second half of the twentieth century, therefore, the company grew substantially. 
In 1960, its total assets amounted to £39mln; in subsequent decades this figure 
increased to £113mln in 1970, £534mln in 1980, £5,786mln in 1990 and, eventually 
£33,553mln in 2000 (Penrose, 2004, p. 70).  
The company’s expansion, fuelled in part by the sustenance of high bonus 
rates, contributed to the depletion of its surplus. In response, Equitable’s actuaries 
gradually altered the company’s bonus system to a system they would later refer to 
as the ‘managed fund’ approach ‒ an approach that was akin to unitised with-profits 
insurance as described above. The Penrose report, which concluded a lengthy 
investigation in Equitable’s downfall ‒ argued that Equitable’s actuaries had 
developed their approach rather haphazardly. To sustain high bonus rates, the 
Equitable Life had drained its estate, first in the early 1970s, and, after having rebuilt 
it temporarily, again throughout the 1980s (Penrose, 2004, p. 119). It then adopted a 
‘full distribution’ policy in the 1980s. In contrast to market convention, Equitable’s 
policyholders would receive benefits that would ‘reflect the value of the assets in the 
fund attributable to [each policyholder’s] policy, i.e. that policyholder’s asset share’, 




1989) ‒ the asset shares were subject to smoothing. Policyholders, in other words, 
would receive their asset share plus or minus an adjustment for current market 
conditions. As a result, the company’s surpluses continued to shrink, and, as noted in 
the Penrose report, to such an extent that the company ‘entered the 1990s with a 
negative estate accordingly’ (Penrose, 2004, p. 117).  
Competing aggressively, the company thus developed a new approach to 
with-profits insurance which allowed it to sustain (temporarily) high bonus rates and 
which could leave the company (again temporarily) with a deficit. In 1989 and 1990, 
Equitable’s actuaries Roy Ranson and Chris Headdon (Ranson and Headdon, 1989, 
1990) took the unusual step to present a paper describing their ‘managed fund’ 
approach at both the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, entitled ‘With Profits, 
Without Mystery’ (actuaries typically refrain from discussing the specific practices 
of their companies and rather focus on industry practice at large). ‘Within our office’, 
Ranson and Headdon explained the motivation of their paper, ‘we had begun to feel a 
growing frustration with the fairly prevalent obfuscation within the industry 
regarding with-profits business compared with our tendency to view it in a simple 
straightforward way’ (Ranson and Headdon, 1989).  
The response to Equitable’s managed fund approach was strongly divided. 
Some praised Equitable’s approach for its simplicity and flexibility, but many were 
also critical, particularly for the fact that it seemed to endow the company with even 
more discretion than they already had. Marshall Field, who, as discussed above, had 
expressed concerns about the extent of freedom offered to offices in running with-
profits funds in his presidential address only two years before, wondered ‘what 
controls are there on the discretion that I was so concerned about?’ (Ranson and 
Headdon, 1989). Increased transparency of bonus distribution could lead to enhanced 
commercial pressure to sustain high bonus rates. Some also questioned the 
desirability of running a fund without an estate, particularly in the case of a mutual 
office (such as Equitable) which did not have access to shareholder capital. Hugh 
Scurfield, for instance, argued that an estate could serve as a capital buffer against 
investment risk, allowing an office to invest in riskier but also more profitable assets. 
Similarly, at the Edinburgh discussion of the paper, Adrian Eastwood argued that an 
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estate was indeed necessary to support the ‘mismatch’ risk of the guarantees 
contained in the policies.  
Still others argued that the concepts used to describe the approach remained 
unclear. For example, while Ranson and Headdon noted that with-profits 
policyholders ‘expect a return broadly commensurate with a unit-linked approach’, 
they also seemed to imply ‒ unlike a unit-linked approach ‒ a great degree of 
smoothing. What, some wondered, did an asset share precisely consist of in this 
case? ‘Is the asset share regarded as including the smoothing element, or is it a figure 
which then has the smoothing process applied to it?’ (Jenkins in Ranson and 
Headdon, 1989, p. 327). Thus, even though some considered the managed fund 
approach to offer a simpler and more flexible alternative to conventional business, 
and, indeed, they suspected that some other offices were running on a similar 
approach, it was also recognised that it contained some important challenges, not 
least of which was the tension between adopting an ‘equity’ approach to asset shares 
and the smoothing logic of conventional insurance, which required at least some 
degree of discretion.  
Finitism, Expectations and the Guaranteed Annuity Options 
Crisis 
Although Equitable’s approach, which was itself born out of an attempt to 
reinvigorate a declining company by aggressively competing for market share, 
contributed to the overall deterioration of the company’s financial position, the most 
severe blow would come from a court ruling by the House of Lords. In the court 
case, it was the meaning of concepts such as ‘actuarial discretion’, ‘policyholder 
reasonable expectations’ and ‘asset shares’, which were at stake. As suggested by 
meaning finitism (discussed in chapter 2), the meaning of terms such as these is not 
intrinsic but generated through specific applications. The court case, as I argue in this 
section, sanctioned a particular application of policyholder reasonable expectations 
that was at odds with how actuaries had previously understood it, which ultimately 
points to a deeper tension in with-profits insurance as it existed in the late 1990s: the 




twin-mechanism for dealing with uncertainty, comprised of actuarial prudence and 
discretion.  
The court case revolved around the Guaranteed Annuity Options (GAOs) that 
Equitable Life and several other companies sold as part of their pension policies. A 
GAO gives a policyholder the right (but not the obligation) to convert a lump sum 
amount at the end of a savings contract into an annuity (a regular stream of payments 
until death) at a predetermined rate. A guaranteed annuity rate of 10%, for instance, 
would guarantee that a policyholder, given a certain age, would receive £100 per 
annum until death for every £1,000 cash at maturity of the savings policy. The value 
of a GAO thus depends on interest rates as well as mortality. If interest rates or 
mortality declined, the value of the annuity would increase. The GAOs thus provided 
policyholders with some security for a minimum retirement income. GAO 
policyholders need not buy the annuity at the guaranteed rate; they may in time also 
buy an annuity at the current market rate. At the point at which the guarantees were 
sold, these market rates were typically much more attractive than the ones that were 
guaranteed. 
 Equitable Life, which sought to compete aggressively in the market for 
pension business, had sold relatively large quantities of GAO policies from 1957 
(when it started selling individual pension plans) to 1988 (when personal pensions 
were introduced). While at the time the GAOs were sold, current annuity rates were 
typically much more attractive than guaranteed rates, this gradually started to change 
in the 1990s. Most problematic were the contracts being sold from 1975 onwards 
when Equitable increased its interest rate assumptions in a period of high inflation 
and concomitantly high interest rates (Corley, 2001; Penrose, 2004). In subsequent 
years, as interest rates declined throughout the 1980s and 90s and life expectancy 
continued to increase above expectation, the GAOs sold by Equitable increasingly 
started to bite. Already in 1982, market interest rates briefly dipped below those 
assumed in the GAO policies. In the early 1990s, guaranteed annuity rates briefly 
exceeded those offered in the open market (the GAOs started to ‘bite’), and, finally, 
from 1997 onwards they continued doing so increasingly (O’Brien, 2006).  
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When the GAOs started biting, there was a large degree of uncertainty about 
how valuable they were. First, the optionality of a GAO meant that it was difficult to 
assign a value to it considering that the variables affecting it were random. Although 
actuaries agreed that even non-biting GAOs still carried a risk ‒ a risk for which 
policyholders should be charged ‒ it was unclear how large the risk and the charges 
for it should be. This was partly because actuaries typically evaluated the value of 
GAOs deterministically ‒ that is, using ‘prudent’, point-based estimates for interest 
rates and mortality; it was difficult to say how prudent such estimates were. Another 
complicating factor was the infrequency of knowledge produced about longevity 
improvements. As Andrew Chamberlain, who worked as an actuary at the 
Government Actuary’s Department at the time, later wrote to the Penrose Inquiry: 
‘Companies can see changes in interest rates, but lighter mortality rates are not seen 
on the same daily basis’ (Chamberlain in Penrose, 2004, p. 607). In addition, 
Chamberlain continued, it was difficult to assess to what extent seeming 
improvements in longevity were not actually ‘statistical noise’, and to what extent 
the ‘rate in longevity improvements’ was picking up. Companies thus had limited 
means to assess how the value of GAOs would change as circumstances changed. 
The annuity guarantees issue brought to the fore some of the tensions that 
might exist among policyholders in a with-profits fund. As Nick Dumbreck recalls, 
the issue of annuity guarantees came up in the demutualization of Provident Mutual, 
a company with ‘some quite onerous guarantees’ on its books (Dumbreck interview). 
Dumbreck was Chair of the Life Research Committee of the UK actuarial profession 
at the time and ‘was instrumental in setting up’ a joint Faculty and Institute working 
party to compare insurers’ reserving practices. After having set out a survey, the 
working party found that of the 66 responding companies (representing 90% of the 
total market), 41 had sold annuity guarantees. The total value of liabilities of the 41 
companies, according to the survey, was £304 billion, of which £35 billion contained 
annuity guarantees (Bolton et al., 1997). Some companies sought to establish explicit 
reserves for the guarantees by adjusting bonuses on with-profits policies. The 
question remained, however, who should be charged for the cost of guarantees? 
Should the costs be spread equally across all policies or only across those policy 




former case, policyholders without annuity guarantees would be affected by policies 
that were not their own. The latter approach, however, which was also referred to as 
a ‘differential terminal bonus policy’, seemed to defeat the purpose of a guarantee. 
After all, if exercising the guarantee meant that the contract’s lump sum benefits 
were to be reduced, then what was the point of having the guarantee in the first 
place?  
By the late 1990s, Equitable Life’s estate had already eroded, but it also did 
not want to charge its non-GAO policyholders for policies that were not their own. It 
decided, therefore, to operate a differential terminal bonus policy, a policy that 
Equitable’s actuaries had first cooked up in the early 1980s when interest rates 
dropped below those implied by the GAOs (Penrose, 2004). The policy was defined 
as follows (Penrose, 2004, p. 6): 
The income available to the policyholders is the higher of:  
(i) Fund (including final bonus) x current annuity rates;  
(ii) Fund (excluding final bonus) x GAR [Guaranteed 
Annuity Rate].  
However, according to the Penrose inquiry, Equitable Life had poorly 
communicated its intention to use a differential terminal bonus policy to its 
policyholders, and, in 1998, it started receiving complaints from its policyholders, 
who, to their dismay, discovered that the guaranteed annuity rate only applied to their 
guaranteed benefits. The company’s management, confident it had a strong case, 
sought to settle the issue by bringing it to court. The court proceedings initially 
looked favourable but took an unexpected turn. While the high court ruled in favour 
of Equitable, its decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal in a 2-1 vote.  
The case was eventually put before the House of Lords, which ultimately 
ruled Equitable’s differential terminal bonus policy illegal in a 5-0 vote. Although 
the Lords recognised that ‘[b]onuses are determined by directors in the exercise of a 
discretion conferred upon them’, they argued that adjustments to the company’s 
bonus policy to override the effect of having a GAO undermined policyholder 
reasonable expectations.  
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[F]inal bonuses are not bounty. They are a significant part of the 
consideration for the premiums paid. And the directors' discretions 
as to the amount and distribution of bonuses are conferred for the 
benefit of policyholders. In this context the self-evident 
commercial object of the inclusion of guaranteed rates in the policy 
is to protect the policyholder against a fall in market annuity rates 
by ensuring that if the fall occurs he will be better off than he 
would have been with market rates. The choice is given to the 
GAR policyholder and not to the Society. It cannot be seriously 
doubted that the provision for guaranteed annuity rates was a good 
selling point in the marketing by the Society of the GAR policies. 
It is also obvious that it would have been a significant attraction for 
purchasers of GAR policies. The Society points out that no special 
charge was made for the inclusion in the policy of GAR provisions. 
So be it. This factor does not alter the reasonable expectations of 
the parties. (House of Lords, 2000) 
As discussed above, Equitable’s bonus policy explicitly aimed roughly to equalise 
policyholders’ benefits with their asset shares. The House of Lords ruled that such 
expectations should not be altered depending on whether the policyholder chooses to 
exercise a GAO or not.  
Although it is not within the purview of this chapter to explain what factors 
contributed to the decision falling one way rather than another (that would require a 
whole other chapter), it is important to note that the degree in which Equitable’s 
practices conformed with legal terms such as ‘policyholder reasonable expectations’ 
could not objectively be established in advance of the court rulings. The meaning of 
such terms as ‘policyholder reasonable expectations’ and ‘asset shares’ was open-
ended, and the interpretation of the Lords conflicted with the notion that it was up to 
actuaries to determine what a fair bonus system consisted of. Indeed, many actuaries 
perceived (and continue to perceive) the decision as a faulty one, even if they 
recognise that Equitable had made some mistakes. An actuary who worked at the 
Government Actuary’s Department at the time, for instance, noted that: ‘The biggest 
error was a legal error. They [Equitable] worded their policies badly. That and the 
fact that the House of Lords judgment was actually based upon finding there was an 
implied term in the contract, which would never have been agreed at the time. The 
judges didn't understand the full implications, and they created a solution that 




The court ruling would have important consequences for the market field and 
the distribution of epistemic authority in particular. Investigations of Equitable’s 
collapse were critical of the way in which the actuarial profession had exercised its 
epistemic authority and the concomitant responsibilities. The Penrose Inquiry, for 
instance, argued amongst other things that actuaries had shown ‘reluctance to indulge 
in mutual criticism’ (Penrose, 2004, p. 121), and prompted further investigation into 
the way in which the profession operated. The subsequent ‘Morris Review of the 
Actuarial Profession’, described the actuarial profession as ‘a profession that has 
been too introspective, not forward-looking enough and slow to modernise’ (Morris, 
2005, p. 4). With the specialist role of the Appointed Actuary, the profession had 
acquired a special role in the governance of insurers’ financial position, but the 
methods which it applied in carrying out such responsibilities, the Review concluded, 
were outdated. Collins, Dewing and Russell (2009) described actuaries for these 
reasons as ‘fallen heroes’, who had failed in their duty to protect the interests of both 
individual policyholders and the company. The weakened standing of the actuarial 
profession was reflected in changes, for instance, in the supervision of the industry. 
While actuaries employed by the Government Actuary’s Department had previously 
played an important role in supervision, interview data indicates that many of them 
were given a position with fewer responsibilities after incorporation of insurance 
supervision into the Financial Services Authority (interview 29; see also: Collins et 
al., 2009). The collapse of the Equitable, in other words, had led or at least 
contributed to the decline of the profession’s epistemic authority, causing 
professionals with no actuarial background to take up a more proactive stance in 
epistemic matters.  
Conclusion 
The crucial point of this chapter is that the challenge to conventional insurance 
arrangements by unit-linked insurance had some important implications for the social 
order in the life insurance field. As the newly emerging unit-linked companies 
challenged the dominant position of traditional insurance companies, incumbent 
insurers increasingly started using unit-linked insurance as an exemplar for the 
distribution of bonuses in with-profits arrangements. There was a convergence 
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between unit-linked insurance and conventional insurance. With-profits 
policyholders were gradually regarded as having an ‘equity stake’ in the company, 
similar to that of shareholders, which was reflected in their asset share. The 
introduction of asset share methodology in some insurance companies thus reduced 
the discretionary space afforded to actuaries and their companies to adjust benefits 
according to financial circumstances, which impaired the traditional mechanism for 
dealing with uncertainty at a time when financial market volatility started to surge. 
At the same time, however, at least some of the insurers continued to rely on bonus 
policy as a marketing device. The downfall of Equitable Life in many ways 
epitomised these developments, even if its practices were not entirely reflective of 
industry practice more general, and contributed significantly to the decline of the 













Chapter 5  
‘Taking Account of What the Market Has to Say’ 
Sometime in 2003, Barrie & Hibbert, a small company based in Edinburgh, received 
a phone call from an insurance company asking for an ‘economic scenario 
generator’. Although John Hibbert, who picked up the phone, recalls he ‘had to ask 
them what they meant’, it was essentially what the company had already been doing 
since the late 1990s; they simply had ‘never used that terminology before’ (Hibbert 
interview). After the first company had called, the ‘phone rang again and somebody 
wanted the same thing, and then the phone rang [again]’ (Hibbert interview). In 
subsequent years, however, economic scenario generators would become a pivotal 
piece of technology in the knowledge machinery underpinning the UK’s life 
insurance market. Barrie & Hibbert, whose scenario generator became widely used, 
grew to become one of the main (if not the main) model providers to the industry. 
Barrie & Hibbert started as a relative outsider to the market for actuarial 
advice. Both its founders were former investment bankers who, for personal reasons, 
returned from London to Edinburgh. Unable to find a job as ‘quantitative analysts’ in 
Edinburgh’s financial sector (because there were none), they decided ‘to try and 
create an advisory research business’ (Hibbert interview). Founded in 1995, Barrie & 
Hibbert’s helped asset managers manage market risk and understand structured 
financial products. The company also did some ‘asset-liability management’, the 
analysis of a company’s investment strategy in relation to its liabilities. When in the 
early 2000s the UK’s Financial Services Authority required insurers to measure their 
liabilities using techniques similar to those used in the derivatives departments of 
investment banks, few insurers had access to relevant expertise. Barrie & Hibbert 
filled a ‘structural hole’ (Burt, 1992). Their expertise in ‘state of the art’ financial 
modelling techniques and the work they had done on asset-liability management 
formed the basis for their economic scenario generator ‒ a piece of software that 
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allowed insurers to do the required calculations. Barrie & Hibbert soon became the 
industry’s main supplier of economic scenario generators.  
Similar to chapter 3, this chapter revolves around the emergence of a new 
type of modelling practice: the ‘market-consistent’ modelling of insurance liabilities. 
Market-consistent modelling ‒ a type of modelling that requires the use of economic 
scenario generators such as those produced by Barrie & Hibbert ‒ draws from an 
intellectual tradition quite distinct from actuarial science: that of modern financial 
economics. In this chapter, I examine how and why the core models of modern 
finance theory were used as exemplars for the modelling of insurance liabilities. The 
chapter proceeds as follows: in the next section, I describe traditional valuation 
practice and the changing institutional environment in which they were deployed. I 
then describe the emergence of modern finance theory and its influence on financial 
market practice, before examining how no-arbitrage modelling came to play a role in 
the epistemic field of actuarial science. In the fourth section, I describe how no-
arbitrage models served as exemplars for the market-consistent modelling of 
insurance liabilities. Finally, I examine how we may understand the emergence of 
market-consistent modelling as a paradigm shift in the epistemic field of actuarial 
science.  
From ‘Freedom with Publicity’ to Statutory Regulation 
The UK’s regime of ‘freedom with publicity’ had been in place since 1870. Since 
then, actuaries were required to perform periodical valuations of insurance liabilities 
but were free to choose the appropriate methods for doing so, on the condition that 
they published an actuarial statement describing the methods and assumptions they 
had used. In the wake of Equitable Life’s downfall (discussed in chapter 4), however, 
this regime came to an end. In this section, I first describe the method that actuaries 
traditionally used for valuation purposes (and was considered to have failed in the 





The net premium valuation method 
Crucial for the traditional actuarial approach to valuation was the ‘net 
premium’ valuation method, which is similar, but slightly more complicated than the 
related ‘gross premium’ method (Turnbull, 2017). A gross premium valuation 
involves the calculation of the ‘net present value’ of all future income (premiums) 
and outgoings (expenses, claims), the value of the liability simply being the 
difference between them. Because premium rates are typically set such that the 
company expects to make a profit, the net present value of premiums will exceed that 
of expenses and claims; in a gross premium valuation, then, liability values tend to 
be negative at their inception. This caused practical problems. Many actuaries 
considered it ‘inappropriate to immediately recognise the profit that was expected to 
be generated over the lifetime of the policy’ (Turnbull, 2017, p. 124). After all, 
profits were only gradually to be distributed to a company’s with-profits 
policyholders through bonus distributions and, if it was a proprietary company, to its 
shareholders.  
The net premium valuation method, in contrast, was designed to allow for the 
gradual release of profit. It did so by reducing the present value of premium income 
so that the net liability value (present value of claims and expenses minus the present 
value of net premiums) would be zero. The net premium valuation thus implicitly 
accounts for future bonuses by deducing ‘profit loadings’ from future premium 
income. These profit loadings then conveniently gave an indication of how large 
bonuses should be. Although many actuaries agreed that the method had several 
important weaknesses, net premium valuations remained a core part of insurers’ 
valuation machinery into the twenty-first century.  
This approach was well suited for some purposes but not others. In his famous 
paper on the principles of life office valuation, Prudential’s chief actuary Frank 
Redington (1952), for instance, pointed to an important trade-off to be made when 
deciding on a valuation method:  
A valuation has two main purposes, and the fundamental difficulty 
is that these two purposes are in conflict. The first and primary 
purpose is to ensure that the office is solvent. The second is to 
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allow the surplus to emerge in an equitable way suited to the bonus 
system. The solvency criterion leads to a changing valuation basis, 
influenced solely by prospective considerations… On the other 
hand, the pursuit of equity of emergence of surplus tends to lead to 
stable valuation bases, influenced mainly by retrospective 
considerations and possibly differentiated according to the terms at 
issue. We are thus faced at the beginning with that most fruitful 
source of controversy, the attempt to reply to two different 
questions in a single answer. (Redington, 1952, p. 298) 
The net premium valuation method was designed for bonus purposes and was 
therefore less suitable for assessing insurers’ solvency. Particularly problematic was 
the fluctuation of interest rates, which, according to Redington, had given rise to an 
‘expanding funnel of doubt’ already in the first half of the twentieth century 
(Redington, 1952, p. 287). ‘A net premium valuation’, he continued to explain, ‘is 
only partially sensitive to a change in the rate of interest because the change in the 
rate is accompanied by a change in the net premiums ‒ a technical idiosyncrasy 
which has no counterpart in the facts’ (Redington, 1952, p. 307). With net premium 
valuations, it was difficult to see the impact of changing economic conditions on 
insurers’ balance sheets – a feature that became increasingly important with the 
surging financial market volatility in the 1970s and 80s. 15 
From the 1980s onwards, however, insurers increasingly started using asset 
share methodology as an alternative approach to bonuses (see chapter 4). One of my 
interviewees who started working as a junior actuary at a large office in the 1980s 
(and would later become its chief actuary), remembers that he found it difficult to 
understand the rationale of the net premium valuation method. 
 [Q]uite frankly, I found the net premium valuation sort of difficult 
to understand … [I]t's trying to allow for profit emergence in a way 
that suits bonuses. And so you sort of shrug your shoulders and 
say, well, okay. But, you know, not long after I got there … asset 
shares were being used to decide what bonuses you wanted to pay, 
and then the net premium valuation was just used to produce the 
answer and the surplus you needed to pay those bonuses. So, you 
                                                 
15 The net premium valuation method, moreover, was often used in combination with a set of 
assumptions known as the ‘premium basis’, or, in other words, the set of assumptions that were made 
at the time the contract was written. Even though these assumptions were typically ‘prudent’, in 
periods of great economic change, the assumptions made in the premium basis may come to diverge 




know, I'm sure in the 1950s and 60s it was important that the net 
premium valuation produced the surplus it did and then that was 
used to pay a bonus. Whereas by the time I got there it ran the 
other way. You use the asset shares to decide what bonuses you 
want and then adjusted the net premium valuation to give you the 
right answer. (Belsham interview) 
Although the emergence of asset shares reduced the significance of the net premium 
valuation method for insurers’ bonus policies, many actuaries continued to use it well 
into the noughties to value insurers’ liabilities ‒ a task for which some argued the net 
premium valuation method was not very well suited.  
Towards a ‘realistic’ statutory regime 
Although most regulatory changes took place in the wake of the crisis 
described in the previous chapter, the supervision of insurance companies had 
gradually become more stringent already in prior decades. Since the 1870 Insurance 
Companies Amendment Act, responsibility for insurance supervision lay with the 
Board of Trade, which, in lieu of in-house actuarial expertise, started seeking advice, 
first, from actuaries in government service, and from the 1920s onwards from the 
government’s internal actuarial consultancy, the Government Actuary’s Department 
(or the GAD), to scrutinise companies’ regulatory returns in the early twentieth 
century. The GAD quickly became the de facto supervisor. For most of the twentieth 
century, however, the resources dedicated to the supervision of insurance firms 
remained limited. By the 1960s, for instance, the GAD employed one full-time 
employee and one part-time senior employee tasked with insurance supervision 
(Daykin, 1992). 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the stringency of insurance 
supervision gradually increased. By 1992, for instance, the GAD employed 17 
actuaries working full-time on insurance supervision (Daykin, 1999, p. 530). 
Regulations, moreover, had cemented the position of actuaries within insurance 
firms. The 1973 Act required every company to have an ‘appointed actuary’, who 
would be responsible for producing the company’s regulatory returns. The appointed 
actuary, in other words, was part of the company’s management team and had 
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responsibilities towards the Department of Trade and Industry to protect 
policyholders (Johnston, 1989, p. 28).  
Around the turn of the century, the pace of change picked up drastically. The 
guaranteed annuity crisis and the collapse of Equitable Life led to the perceived 
failure of traditional actuarial methods accurately to represent insurers’ ‘true’ 
solvency position. The deterministic methods that actuaries typically used (using 
point-based estimates of key variables), had failed to account for the ‘time value’ of 
insurance guarantees, and in the net premium valuation method, moreover, future 
bonuses were accounted for only implicitly. This, critics argued, had obfuscated 
insurers’ ‘real’ liabilities. The Penrose Inquiry concluded, for instance, that the 
‘regulatory returns and measures of solvency applied by the regulators did not keep 
pace with developments in the industry… regulatory solvency became an 
increasingly irrelevant measure of the realistic financial position of the Society’ 
(Penrose, 2004, p. 727).  
When the fall out of the maturity guarantees crisis was in full swing, the UK’s 
newly integrated financial services supervisor, the Financial Services Authority, 
decided to overhaul the epistemic machinery underpinning the production of 
regulatory returns. Although European efforts to revise the calculative framework of 
regulatory solvency were already on their way (starting in 1997 – see chapter 7), the 
FSA also noted that ‘the [current] EU minimum is widely regarded … as inadequate’ 
(FSA, 2002b). This was especially problematic in the early 2000s when after the 
bursting of the Dotcom bubble stock markets were persistently in decline. The FSA 
proposed simply to increase the EU minimum requirements. The industry, however, 
railed against this proposition. Although many conceded there was a need for more 
stringent capital standards, they also argued that regulatory capital requirements 
should reflect the ‘real’ risk embedded in an office’s liabilities. By simply raising 
capital requirements, companies that had been more prudent would nonetheless be 
required to hold more capital at a time when the value of their assets was 
significantly depressed. For them, simply raising capital requirements would lead to 
‘“margins upon margins”, overstating the provisions required’ (Dullaway and 




To extricate itself from this conundrum, the FSA pursued the implementation 
of a ‘twin-peaks’ regime. In this regime, insurers had to measure their liabilities in 
two ways (yielding two ‘peaks’). The first peak comprised a traditional valuation as 
prescribed by the principles put down in the EU’s Third Life Directive (see chapter 
7), and a measure of the solvency margin using the EU’s formulaic approach. The 
second peak, however, comprised two new devices: a ‘realistic’ valuation of 
insurers’ assets and liabilities (resulting in a ‘realistic balance sheet’) and firms’ own 
‘risk-based’ assessment of capital requirements (the individual capital assessment or 
ICA). A realistic valuation of with-profits liabilities, the then chairman of the FSA 
Howard Davies explained in October 2002, should take into account both 
discretionary benefits and the time value of options, as well as the benefits that were 
guaranteed. The realistic balance sheet, moreover, should be calculated using ‘the 
same techniques as are used by banks and other participants in the capital markets’ 
(Davies, 2002). For the ICA, the FSA required companies to measure their risks with 
stress and scenario tests. A company’s capital requirements would be equal to the 
higher of the two peaks, the idea being that the second peak would reflect a 
company’s real risk profile. In contrast to the previous valuation regime, the realistic 
balance sheet would not contain any ‘implicit margins’, but would provide an 
‘objective, best-estimate’ of the value of a company’s liabilities and the risks 
contained within them.16 
Changes in the evaluation practices underpinning insurance regulation were 
thus facilitated by the decline of actuaries’ epistemic authority. The more ‘objective’ 
models of modern finance theory circumvented the need for actuarial discretion and 
prudence in matters of financial risk. This is not to say, however, that the application 
of techniques from modern financial economics was straightforward; as suggested by 
meaning finitism, it required implicit or explicit decisions to be made (see chapter 2). 
                                                 
16 The choice for market-consistent valuation, moreover, articulated well with international 
developments in accounting and solvency regulation. As noted above, the EU had started a project to 
harmonise European insurance solvency regulation in the late 1990s. At the same, the International 
Accounting Standards Board started development of an accounting standard for insurance contracts in 
line with the fair value approach. Both developments seemed to move towards market-consistent 
valuation. However, while the FSA rapidly unfolded a market-consistent regime, the International 
Accounting Standards Board did not. An international ‘fair-value’ accounting standard was agreed 
upon only in May 2017 and will come in force after January 2021. 
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When the new regime was announced, most insurance companies did not have the 
appropriate machinery in place to perform the calculations required for the second 
peak. Indeed, John Hibbert remembers that regulators ‘were aspirational… [A]t a 
higher level [they] could define what they wanted, but they had no real idea how it 
was going to be delivered’ (Hibbert interview). The FSA (2003) considered ‘realistic 
reserving methods’ a ‘developing art’. Given the relatively underdeveloped state of 
these realistic reserving methods and the fact that the stochastic simulation methods 
discussed in chapter 3 were readily available, what can explain the uptake of modern 
finance theory in the context of life insurance? Before addressing this question and 
describing how the ‘developing art’ of realistic reserving was developed into a full-
blown epistemic machinery (in this chapter I focus mainly on valuation; risk 
measurement and management is dealt with in the next chapter), I first examine the 
environment in which no-arbitrage models were developed and deployed.   
No-Arbitrage Modelling and Modern Finance Theory  
By the turn of the century, financial economics was a nascent academic specialism, 
which had gained significant traction in financial markets (Whitley, 1986; 
MacKenzie, 2006). Economists had traditionally paid little attention to finance, and, 
similarly, business finance scholars had shown little interest in the theories and 
methods used by economists. From the 1950s onwards, this started to change 
(Whitley, 1986). Although financial economics ‘had started as separate streams’, by 
1970 these were ‘seen as parts of a largely coherent view of financial markets’ 
(MacKenzie, 2006, p. 66). One of the streams, for instance, concerned itself with the 
analysis of stock prices, the central proposition in the field being the ‘efficient 
market hypothesis’. The efficient market hypothesis, which had famously been 
formulated by Eugene Fama (1965, 1970) and built upon the earlier claim that stock 
prices follow a ‘random walk’ (a topic that was also discussed in chapter 3), put 
forward the suggestion that markets were efficient and at all times would reflect all 
available information in prices. In other words, it would be impossible to predict 
whether prices would move up or down over time. Other streams included ‘modern 
portfolio theory’ (Markowitz, 1952; Treynor, 1961; Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965), 




portfolio of investments, and research into questions such as whether companies’ 
capital structure mattered for their value (Modigliani and Miller, 1958).  
The most influential work emanating from financial economics, however, 
came later: the Black-Scholes-Merton model for pricing options. Option pricing had 
been a long-standing puzzle in finance. The owner of a stock option has the right but 
not the obligation to purchase (or, in the case of a ‘put option’, sell) the underlying 
stock at a predetermined price. An option’s payoff thus depends on the price of the 
underlying stock, a relation that for a long time had been difficult to describe 
mathematically. The option pricing model developed by the Chicago economist 
Fischer Black, and the MIT economists Myron Scholes (1973) and Robert Merton 
(1973), sought to provide an alternative to the rules of thumb on which practitioners 
traditionally relied. The Black-Scholes-Merton model draws on arbitrage arguments, 
which had readily been used in a different context by Modigliani and Miller, and 
suggests that an option’s payoff can be replicated by a portfolio of shares in the 
underlying stock and ‘risk-free’ bonds in continuously adjusted proportions.17 
Following the arbitrage logic (and some simplifying assumptions), the price of the 
option should then be equal to the price of the ‘replicating portfolio’, for if not, 
arbitrageurs could potentially make a ‘riskless profit’ by buying or selling the option 
and ‘hedging’ their risk by buying or selling the replicating portfolio, depending on 
their relative prices. In pursuing these strategies, the actions of arbitrageurs would 
contribute to the convergence between the price of the option and the price of the 
‘replicating portfolio’. The model’s solution to the problem, the Black-Scholes 
equation, expressed the price of a stock option in terms of time, a risk-free interest 
rate and the volatility and price of the underlying stock.  
The importance of the Black-Scholes-Merton model went much further than 
this specific problem solution, which was limited to ‘European options’ and ignored 
                                                 
17 In fact, Black and Scholes had derived their famous Black-Scholes equation from the capital asset 
pricing model central in modern portfolio theory. It was Robert Merton’s paper that provided the no-
arbitrage arguments that would later become so influential. Hence, the model is appropriately referred 
to as the Black-Scholes-Merton model (see MacKenzie, 2006, pp. 135–136).  
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dividends.18 It provided an ‘exemplary problem solution’ that by analogical 
extension indicated how other problems in financial economics could be 
reformulated and solved (MacKenzie, 2006, p. 139), and ‘became the central 
paradigm … of financial economics’ (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003, p. 109). In 
subsequent years, a host of ‘no-arbitrage’ models were developed, some of which 
were intended to express the intuition behind the Black-Scholes-Merton model in 
more general theoretical and mathematical terms. Notable, for instance, was the work 
of Stephen Ross and John Cox, who ‘showed that the determination of option prices 
in [the way suggested by the Black-Scholes-Merton model] was equivalent to the 
principle of “risk-neutral valuation”’ (MacKenzie, 2006, pp. 139–140), a principle 
that did not just apply to options, but to all asset classes. It suggested that all assets 
could be valued by assuming that they would yield an expected return equivalent to 
the risk-free rate and then discounting all projected cash flows using the risk-free 
discount rate. 
Asset pricing theory found an even more general mathematical expression in 
the work of the operations researcher Michael Harrison, the economist David Kreps 
(both at Stanford University) and Stanley Pliska, an operations researcher at 
Northwestern University. Building on the work of Cox and Ross, Harrison and Kreps 
(1979) and by Harrison and Pliska (1981) proved mathematically that if a market is 
‘frictionless’ and free from opportunities for arbitrage, it is possible to assign a 
probability measure (an ‘equivalent martingale measure’ in mathematical terms) 
characterising potential future price trajectories such that the price of a derivative on 
that asset is simply the expected payoff discounted to a present value. Moreover, in a 
complete market (that is, a market in which all risks can be hedged) there is a unique 
probability measure: the ‘risk-neutral measure’ implied in the work of Cox and Ross 
(MacKenzie, 2006, pp. 140–141). Harrison and Kreps had produced mathematical 
proof that in a ‘frictionless’ and ‘complete’ market, and in the absence of 
opportunities for arbitrage, every asset could be assigned a price by assuming that all 
assets provided the same ‘expected rate of return’, the ‘risk-free rate’ ‒ a complicated 
                                                 
18 In contrast to an American option, which can be exercised at any point in time, a European option 
can only be exercised at maturity. This makes the analysis of a European option relatively simple 




proposition that nonetheless proved useful in a wide variety of settings (Chiapello 
and Walter, 2016). As MacKenzie argues, with the publication of Harrison and 
Kreps’s propositions, ‘the basic structure of “orthodox” modern finance theory was 
essentially complete’ (MacKenzie, 2006, p. 141). The papers by Harrison, Kreps and 
Pliska ‘turned financial economics into mathematical finance’ (Davis & Etheridge 
2006, p. 114).  
Although no-arbitrage models rely on what are often considered rather 
arbitrary assumptions about how financial markets work, they became hugely 
influential. What makes no-arbitrage models like the Black-Scholes equation 
distinctive (and perhaps powerful) is that they seek to calculate value 
‘synchronically’ (Langenohl, 2018). The Black-Scholes equation ‘posits the 
existence of a specific socially imagined totality, the market’ (LiPuma, 2017, p. 2; 
emphasis in original). The model, which requires an extensive set of assumptions to 
make the problem mathematically tractable, ‘exteriorizes the social structuring of the 
market, setting aside both the objective structures of the financial market and the 
motivating structures embodied in its agents’ (LiPuma, 2017, p. 3). In so doing, the 
model does not provide an accurate description of real financial markets but 
constructs an idealised image of their underpinning ‘objective structures’, an image 
that allows the formulation of useful practical devices such as the Black-Scholes 
equation. It allows, in other words, the relation between prices and volatility of 
different assets (enforced through the logic of arbitrage) to be expressed in 
mathematical terms. Those who use the Black-Scholes equation in practice rarely 
believe that it describes financial markets accurately, but tend to argue that it helps to 
perceive, orientate and structure financial action – perhaps in ways that make 
markets more ‘rational’ (MacKenzie, 2006; Millo and MacKenzie, 2009; Svetlova, 
2009). Models like the Black-Scholes equation are understood to be objective, 
because they circumvent the need for the formation of ‘expectations’ about future 
financial market behaviour, which is normally required to value assets whose pay-
offs are uncertain.  
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No-arbitrage models have a certain ‘ontological dignity’, which is reflected by 
the distinction that is often made between the ‘real world’ and the ‘world contained 
within the model’. Take for instance Chiapello and Walter, who recently wrote: 
For calculative purposes the “new finance” has imagined a new 
world, the risk-neutral world, in which all invested assets are 
assumed to provide the same expected rate of return, namely the 
risk-free rate, regardless of the risk of each specific asset. This 
purely mathematical transformation certainly has major financial 
virtues. (Chiapello and Walter, 2016, pp. 163–164) 
Similar distinctions may surface in the language of practitioners. They may speak for 
instance speaks of the ‘Black-Scholes world’ and the ‘no-arbitrage world’, a world 
that satisfies assumptions underpinning no-arbitrage models and in which 
opportunities for arbitrage are absent (Kemp, 2009).  
The construction of a ‘model world’ allows no-arbitrage modellers to see 
things that others cannot see. ‘[K]ey to the ontology of no-arbitrage models’, as 
MacKenzie and Spears (2014b, p. 399) point out, are the martingale or risk-neutral 
probabilities referred to earlier. These are central in the derivatives quant culture 
studied by Spears (2014). No-arbitrage modellers do not assign ‘real world’ 
probabilities (which are not to be confused with ‘realistic’ estimations of value) to 
the possible future price trajectories of an asset (probabilities that are based, e.g., in 
archival-statistical analysis), but rather describe such price trajectories with a 
probability distribution that reflects the expectation that future prices will on average 
be equal to today’s price. Risk-neutral probabilities ‘are simultaneously less real and 
more real than actual probabilities’ (MacKenzie and Spears, 2014b, p. 400). They are 
less real in the sense that they do not describe true expectations; they are more real 
because they provide access to the ‘objective’ value of an asset. No-arbitrage models 
thus posit a specific ontology or a particular way of viewing the economic world, 
which sees the world of finance as an objective totality held together by the logic of 
arbitrage.  
Although finance practitioners initially tended to be sceptical or even hostile 
towards early financial economics, a ‘significant body of practitioner opinion came 




Particularly influential was the Black-Scholes equation, which entered the trading 
floor of the Chicago Board Options Exchange in the form of paper sheets as early as 
1973. These devices, which described the relation between the volatility of the 
underlying stock, an option’s strike price and its value, facilitated communication 
between actors on trading floors, allowing for the easy comparison between option 
prices at different strike prices and maturities because they could be expressed in a 
single figure: their ‘implied volatility’ (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; MacKenzie, 
2006; Svetlova, 2018a). In so doing, no-arbitrage models facilitated the development 
of novel trading strategies (Beunza and Stark, 2004, 2012).  
By allowing the ‘backing out’ of assets’ ‘implied volatility’, no-arbitrage 
models also contributed to developments in risk analysis and management (Millo and 
MacKenzie, 2009). ‘Backing out’, which allows modellers to deduce a ‘market 
implied volatility’ for a given from the observable market prices of the asset and a 
derivative on the asset, facilitated the evaluation of risk for large portfolios. 
Quantitative risk management, moreover, helped justify economic capital allocation 
decisions (Lockwood, 2015) by allowing for comparisons between the risk-reward 
trade-off of different portfolios (Holton, 2002; Kavanagh, 2003; Rosen, 2003). No-
arbitrage models thus not only endowed derivatives with legitimacy (MacKenzie and 
Millo, 2003; de Goede, 2005b) but also rationalised and justified the proliferation of 
derivatives and structured products (Dionne, 2013). An early example is portfolio 
insurance, a ‘synthetic put option’ on a market portfolio implemented through the 
kind of dynamic hedging strategy implied by the Black-Scholes-Merton model 
(Leland and Rubinstein, 1988; MacKenzie, 2006). Other innovations included credit 
derivatives, interest rate swaps, caps and floors, and collateralised debt obligations 
(see: Dionne, 2013).  
Finally, the cultural authority of financial economics and the concomitant 
proliferation of derivatives (the value of which was difficult to account for using 
traditional accounting techniques), influenced accounting practice too, manifested by 
the ascendancy of ‘fair-value’ accounting. Preceding conceptual frameworks for 
accounting had increasingly put emphasis on the economic meaning of the balance 
sheet, rather than its legal meaning; fair-value accounting, with its emphasis on 
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market value, thus promised to enhance the economic relevance of accounting 
representations (Power, 2012, pp. 301–302). Fair-value is an accounting technique 
that seeks to make use of market prices and is also referred to as a mark-to-market 
approach. Fair value is typically defined as ‘the price that would be received to sell 
an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market 
participants at the measurement date’ (Laux and Leuz, 2009, p. 827). When 
sufficiently relevant market prices are not available, quoted prices of similar assets or 
hypothetical market prices produced by an economic model may also be used.  
With its focus on observable market prices, fair value accounting is often to 
be more reliable and relevant. Critics, however, point to some important limitations 
too. In practice, relevant market prices are not always readily available, meaning that 
many fair-value representations are mark-to-model rather than mark-to-market, 
giving accounting representations somewhat of an ‘imaginative’ character (Laux and 
Leuz, 2009; Müller, 2014; Zhang and Andrew, 2014), potentially compromising the 
‘reliability’ of the accounting representation (Ronen, 2008). Fair-value accounting, 
moreover, may strengthen procyclical tendencies, inflating the value of a firm in 
good times thereby allowing it to become more highly leveraged (or to take on 
relatively more debt), while deflating it in poor ones (cf. Laux and Leuz, 2009, pp. 
829–830). As discussed below, these issues surfaced in the context of insurance 
valuation too. 
From No-Arbitrage to Market-Consistency 
Having described the key features of no-arbitrage modelling, how can we explain 
their uptake in the field of life insurance? Even if the epistemic authority of 
traditional actuarial methods was on the wane, it does not yet explain why the 
insurance sector embraced no-arbitrage modelling, especially considering that 
stochastic simulation techniques such as the Wilkie model (models that were also 
capable of accounting for the ‘time value’ of guarantees) were more readily 
available. When the FSA required insurers to use the same techniques as are used in 
banking to quantify their liabilities, it was not the first time no-arbitrage models were 




however, tended to diverge. Discussions of the merits of the Black-Scholes equation 
in particular, and, more generally, modern finance theory first appeared in the 
profession with the issue of maturity guarantees on unit-linked business (see chapter 
3). The Irish actuary Colm Fagan had suggested an approach to managing the risk of 
insurance guarantees that was very similar to that suggested by option pricing theory. 
Moreover, a former colleague of Scholes and Merton at MIT, Michael Brennan, and 
his doctoral student Eduardo Schwartz (Brennan and Schwartz, 1976, 1979), and the 
Irish actuary and economist Phelim Boyle (Boyle and Schwartz, 1977), all at the 
University of British Columbia, had published papers in finance journals indicating 
how option pricing theory could be used to price such guarantees.19 The Maturity 
Guarantees Working Party had examined the possibility of using option pricing 
theory, but it reached a (predominantly) negative conclusion; to them, option pricing 
theory seemed ‘to have serious practical disadvantages because it depends upon 
several underlying assumptions’ (Ford et al., 1980, p. 112).20 A similar conclusion 
was reached by the actuary Thomas Collins, who published a paper two years later 
arguing ‘that the theory … is not practical enough’ (Collins, 1982, pp. 281–282). 
Actuaries thus acknowledged that option pricing theory could in principle be 
extended analogically to maturity guarantees on unit-linked contracts, but regarded it 
of limited practicality, because of its foundational assumptions and the discrepancy 
between the near-term expiries of exchange-traded financial options and the long-
                                                 
19 The possibility of drawing an analogy between insurance guarantees and financial options was 
remarked on in other places too. When, for instance, Myron Scholes and Robert Merton were awarded 
the Nobel Prize in 1997 (Black had died by that point), the press release contained the following 
comment: ‘A similar method [as the Black-Scholes-Merton model] may be used to value insurance 
contracts and guarantees. … A guarantee gives the right, but not the obligation, to exploit it under 
certain circumstances. Anyone who buys or is given a guarantee thus holds a kind of option. The same 
is true of an insurance contract. The method developed by this year’s laureates can therefore be used 
to value guarantees and insurance contracts. One can thus view insurance companies and the option 
market as competitors’ (The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 1997). 
20 This is how Phelim Boyle, who was well respected in both the British actuarial profession and 
amongst financial economists, recounts this episode: ‘After a short stint in Liverpool with a firm of 
consulting actuaries, I moved in 1973 to the University of British Columbia in Canada. The Dean, 
Philip White, was building a finance department and had recently hired Michael Brennan and Bob 
White from MIT, both of whom had learned about modern option pricing theory from Scholes and 
Merton. I recall giving an early seminar to the finance group and mentioning the problem of the 
maturity guarantees. Michael excitedly pointed out that this contract was a put option and that it could 
be priced and also hedged using the Black Scholes Merton technology. We wrote a few papers on how 
maturity guarantees could be handled in an option framework. This approach was treated with some 
healthy actuarial scepticism by the Maturity Guarantees Working Party’ (Boyle, 2005, p. 592) 
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term nature of insurance guarantees. With-profits liabilities were entirely out of the 
question. 
By the mid-1990s, however, a new generation of actuaries had emerged, who 
were avid proponents of modern finance theory. According to Turnbull (who was 
one of them), the generation consisted of actuaries who had practical experience with 
modern finance theory in a variety of different professional ecologies (Abbott, 2005; 
Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009) – they‘had independently developed expertise in 
financial economics and who worried that the British actuarial profession was 
dangerously behind other financial professionals’ (Turnbull, 2017, p. 216). Among 
its members was Andrew Smith, a consulting actuary at Bacon & Woodrow (the 
insurance branch of which was acquired by Deloitte in 2000), who, after having been 
‘seconded to an investment bank’ in the early 90s, became familiar with an approach 
to valuation ‘completely different from the way that actuaries did it’ (Smith 
interview). Smith became a leading proponent of ‘the investment banking way of 
doing things’ and with his economic scenario generator (the ‘Smith model’), Deloitte 
became Barrie & Hibbert’s main competitor. Craig Turnbull, who started his 
actuarial career at Watson Wyatt before moving to Barrie & Hibbert where he was 
the ‘fifth man’ and where he finished his actuarial qualification in 2003 (Turnbull 
interview). Other members included David Dullaway, who, rather unusually, had a 
background in economics, Malcolm Kemp, Jon Exley, Shyam Mehta, Cliff Speed, 
David Bowie, and the academic actuaries Andrew Cairns and Angus Macdonald, 
both at Heriot-Watt University’s actuarial department (Turnbull, 2017).  
In the late 1990s, the merits and demerits of modern finance theory were 
discussed within the profession with increased frequency. The debates often incited 
great passion. David Dullaway, for instance, remembers ‘one public meeting … 
where somebody actually stood up and called me a traitor to my profession’ 
(Dullaway interview). According to Dullaway, some actuaries perceived the 
emergence of modern finance theory as a direct threat to traditional actuarial 
approaches.  
There’s a lot of people here who have senior positions, it’s a very 




doing for the last ten, twenty years has simply been wrong. At least 
that’s what they felt I was saying. …There was a real backlash of: 
“you can’t say that, because if you’re right everything that we’re 
doing is wrong”’. (Dullaway interview)  
The main objections against the use of no-arbitrage models in an actuarial 
context (mimicking those of the earlier debates discussed in chapter 3) were that the 
models were based on unrealistic assumptions and that the mathematics required to 
implement such models in actuarial practice was too complex. One of the main 
critics of modern finance theory and avid defender of an ‘actuarial approach’ was the 
actuary Robert Clarkson. Apart from various commentaries in The Actuary, Clarkson 
published two papers, one entitled ‘Financial Economics: An Investment Actuary’s 
Viewpoint’ (1996), the other ‘An Actuarial Theory of Option Pricing’ (1997), 
criticising the ‘unrealistic’ approach of modern finance theory and suggesting 
alternatives. The new generation of actuaries, though, was quite numerous and its 
members attended many of the Institute and Faculty’s sessional meetings, including 
those in which Clarkson presented his paper. They criticised, in particular, 
Clarkson’s use of mathematics. Macdonald, for instance, noted that Clarkson ‘has no 
desire to allow the precision of mathematical argument to stand in the way of his 
assaults on his chosen targets’ (Macdonald in Clarkson, 1996, p. 959). Similarly, 
David Wilkie, whose earlier contributions to actuarial science had led both the 
Institute and Faculty of actuaries to award him a gold medal and who was rather 
more hesitant about the merits of financial economics than some of the younger 
actuaries, criticised Clarkson’s use of mathematics. He ended his contribution to the 
debate by stating: ‘I have been depressed by the discussion. It is, I am afraid, a 
dialogue of the deaf, between those who know something about statistics, about 
financial economics and about mathematics, and those who do not. I am really very 
discouraged that the Faculty should have brought forward such a paper’ (Wilkie in 
Clarkson, 1996, p. 961).  
As predicted by Abbott’s (2005; see also: Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009) 
‘linked ecologies’ approach, a key factor in the uptake of modern finance theory was 
that advocacy of modern finance theory allowed the younger generation of actuaries 
to form a coalition with other actors in the insurance field (shareholders) and in the 
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adjacent field of investment banking (derivatives department seeking to sell risk 
management solutions). Towards the late 1990s, the younger actuaries, who had 
become familiar with modern finance theory by traversing across different fields, 
started outlining how the methods of modern finance theory could be applied to 
insurance valuation, which they argued produced superior knowledge for e.g. 
investors about the economic value embedded in insurance operations. Other papers 
outlined more generally how financial economics could be applied in an actuarial 
context (Smith, 1996), how modern finance theory could be used to value pension 
funds (Exley, Mehta and Smith, 1997; Head et al., 2001), and how derivatives could 
be used to manage the financial risk embedded in insurance and pension 
arrangements (Kemp, 1997).   
A key actor group in this regard were the supervisors. The integration of 
banking and insurance supervision in the Financial Services Authority, or FSA, in 
1997 was crucial for creating a critical mass within the supervisory agency to favour 
the risk management techniques of modern finance. The emergence of the FSA 
manifested a broader development towards a model of statutory regulation, in which 
regulatory and supervisory tasks are performed by an independent expert agency that 
would take a stronger stance in epistemic issues (Majone, 1996). Initially, it seemed 
the transition was mainly organisational. Although the FSA initially continued the 
regulatory principles and practices of the previous regime, it also implemented some 
key organisational changes. As interview data suggests, organisational reform 
contributed to the declining position of supervisors with an actuarial background. In 
contrast, supervisors with experience in banking acquired a more dominant role in 
insurance supervision. Changes internal to the supervisory agency, in other words, 
provided opportunities for actors in the epistemic field of actuarial science favouring 
more explicit use of modern finance theory – particularly the use of no-arbitrage 
modelling for valuation purposes and risk management – to gain the backing of key 
state actors. Indeed, in the early years of the new millennium, this resulted in the 
publication of various consultancy reports (e.g. Barrie & Hibbert, 2002) and actuarial 
research papers (Hare et al., 2000; Hairs et al., 2002; Whelan, Bowie and Hibbert, 





As noted above, regulators considered market-consistent valuation more 
objective than traditional valuation methods, because no-arbitrage models seemed to 
isolate the objective structures of finance. Market-consistent valuation, therefore, 
appeared to articulate well with the statutory model of regulation. As a supervisor put 
it: ‘if you're producing a standard that has got to be audited, you've got to reduce the 
discretion available for firms’ (interviewee BB). Craig Turnbull indeed suspected 
that the perceived objectivity of no-arbitrage modelling made it attractive for a 
system of statutory regulation: 
I think one of the fundamental attractions to adopting these 
approaches, for the regulator in particular, and maybe for the 
accountants and others, was this idea that you could get to an 
objective measure of these costs in a way that removed actuarial 
judgment or actuarial judgment or strange actuarial assumptions 
that no one else understood. You know, you mark-to-market and 
there's market prices. You use them. And that was your price, and 
it would be this objective single answer. (Turnbull interview) 
Although market-consistent modelling was considered more objective, 
modellers were well aware that important decisions had to be made. As noted above, 
the FSA considered realistic reporting, for instance, a ‘realistic art’. This is because, 
as Dullaway noted, ‘a lot of the stuff that … comes out of finance and banking isn't 
directly applicable because the products are different’ (Dullaway interview). The 
differences with financial instruments complicated the extension of no-arbitrage 
models to insurance liabilities.  
We are not dealing with a market in which all the instruments are 
traded both ways. You cannot decide arbitrarily to buy or sell a life 
insurance policy. Also, the very notion of doing so only considers 
the pure investment part of the risk, and ignores all other aspects of 
a with-profits policy, such as the pooling across generations and 
the smoothing. (Macdonald in Hare et al., 2000: 208) 
The prices of insurance guarantees cannot in practice be enforced by arbitrage and 
the ‘no-arbitrage’ prices that could be assigned to insurance guarantees only 
considered the cost of investment risk, not of their insurance-related risk. Moreover, 
the value of insurance guarantees on with-profits policies typically depends on 
multiple random variables at once (including, e.g., interest rates, inflation, equity 
prices and real-estate prices), and, crucially, the correlation or dependency between 
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them. The valuation of insurance guarantees, in other words, is an imperfect market 
problem in the sense that not all assets required to hedge those guarantees are 
available. Insurers’ models were therefore not referred to not as no-arbitrage models, 
but as ‘market-consistent’ models, a concept that in the words of Kemp (2009: 1) is 
‘a catch-all for the activity of taking account of “what the market has to say”’. 
Building Models, Shifting Between Worlds 
The perceived complexity of insurance guarantees had some important consequences 
for the technological features of the market-consistent valuation machinery. The 
Black-Scholes equation and some other no-arbitrage models were ‘analytical’, 
‘closed form’ solutions. According to Parit Jakhria, an actuary with a background in 
stochastic calculus who developed the in-house asset-modelling engine of Prudential, 
if the valuation problem ‘was completely simple, you could try and use a closed form 
solution like Black and Scholes. Trouble is, none of these [insurance guarantees] 
were simple, and hence you had to use a Monte Carlo [simulation]’ (Jakhria 
interview). Because the value of insurance guarantees depends not just on one 
stochastic process (e.g. the price of a single stock option), but multiple (e.g., interest 
rates, the stock market index, real-estate prices), it is necessary to model a range of 
processes at once. An economic scenario generator allows doing just that. Having 
used the scenario generator to produce a set of scenarios, one can calculate the value 
of a policy’s underlying fund in each of the scenarios and, by discounting the payoff 
of the policy in each of the scenarios to a present value and averaging across all 
scenarios, one can then obtain its value.  
In the early years of market-consistent modelling, there were two competing 
approaches. Barrie & Hibbert’s scenario generator, which was widely used, was risk-
neutral (i.e. it produced scenarios in which all assets on average would produce a 
risk-free rate of return). The mathematician Andrew Smith, who worked at Bacon & 
Woodrow (the insurance branch of which was acquired by Deloitte in 2000), 
however, developed an alternative model that was ‘mathematically equivalent’ but 




…at the time not many actuaries understood risk-neutrality. It was 
not something that was in the actuarial exams, it was not something 
that was well explained. If you showed an actuary a risk-neutral 
model, they would likely say: ‘well that's obviously nonsense 
because we know over the last hundred years equities have 
outperformed bonds by 4 percent, 5 percent, whatever it is. (Smith 
interview) 
Indeed, Dullaway confirms, the shift towards a risk-neutral world, where all assets 
are assumed to yield the same returns as the ‘risk-free’ government bonds for 
pragmatic reasons, posed interpretative difficulties: ‘it did cause a lot of difficulty in 
terms of conceptual understanding for quite a period’ (Dullaway interview). 
Modellers described risk-neutral valuation as 'a neat trick' and likened risk-neutral 
probabilities to 'pseudo-probabilities' that provide 'a neat short cut to the correct 
answer every time' (Whelan et al., 2002, pp. 57–59). 
Smith, however, noted that risk-neutral valuation was not the only way to 
solve no-arbitrage pricing problems. Indeed, the problem solution of Harrison, Kreps 
and Pliska, which was discussed earlier in this chapter, indicated that other solutions 
were possible too. While the risk-neutral approach solved the valuation problem by 
adjusting the probability measure so that all cash flows could be discounted using the 
same discount-curve, Smith recognised the possibility of using ‘state price deflators’, 
which, he suggested, is a ‘stochastic generalisation of a discount factor’ (Smith, 
1996, p. 1121). Thus, instead of assuming a ‘risk-neutral world’, which required 
some familiarity with option pricing theory, deflator models would simply start from 
‘real-world’ projections of cash flows and then define a stochastic discount factor 
consistent with the assumption of no-arbitrage ‒ i.e. a discount factor that would 
return market prices when applied to the real-world projection of cash flows (see, 
e.g.: Jarvis, Southall and Varnell, 2001).21 According to Smith, ‘the deflator was a 
way of explaining, well, this is how you get from a realistic-looking model to 
something that replicates market prices… It was actually more a cosmetic difference 
                                                 
21 A stochastic discount factor, in other words, is a variable discount factor that produces a discount 
rate consistent with a particular scenario. The changes in the discount factor relative to the risk-free 
rate are at least in principle directly proportional to the adjustment from a realistic projection of a 
derivative’s underlying asset to a risk-neutral projection.  
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than anything else. Those two models calibrated the same way would produce pretty 
much the same answer’ (Smith interview).  
While the scenarios produced by deflator models may have been easier to 
understand, the risk-neutral valuation models were easier to implement. Financial 
mathematicians had primarily built models of the latter type, which meant there was 
a rich repository of already developed models from which the modellers in insurance 
could borrow. Initially, the construction of the ‘risk-neutral economic scenario 
generators’ consisted primarily of bricolage. As the physicist and former modeller at 
Barrie & Hibbert Steven Morrison explains: ‘What we were basically doing was 
picking up those models that were already used for valuation problems [in banking] 
and … putting them all together in one large model… almost sort of glue them 
together into one model’ (Morrison interview). Barrie & Hibbert, in other words, 
‘patched together off-the-shelf banking models that you could get from textbooks … 
that aren’t really supposed to work together’ (interviewee CJ). The Smith model 
similarly started ‘out of things that were out there in the public domain’, but later 
included a mix of both deflator and risk-neutral enabled models (Smith interview).  
Although mathematically the choice of approach was considered primarily a 
‘cosmetic difference’, it potentially had some important implications ‒ implications 
that have to do with the relation between risk-neutral and real-world scenarios. 
Theoretically, it should be possible to move between the two model worlds by 
applying a ‘change of measure’, which is equivalent to Smith’s ‘state price deflator’. 
Risk-neutral models were simply calibrated to reproduce observable market prices by 
‘back-solving’ for the volatility of the underlying asset, yielding a ‘market implied 
volatility’. ‘[I]n theory’, Smith explained, ‘that volatility ought to be consistent with 
historic volatility, but in practice it never is’. Subsequently, he continued, ‘we 
discovered … that a model which would replicate market prices was not, in 
mathematical terms, absolutely continuous with respect to any credible model of real 
worlds’ (Smith interview). This is because the ‘change of measure argument relies on 
all sorts of assumptions that don’t actually hold true in the real world’ (Morrison 
interview). No-arbitrage models, for instance, assume trading to be ‘frictionless’, a 




The choice of calibration method therefore matters. It is well known that 
‘historically option implied volatility has been higher than the corresponding real-
world volatility’ (Morrison interview), which is another way of saying that market 
prices exceed the prices produced by a model calibrated to real-world parameters. As 
Morrison explained, this leaves modellers with a conundrum: 
If you use the option implied volatility, you’d probably be 
overstating … the real-world volatility. If you use the real-world 
volatility, you would under-price options. So if you want to use the 
same model for two different things, constraining yourself by the 
theoretical straitjacket means you're actually doing neither of those 
things particularly well, so we've always argued to actually … 
focus our attention on the job at hand. If you're interested in pricing 
options, you look at the option market and … implied volatility. 
(Morrison interview) 
For some ‘sizeable problems’, Smith argues, whether you calibrated to historic 
volatility or market implied volatility ‘really mattered’. For instance: 
if you are an insurer and you’ve written some liabilities that had 
guarantees and you were considering whether to hedge or not, if 
you use … [a] model calibrated to market prices of options, then 
hedging always looked like a fantastic idea, because you got rid of 
all these risks of things going wrong, and you would just pay a fair 
price for the option, whereas if you used the historic calibration it’s 
much more a trade-off, because you think the volatility is going to 
be 15%, the market is charging 20%, but … when you’ve paid that 
20, you've got some peace of mind … you're no longer exposed to 
your model being wrong. (Smith interview) 
The calibration method matters for decision-making. In practice, therefore, the 
scenario generation software of both competitors will include tools to generate 
scenarios both in a real-world and risk-neutral setting. (For market-consistent 
valuations, for instance, the risk-neutral setting will typically be used.) Although it is 
difficult to assert (and outside the purview of the methods that I deploy here) to what 
extent calibration methods have influenced insurers’ investment decisions, the 
crucial point here is that seemingly minor technical details may have important 
consequences for what courses of action appear desirable.  
The calibration of models in either a real-world or a risk-neutral setting comes 
with different challenges. Real-world modelling (used, e.g., for risk management 
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purposes) is limited by the availability of relevant data; calibrating a model to market 
prices is limited by the availability of relevant market prices. Take for instance the 
calibration of a stock-market model, which requires stock-index option prices going 
as far out into the future as, say, twenty years. Prices for such options are not readily 
available. This may have important implications:  
 [T]he shorter term options have more weight in the calibration, but 
when we look at the longer term options, we’re essentially 
extrapolating towards something which is informed by our real-
world views. Because we don’t have … market information … 
you're sort of constructing a pseudo-option-implied vol[atility] in 
the long term … using real-world assumptions to inform what an 
implied volatility might look like. (Morrison interview) 
This calibration issue was especially challenging in the early years, as a former 
regulator explained, when there were a ‘vast number of insurance liabilities being 
valued on the back of a handful of transactions’ (Chamberlain interview). Modelling 
firms such as Barrie & Hibbert and Deloitte had set up panels of investment banks 
who would supply them with over-the-counter quotes for longer-term derivatives. 
But when banks realised they were not obliged to sell options contracts at those 
prices, ‘regulators started to worry those prices were artificial’ (Chamberlain 
interview). Regulators pushed for companies to show that they ‘could actually deal at 
that price’, but banks were reluctant to facilitate the hedging of, say, equities thirty 
years out. Calibrations of insurers’ market-consistent models, especially in the long 
term, were necessary compromises between market-based estimates, on the one 
hand, and the real-world views and desire for profits of investment bankers, on the 
other hand; they were, therefore, less ‘objective’ and judgement-free than some 
perhaps initially hoped.  
To sum up, the appropriation of no-arbitrage models in insurance was not 
simply a case of a straightforward application of already existing models to new 
domains. Rather, modern finance theory served as a repository of exemplary problem 
solutions and modelling techniques, based on which the idiosyncratic valuation 
problems of insurance could be addressed. The analogical extension of exemplars 
thus required decisions to be made, either implicitly or explicitly, decisions on which 




Market-Consistent Modelling as a New Paradigm? 
[I]t's like a Kuhnian paradigm shift had to happen before people 
would say: okay, yes, maybe you’re right, now let's look at the 
details…. It was exactly like one of those shifts, like when Newton 
came along or when Einstein came along and the whole world 
changed. (Dullaway interview) 
At least three of my interviewees, including Dullaway, experienced the transition 
from ‘traditional actuarial modelling’ to ‘market consistent’ modelling as a Kuhnian 
‘paradigm shift’. As noted in chapter 2, the Kuhnian account of scientific change 
provides little guidance if we want to understand why ‘paradigm shifts’ such as these 
occur. In following Barnes (1982), I argued that paradigms are best understood as 
exemplary problem solutions that may be more or less central in a given epistemic 
field. When there is a dominant paradigm, this needs not imply that it is the only 
paradigm. It may well be that different paradigms exist alongside each other; each 
paradigm, may, for instance, animate a different part of a given epistemic field, or, 
perhaps, may be used as exemplars for different problems. Paradigm shifts, in this 
sense, are changes in practice that are either abrupt or gradual and that are 
experienced as significant discontinuities. 
In the case of actuarial science, it is difficult to identify a clear ‘twentieth-
century actuarial paradigm’. Indeed, proponents of modern finance theory suggest 
that the techniques and practices of actuarial science were rather diffuse and were not 
part of a coherent theory of value. Exley, Mehta and Smith (2000), for instance, 
distinguish between ‘traditional actuarial practice’ and modern finance theory by 
arguing that ‘much of UK actuarial “science” is in fact no science at all, but rather a 
collection of ad hoc techniques evolving over time to suit the business objectives of 
clients and consultants’.22 Modern finance theory, in other words, would give 
actuarial science its scientific basis. Surely, actuarial science had drawn on theory, 
like statistical theory or risk theory, but none of these theories had become a 
‘paradigm’ proper ‒ that is, none of the exemplary problem solutions through which 
                                                 
22 Of course, as scholars in science studies have shown, scientific activity can seem as ad hoc (e.g. 
Latour and Woolgar, 1986). The point is, however, that most practitioners perceive the methods of 
modern finance theory as a coherent theory, more so than traditional actuarial science.  
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the meaning of such theories was conveyed became a central point of reference for 
actuarial research. Risk theoretical models developed in the context of life insurance 
remained limited to the models discussed in chapter 3, most notably the Wilkie 
model.23 As discussed in chapter 3, Wilkie’s model had grown out of the analogical 
extension of exemplary ‘risk theoretical’ models to the problem of investment risk 
and became extensively used for a range of different purposes. Until the emergence 
of market-consistent models, however, it remained the only widely used stochastic 
model of financial risk in the industry.  
Another important problem solution was Frank Redington’s (1952) 
‘immunisation theory’, developed in the mid-twentieth century (Shedden, 1977; see: 
Hare, 1989). Redington was chief actuary at Prudential and was a well-respected 
member of the profession (awarded a gold medal by the Institute in 1968), whose 
works addressed the typical problems of with-profits insurance: reserving, bonus 
policy and valuation (Turnbull, 2017, p. 106). Concerned with the volatility of 
interest rates and its potentially devastating impact on insurers’ financial position, 
Redington, wondered whether such risk could be mitigated or ‘immunised’ by 
‘matching’ the characteristics of an insurer’s assets with those of its liabilities. 
Redington postulated that if the sensitivity of the value of an insurer’s assets to the 
interest rate was equal to the sensitivity of the value of its liabilities to that same 
interest rate (which he both expressed mathematically as the first derivative of the 
respective values with respect to the interest rate) and the rate of change in the 
former was at least as great as the latter, then the total portfolio would be 
‘immunised’ against interest rate risk. Although Redington’s immunisation theory 
may have ‘delivered a thunderbolt of much-needed clarity to the management of 
interest rate risk’, as Turnbull (2017, p. 109) suggests, its concrete practical 
applications remained limited. ‘For life offices … it did not resolve the question of 
                                                 
23 In general insurance, risk theoretical models were much more widespread, but in the UK, actuaries 
remained relatively divorced from general insurance. In the context of life insurance, Wilkie updated 
his model in a series of papers (Wilkie, 1984, 1995). In the late 1990s, other models started appearing, 
some of which continued along the lines of Wilkie’s time series model such as the TY model 
(Yakoubov, Teeger and Duval, 1999). Others, however, started developing market consistent models. 





which liabilities it ought to be applied to’ (2017, p. 109). Redington’s model of 
immunisation depended on the assumption that an insurer’s liabilities were non-
arbitrary. In the context of with-profits, however, such liabilities depended on 
actuarial discretion. The question thus remained whether the theory should apply to 
guaranteed benefits, surrender values or whether it should also include bonuses, a 
question that remained unanswered.  
Even though Redington’s theory was quite influential in actuarial thought and 
sparked much debate on the matching of liabilities with assets, its paradigmatic 
influence was limited, partly because actuaries did not perceive Redington’s 
representation of liabilities as accurate.24 Interestingly, once the no-arbitrage models 
of modern finance theory started migrating into the epistemic field as exemplary 
problem solutions, actuaries started making analogies between the Black-Scholes-
Merton model and Redington’s immunisation theory. Crucial in this respect was the 
fact that the Irish actuary Colm Fagan had independently developed a concept for a 
dynamic investment strategy similar to that underpinning the Black-Scholes-Merton 
model. He presented his model as a ‘generalisation’ of Redington’s immunisation, 
‘both being dynamic investment strategies designed to keep the market value of the 
assets and liabilities equal at all times by imposing certain constraints on the assets’ 
(Whelan, 2002, pp. 34–35). In early contributions to the debate, dynamic hedging 
was often referred to simply as a form of immunisation and was seen as being of the 
same family as Redington’s concept of duration matching (Ford et al., 1980; e.g. 
Collins, 1982). However, as mentioned earlier, the ‘immunisation approach’ was 
initially not considered practical enough for actuarial use. When the new generation 
of actuaries familiar with modern finance theory entered the stage, the actuarial 
nomenclature was largely abandoned.  
While the exemplary problem solutions of twentieth-century actuarial science 
remained somewhat diffuse, this changed with the FSA’s imposition of market-
consistent reporting. Compelled by regulations, actuaries now had a clearly defined 
                                                 
24 Redington’s immunisation theory, moreover, only applied to interest rate risk. It did therefore not 
seem to have shaped actuarial thought on the risks that come, for instance, with equity and real estate 
investment in any direct way.  
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set of problems (the valuation of liabilities containing guarantees that were similar to 
financial options), for which a repository of exemplary problem solutions was 
available. This, however, is not to say that the development of market-consistent 
modes was in any way easy or that the choices to be made were trivial (the 
particularities of insurance liabilities presented idiosyncratic difficulties some of 
which are discussed in the previous section), but simply to say that the actuarial 
research agenda had been defined. This meant that actuaries with little knowledge of 
modern finance theory had to familiarise themselves with its exemplary problem 
solutions. In the 1990s, Dullaway recalls, ‘the examinations … were teaching things 
which from a pure finance perspective didn't make sense’ (Dullaway interview). 
Only in 1999 did a basic exam in financial economics (and an option to take an 
advanced exam in derivatives pricing) become part of the actuarial curriculum. 
Consequentially, consultancy firms played an important role in familiarising 
actuaries with the exemplary problem solutions of modern finance theory. Craig 
Turnbull, who worked at Barrie & Hibbert at the time, remembers for instance that ‘a 
lot of our work, as well as doing all the modelling and [writing] papers … was 
actually more education’ (Turnbull interview 1). ‘You were going along to clients 
and explaining what a market consistent valuation was, doing these simple 
examples’, Dullaway similarly recalls (Dullaway interview). The shifting demand for 
expertise was not only reflected in actuarial training but also in the hiring patterns of 
the firms that build the modelling machinery. As John Hibbert recalls, ‘we employed 
actuaries, we had economists, we had probably more physicists than any other 
background among our technical professional staff, but I think that was a bit of a 
departure for the profession’ (Hibbert interview 1).25  
Once market-consistent modelling started to emerge in the late 1990s, the 
number of models proliferated quickly. Insurers started using market-consistent 
models not just to calculate the value of liabilities, but also to manage risk. The 
models used for valuation purposes, however, were not necessarily well suited for 
risk management purposes. For solvency calculations, accuracy was considered key. 
                                                 
25 Similarly, Prudential, the only UK firm that succeeded in building an in-house scenario generator, 
hired not only actuaries, but also people with a strong ‘programming and quantitative background, and 




Scenario generators were designed to minimise statistical errors. Dullaway explained 
that ‘if you're running only a thousand scenarios and average them, there's a good 
chance that you’ll be out by one or two percent either side. But one or two percent 
either side when you're valuing a set of liabilities, which may be 50 billion, and 
you’ve got assets, which will maybe be 55 billion, okay, well, a one or two billion 
error can have a very big effect on your solvency’ (Dullaway interview). For ‘hedge 
diagnosis’, however, a model ‘wasn’t supposed to particularly accurately model your 
balance sheet. It was supposed to be able to work out [for example] a replicating 
portfolio … management actually requires cruder models’ (Fulcher interview).  
‘Replicating portfolio models’ (or simply ‘replios’) are an example of a type 
of cruder models often used for risk management purposes. Replicating portfolio 
modelling (which is not to be confused with the ‘replicating portfolios’ of the Black-
Scholes-Merton model) is ‘a sort of simple top-down type modelling’ that provided a 
solution to the ‘nested stochastic problem’ (Fulcher interview). Market-consistent 
valuation of a book of liabilities requires the generation of a large set of economic 
scenarios, but doing so will only yield information about the value of your liabilities, 
not about the sensitivity of those liabilities to different ‘stress factors’. As Fulcher 
explained: 
[T]he option itself is a stochastic model … and you almost want to 
do another stochastic simulation on the stochastic simulation to 
work out what the value of that option might do over the next 
twelve months, if you see what I mean, and therefore what hedging 
strategy you need. (Fulcher interview) 
Calculating the sensitivity of a set of liabilities to different ‘stress factors’ requires 
the simulation of an additional set of scenarios. As interviewee CJ, an actuary and 
physicist, said:  
I probably need to do, I don’t know, maybe 5,000, 10,000 
scenarios to get enough resolution in the tail for 1-in-200. ... I then 
need to revalue at every point there. And therein lies the issue. If to 
revalue, I need to use another stochastic scenario, it becomes a 
massive computing exercise. The PCs and the systems at the time 
weren’t capable of doing that. (Interviewee CJ) 
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Replios are a quicker way of doing the same calculations. Typically, replios 
seek to infer the sensitivity of a book of liabilities to a set of different ‘stress factors’ 
(e.g. a drop in the stock market index) by calculating how the value of liabilities 
changes in a subsample of economic scenarios. The model then attempts to optimise 
a portfolio of assets that replicate those sensitivities as closely as possible such that 
the value of the liabilities remains roughly equal to the value of the replicating 
portfolio in each of the stress scenarios.  
The replicating portfolio models were typically used for purposes other than 
solvency calculations. Investment banks used replios as ‘a one-off bespoke exercise’ 
to identify a set of ‘static hedges’, or investment strategies that reduced the risk of a 
particular set of liabilities, which they then sold to insurers (Fulcher interview). Such 
hedges were ‘static’, because the replicating portfolio may change as economic 
conditions change (as implied by the concept of ‘dynamic hedging’ crucial for the 
Black-Scholes-Merton model). The modelling thus yields, in the words of Fulcher, a 
‘static portfolio of hedges that should be robust enough to sort of last you for three 
years’ (Fulcher interview). 
Although some considered replios a useful simple alternative to nested 
stochastic simulation, not everyone was convinced of their merits. According to 
Turnbull, for instance, the problem with replios was that ‘it was very difficult to use 
these portfolios of vanilla instruments [the most standard types of derivatives] to 
capture the complexity of how these liabilities actually worked … the replicating 
portfolio wasn’t really replicating what you were actually doing’ (Turnbull interview 
2). Some modellers argued, therefore, that there were ‘better technical approaches to 
solving the problem’ (Hibbert interview 2). Some companies developed proxy 
generation software, in which the computational intensity of the nested stochastic 
simulation was reduced by the application of regression techniques, a technique that 
was first applied in finance to ‘American options’ (see, e.g.: Tsitsiklis and Van Roy, 
2001). For proponents of the replicating portfolio approach, however, such 
techniques were too complicated to be useful for practical decision making. ‘You’ve 
totally lost everyone who is not a mathematical expert’, interviewee CJ argued, ‘No 




The crucial point here is to note that market-consistent modelling refers to a 
‘spectrum’ of models that might differ in important ways, but that nonetheless have 
been designed through the analogical extension of the exemplary problem solutions 
of modern finance theory. On one end of the spectrum there were the relatively 
complex but ‘precise’ economic scenario generators, and, on the other, the cruder 
and simpler replicating portfolio models used for risk management purposes.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I want to stress two main points. The first is a finitist one. Even if no-
arbitrage modelling was considered more objective, the extension of key exemplars 
from modern finance theory to insurance was not straightforward. And, according to 
finitism, nor can it be. The idiosyncrasies of insurance guarantees require decisions 
about how models are extended – decisions that are either implicit or explicit. For 
valuation purposes, for instance, there appeared to be two theoretically similar and 
mathematically equivalent, but practically different approaches to model calibration, 
which may have important consequences for decision making. This, then, is the 
micro-politics of evaluation. Decisions about how insurance liabilities are modelled 
may be consequential; sometimes they are made explicit, presented as a pragmatic 
choice, and shaped by the immediate organisational aims of the modelling exercise; 
more often, however, they remain implicit, constrained by implicit ‘local 
circumstances’ (Bloor, 1997).  
This brings me to my second point, which is that the epistemic machinery 
underpinning the governance of life insurance changed in conjunction with 
developments in the market field more generally and the supervisory agency as 
‘internal governance unit’ in particular. The limitations of traditional actuarial 
practices were well known and the paradigms of modern finance theory had been 
available for some time. Modern finance theory’s focus on ‘objective structures’, 
however, articulated poorly with a model of insurance in which the actuary, as the 
‘custodian of surplus’ is the central epistemic authority. When the actuary’s status as 
such declined and pressure mounted on the newly established FSA to reform 
insurance supervision, however, modern finance theory appeared to articulate well 
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with regulatory aims. (This is not to say that modern finance theory would have 
never been drawn upon in actuarial science had this not happened, simply that its 
embrace would likely have been more limited.) This allowed those actuaries who had 
become familiar with modern finance theory in their travels across different 
professional ecologies to form a powerful alliance not only with investors (who were 
keen on more transparency about the economic value in the insurance business) and 
investment bankers (keen on selling derivative-based risk management solutions) but 
also with insurance supervisors in promoting the use of no-arbitrage models and risk 
management techniques (which are further discussed in the next chapter). Changes in 
the epistemic field, in other words, were intricately entangled with development in 














Chapter 6  
Stressing and Managing the Balance Sheet 
The previous chapter dealt with valuation models. In this chapter, I focus on another 
set of modelling practices that came to underpin the UK’s capital regulation regime 
and influenced insurers’ capital allocation decisions: the modelling of ‘risk’. In the 
FSA’s market-consistent regime, an estimate of insurance liabilities did not suffice. 
To determine what level of reserves a company should maintain in order to protect 
itself, the FSA also required an estimate of the risk embedded in the insurance 
undertaking as a whole. The risk modelling practices central in this chapter are quite 
distinct from the valuation practices discussed in chapter 5. As David Dullaway, 
whom we already encountered in chapter 5, puts it, risk modelling ‘is a whole 
separate world… You’ve got two questions here. You’ve got, how do I do the 
valuation, which is hard enough. And then, if I’ve got an economic capital world, 
what sort of stresses should I apply … to the starting point of that valuation?’ 
(Dullaway interview). In comparing the two worlds, actuaries tend to understand the 
world of valuation as revolving more around ‘hard facts’ that are ‘mathematically 
correct’ and ‘almost provable’; the world of risk analysis, in contrast, is seen as 
involving limited data that require interpretation based on ‘expert judgment and 
opinions’ at least as much as concrete evidence (Sharp interview). 
It may sound counterintuitive to state that risk analysis emerged only as a key 
mode of governance in the early 2000s. After all, has insurance not always revolved 
around the analysis and management of risk? Indeed, to some extent, this is true. 
Since the 19th century, insurers were well aware that insuring the life of a single 
individual could be risky business. The solution to such risk was to make sure that 
insurance was written on a large enough pool of ‘independent’ lives such that the risk 
of a single individual dying much sooner than expected could be diversified away. In 
chapter 3, however, we saw the emergence of another type of ‘risk’ that was non-
diversifiable: financial market risk. In contrast to the ‘diversifiable risk’, the 
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management of ‘non-diversifiable’ risk was perceived to require explicit modelling 
and quantification. This, in a nutshell, is what is meant here with risk analysis and 
management: the modelling and quantification of ‘non-diversifiable’ risk (analysis) 
and the control and selection of risks, either by passing them on to third parties 
through market transactions or by retaining them on your balance sheet and 
‘controlling’ them (management).  
The introduction of risk analysis and management is intricately entangled 
with the introduction of market-consistent valuation. Both sets of practices 
contributed to the explication of ‘value’ and ‘risk’, albeit in different ways. This 
explication, I argue, marked a shift in the relations among stakeholders in the life 
insurance business. In conventional life insurance arrangements, for instance, 
shareholders relied on actuaries to ensure a steady stream of dividends. In today’s 
insurance arrangements, however, actuaries produce representations of economic 
value and risk; the decision about whether the promise of future profit is ‘credible’ is 
left to shareholders. The new epistemic machinery emphasised the optimisation of 
capital usage, and the proliferation of novel investment strategies to manage risk 
capital, with concomitant changes in the structure of the insurance market.  
In this chapter, I examine the evolution of risk analysis and management in 
life insurance, a development that was strongly influenced by the regulatory changes 
in the early 2000s with the introduction of the Individual Capital Adequacy 
Standards (ICAS) and the Realistic Balance Sheet. First, I describe the epistemic 
problem of quantifying non-diversifiable risk. I then move on to discuss the 
evolution of risk analysis in the context of life insurance, before describing how 
insurers developed the risk models that allowed them to comply with the ICAS. 
Finally, I argue that risk models (in conjunction with the market-consistent models 
discussed in the previous chapter) reshaped the market field of life insurance by 
further reducing the epistemic authority of actuaries and by casting the optimisation 




Risk Modelling as the Construction of Fictional Expectations 
To get a sense of the epistemic dimensions of risk modelling, it is useful to compare 
it with the valuation modelling discussed in the previous chapter. One important 
difference is how the risk and valuation models engage with the future. The market-
consistent valuation models discussed in the previous chapter infer the value of 
liabilities by considering how future variation in underlying cash flows can be 
neutralised (or ‘hedged’) by a portfolio of instruments whose characteristics mirror 
those of the liability. As discussed in the previous chapter, insurers started using risk-
neutral economic scenario generators to do these calculations, which some of my 
interviewees suggested should be ‘provable’ in principle.26 The value of insurance 
liabilities, however, also depends on parameters that cannot readily be ‘hedged’ with 
market instruments, the non-diversifiable dimension of risk. In market-consistent 
valuations, these parameters are typically accounted for with a ‘best-estimate’ 
expectation. Such estimations or forecasts have no ‘objective’ referent but are made 
drawing on a variety of resources. The models in this chapter similarly seek to 
forecast or estimate a variety of risks; they focus, however, not on the central 
expectation (the ‘best estimate’), but on a worst-case scenario with a pre-specified 
probability. In the case of insurance, risk modellers are typically interested in 
estimating what a ‘1-in-200 one-year event’ looks like.  
Thus, while market-consistent models seek to model how future variation in 
the underlying cash flows of liabilities may best be insulated in the present, risk 
models seek to ascribe ‘real-world’ probabilities to a range of different outcomes. 
Each type of modelling comes with its own peculiar challenge. In the case of market-
consistent modelling, the challenge is to construct a model that can reproduce 
market-observed prices, which is complicated by the fact that consistency in market 
observed prices may be less than ideal. In the case of risk modelling, however, the 
challenge is that the future is ‘fundamentally uncertain’ (Beckert, 1996, 2016). In a 
highly controlled setting (a ‘closed system’), uncertainty may be expressed in 
                                                 
26 What is meant here is that in a market-consistent model it should be possible, in theory, to retrieve 
the variables to which the model is calibrated as output from the model. Since the input variables are 
‘market observables’, two ‘fully’ market-consistent models should produce very similar output.  
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quantitative terms as ‘risk’. When tossing a coin, we can be fairly sure that the 
likelihood of the toss returning heads or tails approximates half. The risk of losing £1 
in a £1 bet is 0.5. If there are elements of the setting that are not controlled, however, 
certainty over whether the estimated distribution of likely outcomes decreases. In the 
above example, for instance, how can we be certain that the specific coin being 
tossed exhibits some key properties that we associate with a coin – namely, that it 
will land heads roughly half the times you flip it? How can we be sure that the coin 
has not somehow been damaged or tampered with to skew its propensity to land 
heads in one direction or the other? Because such fundamental or ‘Knightean’ 
uncertainty in practical applications of risk analysis always remains, risk modelling 
revolves around the construction of ‘expectations’ that guide present action more so 
than it is about ‘knowing’ the future (Beckert, 2016, chapter 3). 
Expectations, Beckert (2016) argues, whether derived from economic theory 
or through induction, are ‘fictional’. By this, he means that economic expectations 
such as risk forecasts ‘create a reality of their own by making assertions that go 
beyond the reporting of empirical facts’ (p. 61). They are constructions of the future 
that exist in today’s reality; they are, in other words, ‘present futures’, partially 
grounded in imagination, partially grounded in ‘empirical fact’, that are accepted by 
relevant actors as plausible. The construction of such ‘fictional expectations’ and 
actors’ willingness to act upon them as if they were true facilitates action in the face 
of fundamental uncertainty.  
In some cases, the ‘fictional’ character of risk modelling becomes quite 
obvious. Take for instance longevity risk, or the risk that future improvements in 
mortality deviate from actuaries’ ‘best-estimate’ of mortality improvements.27 This 
is, for instance, how Andrew Smith described the challenges in modelling longevity 
risk: 
                                                 
27 Longevity risk is not to be confused with mortality risk. While the latter refers to uncertainty about 
the timing of individual mortality – a form of uncertainty that can be reduced in the aggregate by 
‘pooling’ together multiple lives – longevity risk refers to uncertainty about improvements in the 





The thing about longevity is there are so many different 
approaches, and … there’s a huge amount of really deep 
uncertainty. So there's not just the difficulty of describing the 
historic data statistically. It's an immensely complex data set… 
[W]hen you're forecasting future longevity of people who are 
retiring now, you're forecasting the quality of care that they are 
gonna get… the amount of exercise they are going to get, how 
good their diet is going to be. And all of these things are difficult 
socio-economic things to forecast…  
By itself, archival-statistical analysis of mortality data is already quite 
challenging, as Smith argues, but the modelling of longevity risk is further 
complicated by the need to consider the relevance of such knowledge for the future, a 
future that is fundamentally open-ended. Risk modelling, in other words, is as much 
about storytelling as it is about statistical analysis (cf. Leins, 2018). Indeed, 
modellers sometimes explicitly recognise the role of ‘stories’ in justifying the choice 
for a particular scenario as a plausible 1-in-200 scenario. ‘So what all this means is, 
because a risk manager could tell you a story, if they believe it to be true, about a 1-
in-200 year [event]: “ah well, that old data isn't really valid anymore, because that 
was before electronic trading started or the central banks gained independence”’ 
(Sharp interview).  
As with fiction, ‘good’ risk modelling induces a suspension of disbelief, albeit 
perhaps in a slightly different way. In the case of literary fiction, the reader may 
forget that the imaginary elements are indeed imaginary, partly so because it is a 
convention to do so. The fact that literary texts are fictional, Beckert argues, does not 
mean that ‘there is no correspondence between fictional texts and reality; to the 
contrary, the assertions of fictional texts are often credible precisely because they are 
or could very well be true because they are coherent, and because they are closely 
interwoven with nonfictional information’ (Beckert, 2016, p. 65). ‘In the case of 
fictional expectations in the economy’, however, ‘the suspension of disbelief is based 
on the conviction that the imaginary of the future will become a future present, or is 
at least somewhat likely to do so’ (Beckert, 2016, p. 68). Relevant actors need not 
mistake risk models for reality, but at least believe that the range of predicted 
outcomes somewhat plausibly represent the ‘true’ range of future potential outcomes. 




Figure 6.1  Insurers’ self-reported use of different stress testing methods. The figure 
displays the percentage of respondents that listed each of several methods as 
‘most important’ for calibrating the 1-in-200 stress for a range of different 
risks. Note, in particular, the broad diversity across the different risk types. 
The figure is a reproduction of a similar figure featured in the KPMG report 
on their 2014 annual technical practices survey. 
their disbelief in the possibility of predicting the future if the expectations appear 
plausible, coherent and draw at least partially on available statistical knowledge.  
Actors may draw upon various resources to make their models ‘credible’.28 In 
fact, figure 6.1 makes clear that modellers in insurance may draw upon a wide range 
                                                 
28 It is possible here to draw a parallel between ‘facts’ and ‘present futures’. As MacKenzie (2009) 
argues with respect to the realm of fact, what sociologists are interested in is not to investigate 




of different resources. The figure is derived from the KPMG annual technical 
practices survey in 2014 and depicts what insurers’ most important resources were 
for calibrating the different stresses. The survey reports not only large differences 
among different types of risk, as one might expect, but also a large variation in what 
insurers reported as their most important source for the same risk.  
To see how risk models are produced, it is useful to distinguish between two 
main resources, each of which can be deployed in-house or is provided by an 
external adviser.29 The first resource is ‘archival-statistical’ knowledge (Collier, 
2008). Although statistical analysis may appear rather straightforward at first sight, 
several major difficulties appear when looked at more closely. Especially in the long-
term context of life insurance, the absence of data is often problematic. Take equity 
risk, for instance. Stock markets have changed quite significantly throughout history. 
One of the major changes was the introduction of limited liability, which, in the UK, 
only took place in 1856 (Johnson, 2010, chapter 5). More recently, the technological 
transformations of financial markets with, for example, the introduction of 
telecommunications and the increased financial market volatility since the 1970s are 
considered as evidence of fundamental changes in the operation of financial markets. 
Hence, ‘most people calibrate their models of something starting in 1975 … that's 
when MSCI [the Morgan Stanley Capital Indices] started producing their index data’ 
(Sharp interview).  
Deriving a 1-in-200 estimation from 20 years of data presents statistical 
difficulties:  
if you look at your 25 years of data and it did contain a 1-in-200 
event, and you assume [that from] those 25 years … you can derive 
what the overall distribution of something is, and there was a 1-in-
200 in the last 25 years, then you're going to think that that 1-in-
200 was really a 1-in-25… I mean, to really know what a 1-in-200 
                                                 
8-10). Similarly, we may say that the present purpose is not to assess the plausibility or credibility of 
present futures, but rather to investigate the conditions that allow present futures to be accepted as 
‘future presents’, or as plausible and credible depictions of the future.  
29 The two main types discussed here do not cover all possibilities. Some insurers, for instance, may 
decide to calibrate a stress to ‘market observables’. As discussed in the previous chapter, no-arbitrage 
models may be used to ‘back out’ a ‘market implied volatility’ measure, which can then be used to 
determine what a 1-in-200 scenario would look like. This approach can only be used for market risks.  
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was … you probably need more than 200 years of data - 
particularly to get at the tails. There is mathematics that addresses 
this issue but the fundamental issue remains. (Sharp interview) 
In order to determine the magnitude of a 1-in-200 one-year event in a 
statistically meaningful way, ideally you would need at least 200 years’ worth of 
data. But not just any data ‒ data that is derived from a relatively stable context. For 
risk modelling purposes, archival-statistical knowledge is considered useful but not 
without its problems.  
The second resource, which is extensively used, is ‘expert judgment’. This 
type of resource draws most explicitly on imagination and storytelling (cf. 
Wansleben, 2014) and, with the increased centrality of risk modelling in actuarial 
work, has become an increasingly important object of debate within the actuarial 
profession (Ashcroft et al., 2016; Tredger et al., 2016). ‘Expert judgment’ is often 
understood as a well-informed guess, the reliability of which is potentially harmed by 
‘cognitive bias’. Suggestions for improving the ‘reliability’ of expert judgment hence 
posit that the guessing process ‒ envisioning what might happen and how likely 
some things are to happen ‒ should be structured such that bias is reduced to a bare 
minimum (Tredger et al., 2016). This leads to the development of an accepted 
vocabulary of justification that indicates how modelling choices may be justified (cf. 
Mills, 1940). Expert judgment thus partly revolves around the appropriate use of a 
vocabulary that may be drawn upon to justify modelling assumptions.  
The appropriate vocabulary is influenced by supervisory challenges of the 
narratives and assumptions underpinning ‘stress scenarios’. An example of this can 
be found in the FSA’s report ICAS: One Year On, in which it reflected on the review 
of the returns of the first twelve companies it scrutinised. Take for instance the risk 
of a catastrophic event occurring, whether ‘natural’ or ‘man-made’, with grave 
consequences for overall mortality. The report noted that:  
A number of firms have selected a catastrophe scenario which 
involves the spread of a new disease or a repeat of a previous 
pandemic such as Spanish flu. Some of these firms have then 
assumed that new drugs would be created in time to treat newly 
emerging diseases and that international crisis management plans 




these firms to provide further detail on their reasoning for these 
assumptions. (FSA, 2005, pp. 29–30) 
How likely is a catastrophe mortality event like the Spanish flu today? And will 
modern medicine be quick enough to develop an antivirus and stop the flu from 
spreading? Since neither of these ‘scenarios’ can be confirmed or disconfirmed, 
supervisors may push modellers to justify their assumptions, but cannot ‘validate’ or 
‘invalidate’ model assumptions.  
The Evolution of Stress-Testing and Risk Analysis  
The history of non-diversifiable risk modelling in the context of life insurance 
predates the implementation of the ICAS regime. As discussed in chapter 3, financial 
risk became an object of actuarial interest already in the 1970s and 80s. Since then, 
actuaries typically used the Wilkie model for stochastic simulation of financial risk. 
In the 1990s, however, actuaries also began deploying statistical techniques to 
examine other ‘risk factors’, most notably ‘longevity risk’, or the risk that actually 
experienced mortality structurally diverged from predictions (Cairns, Blake and 
Dowd, 2006). Trends in mortality had always been a topic of actuarial interest. After 
all, to value an insurance liability one needed to come up with an estimate of future 
mortality. Early investigations of mortality trends, however, focused primarily on 
interpreting large mortality data sets and did not seek explicitly to quantify the 
likelihood of actual mortality experience to diverge from predictions in the future. 
This changed in the 2000s when actuaries increasingly started modelling long-term 
mortality trends (as opposed to individual mortality) stochastically, allowing them to 
assess the likelihood of future mortality to diverge from the predicted trend.  
Innovations in mortality modelling initially took place outside the actuarial 
context. Most notable was the Lee-Carter model, a model that was developed, not by 
actuaries, but by the UCL Berkeley demography professor Ronald Lee and the 
sociology professor, Lawrence Carter, from the University of Oregon. In their 
seminal paper, Lee and Carter noted that a simple extrapolation of average twentieth 
century mortality improvements of the US population would lead one to conclude 
that life expectancy would rise to 100 by 2065, a development, they noted, that 
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would ‘come as a nasty surprise to the Social Security Administration’ (Lee and 
Carter, 1992). By modelling US mortality using state-of-the-art techniques of 
extrapolation, Lee and Carter examined the likelihood of this event occurring. 
Benefitting from recent developments in time series analysis, they forecasted 
mortality by projecting forward life tables with a model that is ‘based firmly on 
persistent long-term historical patterns and trends’ and ‘provides probabilistic 
confidence regions for its forecasts’ (Lee and Carter, 1992). They concluded that 
expected life expectancy in 2065 would be 86.05, not 100. The analysis, they 
suggested, ‘demonstrates that for life expectancy to rise to such a high value as 100 
by 2065 would require a radical break in historical trends’ (Lee and Carter, 1992). 
The crucial innovation of the Lee-Carter model was to include ‘confidence regions’, 
which made possible the statistical analysis of the likelihood of extreme events.  
The uptake of quantitative risk models such as the Lee-Carter model by 
actuaries and life insurers was strongly influenced by regulatory change. As 
discussed in chapter 3, actuaries started developing quantitative risk assessment 
techniques for financial market risk in the 1970s and 80s drawing on risk theory, but 
their use had remained rather limited. Paul Fulcher, who was an actuary at Friends 
Provident at the time, remembers for instance that such modelling ‘wasn’t really 
driving a huge amount of decisions … the modelling seemed a little bit for the sake 
of it’ (Fulcher interview). By the 1980s, however, there was significant financial 
market volatility and regulators became increasingly interested in quantifying the 
financial risks embedded in insurers’ liabilities. In 1985, for instance, the 
Government Actuary’s Department introduced the ‘resilience test’ for unit-linked 
business, which ‘required actuaries to consider the adequacy of their reserves in the 
context of immediate falls in asset values of 25% in equities … and also the changes 
in values equivalent to a rise, or a fall, of 3% in the yields on gilt-edged and other 
fixed-interest stock’ (Fine et al., 1988). The resilience reserve test is now regarded as 
a ‘first generation stress test’ (interviewee BC), which anticipated quantitative risk 
management as the pivot of risk-based capital requirements. From today’s 




Nonetheless, the implementation of the resilience reserve test raised some 
difficult questions, some of which anticipated later debates on the ‘procyclicality’ of 
risk-based capital regulation (the tendency of risk-based capital regulations to 
exacerbate downward market trends by forcing asset sales in times of stress). Many 
actuaries understood equity prices to follow a cyclical pattern. Asking firms to 
maintain reserves against a 25% drop in equities while the market was already in a 
downswing seemed rather cumbersome, potentially forcing insurers to sell shares in 
market downturns thereby worsening them. In his Presidential Address, Roger 
Corley posed the problem as follows: ‘if the market shifts in such a way as to remove 
90% of a particular life office’s mismatching reserve, and there is no reason to expect 
an early reversal, what mismatching reserve should that office then be required to 
maintain?’ (Corley, 1989, p. 21).  
By the late 1990s, the Government Actuary’s Department considered how to 
make the resilience test dependent on current market conditions. Its proposals were 
implemented by the FSA, which took over full control of insurance supervision in 
2001. On September 10, 2001 the FSA issued a letter in which it required insurers to 
perform a resilience reserve test for at least a base scenario of a 25% decline in 
equity values subject to the constraint that equity prices divided by the earnings of 
the underlying stock (the ‘P/E ratio’) should be no smaller than 75% of the inverse 
long-term gilt yield (Hewitson, 2001). The severity of the scenario, in other words, 
was capped by the fundamental revenue stream of stocks. Even so, the FSA decided 
temporarily to revoke the resilience reserve test only two weeks after it had initially 
sent out its new resilience requirements. On September 11, the terrorist attack on the 
World Trade Center caused significant stock market distress. To prevent ‘technical 
selling’ of equity ‒ equity sales that are induced by deteriorating regulatory capital 
rather than an ‘economic’ rationale ‒ the FSA decided that the resilience reserve test, 
even in its amended version, would need to be revoked (Roberts, 2001). Even if from 
today’s perspective the resilience reserve test seems a rather embryonic form of risk-
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based capital, it already indicated potential difficulties of risk-based capital 
regulation more generally.30 
Risk-based capital was further developed with the introduction of the ICAS, 
for which each firm had to perform its own Individual Capital Assessment (ICA). As 
described in the previous chapter, the introduction of ICAS was driven by a 
confluence of the collapse of Equitable Life, the initiation of regulatory change on 
the European level, and the emergence of the FSA as an integrated supervisor for 
both banking and insurance. Market-consistent valuation, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, was one aspect of the envisioned regime. Firms’ ICAs would be 
another major component. The FSA’s stated aim was to make capital regulation more 
‘transparent’ by making firms responsible for performing their own risk assessment 
and to determine their own capital requirements, which would then be reviewed by 
supervisors (FSA, 2002a).  
The ICA was heavily influenced by developments elsewhere, such as 
innovations in bank capital regulation, and the European Commission’s project to 
overhaul European insurance capital regulation (see chapter 7). An influential report 
commissioned by the European Commission and composed by KPMG to make 
concrete proposals for the new European insurance capital regime borrowed heavily 
from the Basel accords for banking (the report will be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter). Similarly, the FSA’s temporary domestic regime came to reflect 
broader trends in the regulation of capital: 1) capital requirements were based on 
insurers internal risk assessment, which would incentivise enhanced risk control; 2) 
whereas insurers had previously only considered market risk, they were now 
expected to perform quantitative analysis of other risks too, either through scenario 
and stress testing, or through stochastic analysis; and 3) value-at-risk (VaR), a 
measure already widely used in banking, became the standard way to measure ‘risk’.  
                                                 
30 Sometime later, it would embrace a slightly different approach to make the test contingent on 
current market conditions. The FSA still required insurers to test the financial condition against a 
scenario of between 25% and 10%, but the precise level was not contingent on price/earning ratios, 




The idiosyncrasies of insurance meant there were limits to the extent to which 
regulatory templates used elsewhere could be imposed on insurance capital. The 
forecast horizon, for instance, is markedly different between insurance and banking. 
The Basel regime requires banks to calculate the VaR of the 99th percentile of ten-
day scenarios.31 Insurers, however, are required to estimate how much capital they 
need to remain solvent in a one-year period with an estimated 99.5% probability, or, 
in other words, all but the worst of 200 one-year scenarios. The choice of time 
horizon and stress severity is not a straightforward one. One justification for the one-
year time horizon is based on the claim that one year is roughly the time needed to 
completely ‘de-risk’ a portfolio of insurance liabilities. Others argue that a one-year 
measure is a compromise between the long-term nature of life insurance while 
allowing analysis to be grounded more firmly in statistical analysis compared with a 
more distant ‘run-off’ measure. Some interviewees, moreover, have suggested that 
the particular confidence level of 99.5% was selected because it produced acceptable 
levels of regulatory capital. Regardless, as discussed in more detail below, the one-
year time horizon limited the extent to which insurers’ risk models could be rooted in 
statistical analysis of historical data.  
Another difference is that insurers calculate a broader range of risks. In 
addition to market risk, insurers evaluate insurance-specific risks such as mortality, 
longevity, morbidity and lapse risk. Indeed, as the KPMG survey indicates, most 
insurers allocate nearly as much capital to insurance-specific risks as they do to 
financial risk (KPMG 2014: 43). Not only are insurance-specific risks difficult to 
calculate, but so are the ‘second order effects’ like the correlation between risk 
factors, or the ‘diversification’ effects (interviewee BC). As different risks may be 
‘imperfectly correlated’ (i.e. if one stress occurs the chance of another stress 
occurring is less than 1), total VaR will be less than the sum of VaR for individual 
risk factors. The impact of diversification is not trivial. In an article in the British 
Actuarial Journal, Andrew Smith, the consulting actuary Richard Shaw, and the 
CEO of Blackrock Life Grigory Spivak, estimated, for instance, that diversification 
benefits may ‘amount to anything in the region of 25-50% of an insurance 
                                                 
31 This may seem quite low, but it is only one of several components of banks’ capital requirements. 
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company’s undiversified total economic capital’ (Shaw, Smith and Spivak, 2012, p. 
602).  
The way in which insurers account for diversification benefits has gradually 
evolved too. Under the ICAS regime, insurers typically evaluated sixteen different 
risks, diversification among which was then taken into account with a sixteen-by-
sixteen ‘correlation matrix’. The dependency among risk factors was modelled as a 
simple ‘correlation’ relation. The advantage of this approach was that no explicit 
estimation of the probability distribution of a risk factor was needed; a simple 
estimation of the 1-in-200 stress sufficed. The correlation matrix approach, however, 
is perceived to have some important weaknesses: it does not allow, for instance, for 
‘heavier dependency in the tail’, it does not ‘capture non-linearities’, and, where data 
on correlation is sparse, relies heavily on ‘expert opinion’ (Shaw et al., 2012, pp. 
630–631) 
An alternative, more ‘sophisticated’ approach is to use a ‘copula model’, 
whereby the probability distributions of different risk factors are jointly modelled to 
produce a single model for all risk factors combined (a ‘multivariate joint 
distribution’). In the early 2000s, copula modelling was a relatively new 
phenomenon in actuarial science. The first actuarial application of copula models 
was the valuation of joint annuities ‒ annuities that pay a regular stream of income 
until both partners die. Traditionally, actuaries modelled the deaths of the partners as 
independent events. Various empirical investigations had shown, however, that 
‘survival of pairs are not independent events’ (Frees, Carriere and Valdez, 1996, p. 
230). If one partner died the likelihood of the other partner dying in subsequent years 
increased. In collaboration with Jed Frees and his doctoral student Emiliano Valdez 
from the University of Wisconsin, the Canadian research actuary Jacques Carriere 
sought to model the ‘joint survivorship of two annuitants’ as a single event by 
drawing on copula theory (Frees et al., 1996; MacKenzie and Spears, 2014b). Their 
model suggested that the price of a joint annuity could be three to five percent lower 
than if joint survivorship had been modelled as depending on two independent events 




In subsequent years, actuaries increasingly started drawing on copula theory 
for claims modelling, predominantly so for pricing purposes in the context of general 
insurance (Genest, Gendron and Bourdeau-Brien, 2009).32 By the mid-2000s, copula 
theory also increasingly started informing actuarial modelling of ‘diversification’ 
effects across different risk categories. The simplest member of the copula family of 
models is the Gaussian copula, which allows the modeller to join up a series of 
Gaussian or normal distributions. However, while relatively simple, the Gaussian 
copula assumes that even with non-zero correlation two variables are independent 
when moving far enough into the tails. ‘I would worry’, John Hibbert said, about ‘the 
dependency in the stress most, not the kind of average statistical correlation’. ‘You 
know what happens when you get a really big fall in equity markets? Well, interest 
rates probably move down quite a long way. That’s what we've seen during periods 
of stress’ (Hibbert interview 2). A Gaussian copula model does not allow for such 
tail dependency.  
An alternative to the Gaussian copula is the ‘t-copula’. T-copula models do 
allow for tail dependence and are therefore seen as more ‘realistic’. T-copulas, 
however, have their own limitations too. The strength of tail dependence is 
determined by a single parameter: the ‘degrees of freedom’ parameter. As a 
consequence, the strength of tail dependence is the same for all combinations of risk 
factors that are included in the copula model. Although this limitation might be 
overcome by using a generalisation of the standard t-copula, the ‘individuated t-
copula’, doing so would lead to another layer of complexity in the risk-model itself. 
The choice of modelling strategy, in other words, ultimately depends on how 
actuaries decide to make a trade-off between ‘realistic’ representation of risk 
diversification and opacity of their model for non-mathematical experts.  
Copula models cannot readily be solved analytically and require simulation. 
They are computationally demanding and were, therefore, throughout the 2000s, 
                                                 
32 As MacKenzie and Spears (2014b) show, the copula modelling techniques deployed by Frees, 
Valdez and Carriere migrated to the context of finance too, where they were used to model the 
dependency of default on a group of assets such as corporate loans or bonds, and later also mortgages 
(see also: Donnelly and Embrechts, 2010).  
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rarely used for regulatory capital purposes. By the early 2010s, however, some 
insurers (particularly the larger ones like AVIVA and Legal & General) started using 
copula models, even if copulas were disliked in finance (particularly the Gaussian 
copula) in the wake of the financial crisis (Donnelly and Embrechts, 2010; 
MacKenzie and Spears, 2014b). In KPMG’s 2014 technical practices survey, for 
instance, 8 out of 31 firms reported to use a copula model; two of which said to use t-
copulas rather than Gaussian ones. The bulk of the firms, however, stuck with 
correlation matrices, either using the 16-by-16 matrix previously popular or adopting 
a layered approach where risks would be grouped together. Thus, with the increased 
complexity of risk modelling, greater divergence in risk modelling practice across 
firms took place, a phenomenon that seems to have been correlated, in particular, 
with firm size.  
In sum, insurers’ risk analysis methods and techniques changed significantly 
over the course of the 2000s and 2010s. In the words of a former regulator, 
regulatory stress testing moved from being a ‘straightforward linear thing’ towards 
becoming a form of ‘scenario testing’, where ‘you can look at … if the world moves 
from what it is to this scenario … this will have this family of consequences for my 
balance sheet, and let's take account of all of them’ (interviewee BC). The increased 
‘realism’ of risk models, however, did not come without a cost. As noted above, the 
complexity of copula models, for instance, makes them rather computationally 
demanding and their design and operation requires very specific expertise.  
Risk Modelling as a Collective Activity 
A comparison between how insurers’ valuation models and risk models were 
developed yields an interesting puzzle. Most insurers outsourced their market-
consistent modelling to firms like Barrie & Hibbert and Deloitte. Most of the risk 
modelling, however, was done in-house. They may have sought advice from external 
sources, but the overall specification of the model and the calibration of some of the 
more important ‘stress factors’ was typically done by companies’ own actuaries.  
The difference between the distribution of valuation and risk modelling labour 




own risk assessment. An influential review of insurance failures (including a private 
data set on ‘near failures’) performed by the Conference of Insurance Supervisors 
under auspices of Paul Sharma, Head of the FSA’s Prudential Risk Department, had 
concluded that most failures were not due to weak capital requirements but rather 
because of poor risk analysis and management. The report, which was commissioned 
by the European Commission early on in the Solvency II process (discussed in 
chapter 7) suggested there was a need for supervisory tools to ‘improve focus on risk 
management and internal control’ (Conference of Insurance Supervisory Services of 
the Member States of the European Union, 2002). Indeed, an important justification 
for the ICAS was that it would incentivise insurers to improve their risk knowledge.  
Another explanation might be that firms wanted to control their own capital 
models. Prior to ICAS, some insurers (especially the larger ones) had some basic risk 
analysis in place to inform decision-making. When risk models started determining 
capital requirements, the incentive for insurers to do their own analysis strengthened. 
Although modelling firms did offer risk capital models, their uptake remained rather 
limited. Indeed, some suspected it was about an issue of control: 
I don't think an insurance company wants an externally supplied 
capital model stress, because if they just use the quarterly 
calibration from XYZ Financial Modellers then their capital would 
be driven by XYZ Financial Modellers’s calibration. And people 
want to own ‒ each insurance company wants to own their 
calibration … they want to be in control of the answer coming out. 
The stress calibration can directly drive what their SCR [solvency 
capital ratio] is going to be. If they delegate the calibration of the 
model to XYZ Financial Modellers then there's a chance that XYZ 
Financial Modellers says we've done some more research , or some 
new data has emerged, and it’s making changes to the model, so 
that over time the capital goes like that [interviewee draws an 
upward sloping curve in the air]. Then companies would go: “What 
have we done? How can our capital be higher than it was twelve 
months ago, just because XYZ Financial Modellers has decided the 
world's become riskier". This is a simplistic statement because the 
modellers should discuss changes with their clients and the clients 
can always amend parameters in the calibration but the underlying 
point remains - an insurer wants to own the calibration of the risk 
model. (Sharp interview) 
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If the risk capital model is used to constrain an insurer’s actions, this may lead 
to an incentive for the insurer to model risks in ways that are least constraining. 
Other interviewees recognised this point too. According to David Dullaway, for 
instance, the tight coupling of capital requirements with firms’ own internal risk 
assessment constituted a tension that may be difficult to resolve:  
[B]efore the realistic balance sheet, there were some companies 
that did economic capital calculations… But when [the 
calculations] were their own capital calculations and they didn't 
affect the capital you had to hold for the regulator, you tended to be 
very honest with yourself, because after all, you chose to do the 
calculation. … As soon as that model becomes your regulatory 
model, and you have to disclose it to the outside world, you 
suddenly have an incentive to get the numbers as low as possible. 
So, in some ways, making the regulatory model and the economic 
capital model the same thing, changed the way that companies 
thought about their economic capital models, from being a useful 
tool to being a number you wanted to minimise. (Dullaway 
interview) 
Regulatory capital is an important aspect of strategic decision-making and if 
regulatory capital depends on firms’ internal risk assessment, then firms are likely to 
want to retain control over that assessment to avoid sudden increases in regulatory 
capital. One could argue, of course, that the same goes for valuation: if the amount of 
regulatory capital depends on the value of firms’ liabilities, then firms are more 
likely to want to retain control over that model. An important difference, however, is 
that valuation models, as noted at the start of this chapter, are considered relatively 
‘objective’, while risk capital models are considered more ‘subjective’: the 
construction of the latter, in other words, is seen as less constrained. Although 
market-consistent modelling still requires decisions to be made, actors understand it 
as more narrowly constrained than risk modelling, which, in turn, contributes to 
making them so. 
Even though there was little epistemic consensus on how a 1-in-200 stress 
scenario should be construed, modellers’ actions were far from unconstrained. The 
constraints, however, were not imposed directly by the regulator. Regulators, as one 
supervisor remembers, ‘hadn’t really told firms in very much terms how to calculate 




supervisors were well aware of the tension between insurers’ interest in appropriate 
risk knowledge and their desire for moderate capital requirements and hence 
deployed several strategies to prevent firms from lowballing their risk estimations.  
One strategy was to challenge insurers to justify their choices. In reviewing 
insurers’ capital models, for instance, supervisors proclaimed to focus ‘upon whether 
the firm has used an appropriate approach to calculations and involved the people in 
the business in the best position to apply judgements. The more credible the 
approach, the more we can rely on the answer’ (FSA, 2005, p. 12, emphasis added). 
In response to the need for ‘credible’ risk modelling practices, the Institute and 
Faculty of Actuaries set up working parties like the Benchmarking Stochastic Models 
working party and the Stress Test working party, to interrogate insurers’ practices. 
Similar to valuation modelling, regulators defined the output that they wanted 
insurers to produce but delegated the development of a vocabulary to justify 
particular modelling choices to the actuarial profession.33 
In lieu of a well-established vocabulary of justification (simply because risk 
modelling was relatively new), firms and supervisors deployed other means to 
determine their stresses too. Firms would observe what other firms were doing 
(White, 1981). They compared, for instance, the severity of the 1-in-200 stresses 
with one another. Such observations were rarely direct but were mediated by 
actuarial consultants. ‘Insurers, via consultancy, talk to other insurers’ (Smith 
interview). Consultants would relay information they obtained through their advisory 
work for one company to the risk modellers of another. Dullaway, remembers for 
instance ‘having a database of all the stresses’ he had seen at his clients: 
So when somebody came along and said: what do you think this 
stress should be, I could say: ‘well, here’s analysis we've done. But 
also, I think most of your competitors are in a range of this to this.’ 
So you know that would be equally important for somebody setting 
their stress because they didn't want to be too far out of the range. 
(Dullaway interview) 
                                                 
33 The FSA summed up its approach quite nicely in an early review of the regime: ‘We keep an open 
mind on the majority of calculation approaches used by firms, placing the onus on them to satisfy us 
that their particular approach is appropriate to their individual circumstances’ (FSA, 2005, p. 4). 
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Consultancies, moreover, conducted surveys, such as the KPMG technical 
practices survey, that showed what ‘the market’ was doing. Consequentially, some of 
my interviewees noted, ‘some of the [modelling] assumptions I guess were based on 
sort of almost a market consensus at the time rather than necessarily a lot of hard 
evidence (Dumbreck interview).  
Market consensus did not in all cases emerge spontaneously from the 
interactions among firms’ actuaries mediated by consultants, but was sometimes 
facilitated by supervisory ‘benchmarking’. Certainly at the outset, modelling 
practices tended to diverge quite significantly. The FSA therefore sought to develop 
internal benchmarks that it used to compare the stringency of firms’ internal models. 
Benchmarking, however, only partially solved the FSA’s epistemic problem of 
assessing the adequacy of stress calibrations. Different firms tend to have different 
‘risk profiles’. Annuity providers, for instance, tend to invest in different assets than 
insurers writing primarily term assurance, which should, in theory, result in a 
different calibration of the 1-in-200 credit default stress. Similarly, a 1-in-200 
longevity stress calibration for an annuity provider underwriting primarily to people 
working in higher education is likely to be different from a 1-in-200 longevity stress 
for an annuity provider underwriting primarily factory personnel. An overreliance on 
benchmarks could mean that firms were not sufficiently scrutinising the risks 
themselves. Nevertheless, benchmarks were an important supervisory tool. The FSA 
gradually ‘took a stronger line on assumptions that they didn’t think were fully 
justifiable, and also maybe a stronger line on consistency between companies’ 
(Dumbreck interview).  
The development of insurers’ risk modelling practices was thus a 
fundamentally social process, in which the relations and tensions among relevant 
actors influenced the stringency of stress scenarios (cf. Thiemann and Lepoutre, 
2017). Some of my interviewees described this social process in combative terms, 
even though it may not necessarily have involved manifest antagonism and 
hostilities. One interviewee suggested for instance that ‘there is actually a bit of a 
battle between companies and regulators because regulators clearly want the answer 




(Dullaway interview). Consequentially, key decisions may be made during an 
extended approval process that takes the form more of a ‘technical debate’ between 
the regulator and regulated (Thiemann, 2018). This is, for instance, how a former 
chief actuary of one of the largest UK insurers experienced the ICAS approval 
process:  
I must have spent probably six months, you know, week by week 
negotiating with the regulators. We went through each element. 
They thought, no we disagree with this, this and this. And we think 
you should hold extra capital. And it was a genuine, not so much a 
negotiation, but a sort of a technical debate. And in the end, some 
things they agreed with us, some things we agreed with them. But 
you came to an agreed position on things, or even if it was just a 
gentlemen's agreement to disagree. You know, it was a proper 
dialogue around risk and what the company’s view was, what the 
regulator’s view was and what the balance in capital was… And I 
remember when we got our final ICG [individual capital guidance] 
I came back and told our executive committee, and there was a 
round of applause at the end of this six months of debate. (Belsham 
interview) 
Supervisors may perceive a firm’s model as too weak, while an insurer thinks 
it appropriate. A crucial tool to resolve such disputes was the ‘individual capital 
guidance’. If supervisors disagreed with insurers’ modelling, it could simply impose 
‘capital add-ons’. The FSA made extensive use of this tool: of the first ten companies 
it reviewed, the individual capital guidance was between 110% and 170% of firms’ 
own estimations of capital requirements (Bruce, 2006, p. 28). Although firm-specific 
information about the individual capital guidance remained private, investment 
analysts wanted to know more about their capital requirements (Bruce, 2006). As a 
result, firms were keen to reduce capital add-ons by bringing their risk models in line 
with supervisory standards.  
Managing the Balance Sheet 
The bedding down of the new risk models had profound consequences for the 
management of life insurance. Throughout the 2000s, ‘risk’ gradually became a 
central object of management in insurance companies, as manifested by a 
proliferation of risk functions, increased use of derivatives to manage financial risk, 
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and an expansion of the actuarial education syllabus to include risk management. 
Although, as Van der Graaf’s (2018) ethnographic study of risk management in a 
continental European insurer shows, risk managers rarely may see the ‘precise’ risk 
calculations as ‘true’ representations of risk, risk nevertheless became an 
increasingly important object in shaping the field of life insurance.  
The emergence of ‘risk’ reshaped the relations between insurers and their 
shareholders. Andrew Chamberlain (formerly at the GAD) described such changes in 
the following terms:  
In the old days, when I started … a lot of the funds were with-
profit funds, and the profits thrown off to shareholders from a with-
profits fund properly run were fairly consistent. So you bought life 
insurance companies for steady income that would grow at the 
time. And people didn't really understand anything about what 
went on underneath the bonnet of the car. They just knew that the 
car drove off at a fairly steady pace in the right direction. And 
that's why people would invest in ‒ maybe it’s commercial, well 
not so much commercial, because they were in much more general 
insurance as well, but companies like Prudential were invested in 
because they threw off this steady dividend string. Nowadays that 
isn't the way it works. With-profit is a much smaller part; it doesn't 
produce a consistent profit stream, because of the lower interest 
rate environment, and so forth. And they're now simply looking at 
reporting profits in the short-term. And so the valuation methods 
take an excessive priority because they drive investor sentiment … 
the world is being driven by the valuation practice rather than 
reflecting reality. (Chamberlain interview) 
The transition that Chamberlain describes is strongly bound up with the 
distribution of epistemic authority. In what Chamberlain describes as the ‘old days’, 
insurance was for investors a ‘black box’, whose performance could only be 
measured by investors through the dividends that it generated. Whether the ‘engine’ 
underneath the bonnet of the car was sound and would be able to sustain such 
dividend streams was up to the actuary. In contemporary insurance, however, 
insurers periodically produce representations of the processes that take place 
underneath the bonnet of the car through market-consistent valuation and risk capital 
calculations and leave investors to decide whether the profit streams promised by the 
insurer are ‘credible’. Inevitably, the representations thus produced are suited to the 




actuaries’ epistemic authority, in other words, made the economic and regulatory 
representations of insurance more influential in shaping today’s actions and thereby 
tomorrow’s outcomes of insurance.  
The increased centrality of risk in life insurance companies was not only 
fostered by a regulatory injunction to perform risk calculations, but also by the 
legitimation of risk management as a profitable activity ‒ a development that 
reflected changes in the broader corporate context of the 1980s and 90s (Power, 
2007). Modern finance theory suggested that investment returns should always be 
relative to investment risk; profit and risk were simply different sides of the same 
coin. In life insurance, it was only in the mid-2000s that risk became central in 
business strategy. In the early 2000s, insurers appeared to conduct risk calculations 
primarily for compliance purposes or simply because it was considered ‘good 
practice’ to do so (Bartlett et al., 2005, p. 3). Since then, however, insurers 
increasingly ‘embraced the value adding aspects of risk management’ to the extent 
that ‘good risk management’ was increasingly considered a ‘competitive advantage’ 
(Deighton et al., 2009, p. 521). The value-creating potential of risk management was 
described as follows: ‘Ideally, a company wishes to hold the minimum amount of 
capital required to meet its risk appetite, and create a win-win situation for 
shareholders and policyholders alike’ (Deighton et al., 2009, p. 521). Having 
appropriate risk management tools in place, in other words, would not only facilitate 
a better understanding of risk (and thus benefit policyholder protection), but would 
also improve shareholder value by minimising excess reserves given companies’ risk 
appetite. Risk management, in other words, was framed as a device to balance the 
interests of policyholders and shareholders.  
The proliferation of risk management practices was reflected in insurers’ 
changing governance structure. A survey conducted by the FSA in 2003 indicated 
that while most insurers had set up a separate ‘risk assessment function’ (37 out of 
39), the number of employees dedicated to the function was rather small (3 on 
average). Moreover, only two companies had appointed an executive level chief risk 
officer, while one company was planning on doing so (Dowd et al., 2008, p. 9). The 
results of a survey conducted in 2004 showed some significant changes: of the 39 
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companies surveyed, 21 now had a chief risk officer and 30 had a risk committee 
(Bartlett et al., 2005, p. 2). The size of the risk function, moreover, had increased to 
an average of five (Bartlett et al., 2005, p. 7). Thus, as the ICAS regime was 
implemented, the number of professionals that concerned themselves with ‘risk’ as 
an object to be assessed, measured and managed grew.  
With the introduction of new tasks within insurance firms, so began the 
Abbotian (1988) jurisdictional struggles among professional groups as to who would 
be best suited to perform risk management work. With the emergence of risk 
management in insurance, the two preeminent ‘financial risk management’ experts 
Kevin Dowd and David Blake wrote, ‘the stage was set for a classic turf war’ (Dowd 
and Blake, 2006, p. 221). While actuaries had ‘been accustomed to thinking of 
themselves of “the” risk experts’, they wrote, ‘the FRM [financial risk management] 
profession had the advantage that it had a flagship, the VaR, that took center stage: 
VaR was the flavor, not just of the month, but of the entire decade, and everyone 
wanted a “VaR model”’ (Dowd and Blake, 2006, p. 221). Within the actuarial 
profession, the rise of risk management was presented as an opportunity for the 
actuarial profession. In his Presidential Address, the consulting actuary Nick 
Dumbreck noted for instance: ‘Even within the insurance sector, the amount of effort 
devoted to measuring and managing risk seems set to grow significantly in the 
coming years. This will provide excellent opportunities for actuaries, and we need to 
be ready to take advantage of them’ (Dumbreck, 2007, p. 9). The educational 
syllabus of the actuarial profession was amended with a mandatory course on 
‘actuarial risk management’ in 2005. After the actuaries of the life insurance, general 
insurance, and investment kind, the American actuary Stephen D’Arcy 
prognosticated, the risk management actuary would be the ‘actuary of the fourth 
kind’ (D’Arcy, 2005).34  
                                                 
34 In his presidential address for the American Casualty Assurance Society, D’Arcy noted that he 
borrowed the expression from the renown financial risk management scholar Paul Embrechts. The 





The centrality of risk as an object to be managed was reflected not only by the 
emergence of a ‘risk function’, but also by insurers’ increased use of derivatives. In 
the 1990s, derivatives usage was only marginal. Paul Fulcher, who was an actuary at 
Friends Provident before he started working for various investment banks from 2001 
onwards, remembers, for instance, that by the late 1990s he ‘would have had no idea 
what an interest rate swap or swaption was’ (Fulcher interview). As mentioned 
above, the resilience reserve test was introduced to take the risk embedded in the 
guarantees into account when calculating reserves. Nevertheless, the resilience 
reserve test did rather little to push insurers to adopt derivative strategies. As Fulcher 
recalls, ‘by the end of ’93 we were holding a lot of money against interest rates 
falling another 100 basis points, say. But it wouldn’t have occurred to you to go and 
get an interest rate swap or an interest rate swaption because you wouldn’t have 
thought of it like that way’ (Fulcher interview). The only sort of derivatives that were 
widely used, according to Fulcher, was for short-term equity protection.  
You might buy some equity protection pretty much every year-end, 
but it’d be very short-dated. It would almost be: look, we’re going 
away, it’s the start of December and we’ve already worked out 
what our bonus declarations are going to be. And we sort of 
worked out and are happy with our balance sheet. … Well, we 
better, sort of, lock that in. So you might buy some equity 
protection that would literally expire in two or three weeks, just to 
lock in the sort of balance sheet over year-end, almost on the 
grounds of, well, that way we can all go home and enjoy 
Christmas. (Fulcher interview) 
Andrew Chamberlain similarly recalls that in the pre-ICAS regime ‘the use of 
derivatives to meet balance sheet tests was relatively low’ (Chamberlain interview). 
In the early 2000s, however, insurers increasingly started purchasing 
derivatives. The case of Equitable Life had made painfully clear what the dangers of 
unprotected interest rate exposures were, and the bursting of the Dotcom bubble put 
further downward pressure on insurers’ equity holdings. Moreover, as insurers 
started enacting the guarantees as financial options by modelling them as such, the 
choice to hedge their exposures with derivatives became a ‘thinkable’, and perhaps 
even logical one. At this point, Fulcher remembers: 
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investment banks suddenly realised that they could sell … interest 
rate derivatives. You know, they had these instruments ‒ things 
like swaptions ‒ that had a remarkably similar profile to the 
exposures that insurance companies had sold to their customers… 
but they needed actuaries to help sell them basically. (Fulcher 
interview) 
Among the investment banks that started hiring actuaries were JP Morgan, 
UBS, RBS, Nomura, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs. At the investment banks, 
however, actuaries tended to experience a very steep learning curve ‒ ‘if Google had 
not been invented, or the internet, I would have struggled to do my job. I spent my 
first six months, you know, at UBS just looking up things on the internet that all my 
colleagues took for granted’ (Fulcher interview). The investment banks started hiring 
actuarial expertise not only to get a better understanding of life insurance but also to 
gain insurers’ trust. As Fulcher continued to explain, ‘most of my clients perhaps … 
trust the bank I work for, because they trust me, if you see what I mean. That was 
part of the job in one sense. So, I trust him [the actuary], I don’t trust the bloke he 
brings to meetings with him [the investment banker], but, you know, at least I trust 
him’ (Fulcher interview). As the actuarial profession is rather small, individual 
members are likely to know each other or, if not, at least to have acquaintances in 
common. Investment banks hired actuaries not only for their expertise but also to 
benefit from actuaries’ professional networks and cultural identification to engender 
trust (Granovetter, 1985). In their position at the investment banks, these actuaries 
straddled across different professional ecologies strengthening the coalition of actors 
favouring the use of the valuation and risk management techniques of modern 
finance.  
Initially, the actuaries at investment banks spent much of their time 
modelling. While in the early 2000s, most insurers had bought a proprietary 
economic scenario generator from Barrie & Hibbert or Deloitte (as discussed in the 
previous chapter), these ‘were models designed to do calculations rather than models 
designed for financial management’ (Fulcher interview). The models produced by 
the investment banking actuaries ‒ which typically were of the ‘replicating portfolio’ 
kind discussed in the previous chapter ‒ were ‘sort of quick and dirty’, but ‘fit for 




the investment banking actuaries often helped insurers to do ‘hedge diagnoses’, or 
the modelling of insurance balance sheets for management purposes. Insurers would 
pay investment banks for such modelling services by buying the derivatives of them. 
The business model, in other words, was ‘quid pro quo’: ‘we’ll sell you the insurance 
to do the financial management, but we’ll help you with the modelling’ (Fulcher 
interview). This model worked well for investment banks, who were keen on selling 
something that requires ‘a bit of analysis and intellectual value added’, for it would 
mean that they would be ‘not just in competition on cheapest price’, but could 
‘charge a reasonable amount for it, because it’s tailored’ (Fulcher interview). Hedge 
diagnosis was an important part of the service that investment banks sold to insurers.  
Over time, however, modelling became a smaller part of the investment 
banking actuary’s job. This was partly the result of insurers’ expanding internal risk 
managing activities. As the ICAS and realistic balance sheet regimes were 
implemented, insurers increasingly ‘realised the importance of financial 
management’ and ‘got the expertise themselves’ (Fulcher interview). As a 
consequence, Fulcher noted, ‘there’s people at insurers who understand the financial 
instruments better than I do… Quite commonly … they would actually understand 
investment banking products at least as well as I do, if not better’ (Fulcher 
interview). This changed the business model of over-the-counter derivatives too. As 
Fulcher put it, ‘now it’s much more, clients basically tell us, this is the derivative we 
need.’ ‘And so the model sort of “we’ll do some analysis, and then you’ll pay us by 
doing the derivatives with us” has become quite hard’ (Fulcher interview). As 
insurers increasingly performed the enactment of insurance guarantees as financial 
options ‘in-house’, competition in the market for over-the-counter derivatives for 
insurers revolved increasingly around price.  
The implementation of the ICAS regime was indirectly an important driver of 
increased derivatives usage by requiring insurers to enact financial risk in certain 
ways rather than others. The ICAS regime, however, also fostered the use of 
derivatives in a more direct sense. It required insurers to perform balance sheet tests. 
Rather than assessing whether a company’s funds were sufficient for ‘running-off’ its 
liabilities, the ICAS required companies to assess whether their funds were sufficient 
172 
 
to cover the market consistent value of the liabilities in one year’s time in all but the 
worst of 200 scenarios. Although some considered the difference between run-off 
and one-year VaR measures ‘artificial’, the choice nevertheless seems to have been 
consequential.35 It rendered capital requirements manageable with derivatives. 
Derivative contracts with a maturity of, say, 20 years may not readily be available 
(and if they are, they may be rather expensive); derivatives with a one-year maturity, 
however, are much more abundant. Indeed, interviewee data indicates that 
derivatives were used to ‘manage’ the balance sheets so that they could stabilise their 
capital position and give off a positive impression to investors.  
Conclusion 
As the epistemic authority of the actuarial profession declined, alternative devices 
had to be deployed to make life insurers’ promises to policyholders, shareholders, 
and regulators appear credible. Such alternative devices were found in the form of 
market-consistent valuation and risk-based capital, which were pushed by a coalition 
of actors that straddled across different professional ecologies and indeed different 
fields. In the previous chapter, we have seen that market-consistent modelling 
derived legitimacy from its perceived objectivity. In the case of risk modelling, 
however, no such ‘objectivity’ exists. Risk modelling requires ‘forecasting’, and, as 
such, is recognised by actors to be situated in the realm of expert opinion. The 
‘credibility’ of risk models is produced through the interaction among relevant actors 
(shareholders, consultants, regulators, supervisors, actuaries, etc.) and in reference to 
quite a distinct vocabulary of justification. As argued above, modellers may draw on 
‘archival-statistical knowledge’ to justify modelling assumptions by extrapolating 
past trends into the future, but by itself, ‘archival-statistical knowledge’ is considered 
inadequate. ‘Expert judgment’ is another resource for justifying modelling 
                                                 
35 Seamus Creedon, for instance, explained this as follows: ‘I think if you had perfect foresight about 
the position one year hence, such that your provisions one year hence reflected a reasonable view of 
the run-off position at that point, then there is really no difference between a full run-off and a VaR to 
the one-year point where you have a fresh set of technical provisions’ (Creedon interview). For 
Creedon, in other words, there is no conceptual difference between the measures because the market-
consistent value of a liability takes into account the amount of assets needed today to sell off all risk to 
a third party, or the amount of capital needed to run-off the liabilities with some degree of certainty 




assumptions. More generally, the need to justify particular modelling assumptions 
may be reduced by adhering to ‘market consensus’ as reflected in industry 
benchmarks.  
 As a consequence of the proliferation of risk modelling in insurance practice, 
driven in no small part by a changing regulatory regime, ‘risk’ has become an 
increasingly central object in the UK’s life insurance market, even if modellers do 
not necessarily perceive representations of risk as accurate. In conjunction with 
market-consistent models, life insurers’ risk models enact insurance policies as 
bundles of risk that can be ‘managed’ through derivative strategies. Indeed, 
derivative usage by life insurers started increasing throughout the 2000s. This had 
consequences not only for the composition of life insurers’ investment but also for 
the composition of the life insurance field. The role of actuaries as custodians of 
surplus diminished while shareholders acquired a more prominent role in assessing 
the credibility of future profitability. The changing composition of the field was also 
reflected in the entrance of various investment banks, who started hiring actuaries to 
establish trust with insurers and to do some of the ‘cruder’ modelling required to 
‘manage’ insurers’ balance sheets. Within this context, risk modelling developed, at 
least partially, as a collective activity that involved not just companies’ actuarial or 
finance teams, but also supervisors, modellers at investment banks, actuarial 
consultants and academics. The epistemic authority of actuarial expertise was 









Chapter 7  
Fixing Paradigms: European Capital Regulation  
In 2016, the UK’s parliamentary Treasury Committee started an investigation into 
Solvency II, a European regulatory framework for insurance implemented earlier that 
year, but that had long since been in the making (work on it had started in the early 
2000s). The Committee, chaired by the Conservative MP Nicky Morgan, reported: 
Evidence gathered … suggested that Solvency II is a 
fundamentally sound regime, but that the legislation has been 
developed within a legalistic and rules-based framework which at 
times is interpreted as rigid truth instead of on the merits of the 
case. Furthermore, the implementation in the UK has, arguably, 
lacked proportionality. (Treasury Committee, 2017c, p. 18) 
In their contributions to the Committee, industry practitioners and 
professional organisations unfavourably compared Solvency II to the UK’s previous 
regime. Yet, UK actors were important advocates of Solvency II, which (similar to 
the Individual Capital Adequacy Standards or ICAS) was market-consistent and risk-
based. ‘Solvency II was what the UK wanted’, supervisor BA said. ‘Solvency II is an 
Anglo-Saxon regime’ (interviewee BA). Now, it seemed, the same UK actors were 
amongst the most avid proponents of changing the regime. In an exemplary 
comparison between the ICAS regime and Solvency II, the CEO of the UK’s 
Prudential Regulation Authority commented on the ‘matching adjustment’ – a 
specific aspect of Solvency II that will be discussed in more detail below ‒ that ‘the 
stricter and tighter nature of the rules around this instrument, under Solvency II 
versus its predecessor under ICAS, have led us into a world where, in order to make 
some of these things work, we have added complexity’ (Woods in Treasury 
Committee, 2017b, p. 10). Brexit, some argued, would provide ‘an opportunity to 
make refinements to the current regime that ensure it is more appropriate for UK 
insurers and customers’ (Association of British Insurers, 2016, p. 2) by separating the 
British insurance field from the European field in an attempt to reclaim a decisive 
role for domestic state actors in shaping fields. 
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In examining the gestation of Solvency II, this chapter suggests that in order 
to understand what caused the change of heart of many British actors it is necessary 
to understand the social and political dynamics of rule following and writing. In 
particular, it is necessary to look at how market-consistent valuation was 
institutionalised in the market field. Under the ICAS regime, market-consistent 
valuation (chapter 5) and risk-based capital calculations (chapter 6) were already 
institutionalised, but their institutionalisation remained relatively implicit, limited to 
a set of broad principles. What those broader principles meant in practice was to be 
decided by insurance companies and supervisors. With Solvency II, however, many 
of the valuation and risk capital calculation rules were made explicit. Doing so, I 
suggest, was an attempt to ‘fix’ the meaning of market-consistent valuation. This, 
then, is the aim of this chapter: to investigate where this urge to ‘fix’ the meaning of 
market-consistent valuation came from, and the challenges that came along with it 
ultimately leaving many British actors eager to rescind the regulatory framework 
they had been in favour of.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: I first place the Solvency II project within 
the context of European integration and describe the politics of regulatory 
harmonisation for European life insurance. In the second section, I characterise the 
politics of Solvency II by arguing that the institutionalisation of evaluation practices 
gave rise to a potentially infinite Wittgensteinian regress to define what market-
consistency means. I then describe how the distribution of authority of European 
capital regulation shaped processes of rule writing and following. In the penultimate 
section, before the conclusion, I describe three controversies around Solvency II and 
show how in each of these cases seemingly technical, ‘micro-political’ issues became 
overtly political.  
The Solvency II Project 
Changes in the regulatory regime of UK life insurance cannot be understood without 
the European context. Particularly important is the process of European market 
integration, which began in the 1950s. Early efforts towards harmonisation by a 




the integration of insurance markets, conflicted with the traditional actuarial 
mechanism of dealing with uncertainty through the principle of prudence. Capital 
requirements on top of already ‘prudent’ valuations would punish those member 
states whose practices were already the most prudent (Daykin, 1992; Sandström, 
2016). Across member states, moreover, ‘different perceptions’ prevailed ‘of what 
life insurance is about’ (Pool, 1990, p. 33).  
Nevertheless, with the passing of the European Community’s First Life 
Directive, the first European solvency rules for life insurers were put in place in 
1979.36 A key question was to what extent capital requirements should be based on 
‘implicits’, reflecting actuarial expectations about future performance, and on 
‘explicits’, calculated on a ‘retrospective’ basis, such as past claims expenses or 
premium income. While practitioners preferred the use of ‘implicits’, regulators 
preferred ‘explicits’, arguably so ‘because one does not need to be an actuary to 
understand what is involved’ (Pool, 1990, p. 36). ‘Explicits’, moreover, were 
independent of mathematical reserves, rules for which the first life directive left to 
national supervisory authorities. The First Life Directive was a compromise between 
explicits and implicits: its solvency margin was based not on mathematical reserves, 
like earlier proposals had suggested, but on past claims expenses and premium 
income; valuation rules, however, remained a domestic affair. 
Some degree of coordination on valuation rules was achieved with the passing 
of the Third Life Directive. The Groupe Consultatif des Associations d'Actuaires des 
Pays des Communautés Européennes (or simply Groupe Consultatif), a European 
association of professional bodies set up in 1978 to represent actuarial interests to 
European legislative bodies, played a crucial role in this. The First Life Directive did 
not lead to the desired cross-border activity and the European Commission perceived 
diverging valuation rules as an important barrier. It therefore adopted a strategy of 
‘minimum harmonisation’, a form of negative harmonisation that seeks to establish 
                                                 
36 The first non-life directive, which is very similar to the first life directive, was passed several years 
earlier, in 1973. The main reason for the difference in timing was that the life directive was much 
longer as it dealt with the issue of ‘specialisation’ ‒ whether insurers should be allowed to write both 




minimum standards whilst facilitating cross-border market access. In so doing, 
national regulatory regimes would face pressure to converge towards the minimum 
standard. In a way, ‘minimum harmonisation’ thus sought to utilise ‘competition 
politics’ – a form of politics in which actors mainly seek to promote the international 
competitiveness of domestic industries (Mügge, 2006) ‒ as a mechanism to level the 
playing field across different states (Story and Walter, 1997). To achieve this, the 
Commission asked the Groupe Consultatif to carry out a survey on whether 
‘different methods or bases for calculating technical reserves … lead to significantly 
different protection for policyholders in different members states’, and whether they 
lead ‘to significant distortions of competition if the principle of a “single license” 
with “home country supervisions” were adopted throughout the European 
communities’ (Wilkie and Horsmeier, 1990, p. 2). 
The survey was carried out by two members of the Groupe’s Life Assurance 
Committee, the Dutch actuary Harry Horsmeier and the British actuary David 
Wilkie, whom we encountered in chapter 3. European insurance markets differed 
quite substantially. ‘Some countries regulated premiums and reserving tightly, 
prescribing the basis, and letting companies compete on bonuses. Others, like the 
UK, were more relaxed’ (Wilkie in personal communication). However, the 
Groupe’s report, which had been composed by Wilkie and Horsmeier and was 
amended by other members of the Life Assurance Committee, concluded that ‘in 
spite of different methods and bases for calculating technical reserves … each 
method provides ample protection for domestic policyholders’ (Wilkie and 
Horsmeier, 1990, p. 72). Moreover, the report noted that ‘any attempt to introduce 
uniformity of methods or bases for calculating technical reserves … would be 
inappropriate, unnecessary and harmful’, and recommended that, instead, ‘the 
relevant directive should contain a statement of actuarial principles’ (Wilkie and 
Horsmeier, 1990, p. 72).  
After having submitted the report, the Groupe retained a strong influence on 
the directive. The committee employed two actuaries, who, as Wilkie recalls, ‘felt 
that they needed a bit of help’ and hence asked the Groupe Consultatif ‘to draft a set 




Groupe’s Life Assurance Committee, Theo Heiligenberg, phoned up David Wilkie 
and asked him whether he could come and see him in the Netherlands that weekend. 
Wilkie, who had already arranged to go to Switzerland that Saturday, arranged a 
stopover at Schiphol airport where he sat down with Heiligenberg and Horsmeier in a 
restaurant and ‘spent about three hours’ drafting a set of valuation principles. The 
initial draft favoured a ‘bonus reserve valuation’, a type of gross premium valuation 
that would also take into account future bonuses and would be performed on a 
prudent basis. Various members of the Groupe Consultatif’s Life Assurance 
Committee, however, preferred a more traditional, net premium type of approach 
(see chapter 5). For instance, as Wilkie remembers, one of the German members of 
the committee ‘did not like the idea of a “breathing balance sheet”’ (Wilkie 
interview), the assets and liabilities of which would go up and down as market 
conditions change. Other actuaries, including the other UK members, similarly 
preferred the ’net premium valuation’ method.  
The Third Life Directive eventually allowed for a wide variety of valuation 
methods to be used. It prescribed a ‘prospective’ bonus reserve valuation but also 
permitted a net premium valuation on a ‘retrospective’ basis. The directive, a former 
regulator recalls, ‘progressed harmonisation of asset and liability values; didn’t 
achieve it, but progressed it’ (interviewee BC). The directive, moreover, prescribed 
that companies should make the valuation basis and methods available to the public. 
The directive thus institutionalised the UK’s ‘freedom with publicity’ regime at the 
European level and effectively entrenched the use of ‘implicit’ valuation practices 
such as the net premium valuation (Penrose, 2004). 
Around the turn of the century, however, things started to change: the launch 
of the Financial Services Action Plan in 1999 and the prospect of a single currency 
shifted regulators’ focus towards positive integration (Quaglia, 2010) – an objective 
that had previously proved difficult to achieve. The series of directives passed in the 
early 90s, however, had contributed to the emergence of large financial institutions 
that operated in multiple member states and had a competitive interest in furthering 
the integration of domestic market fields into a single European one (Mügge, 2006). 
In 1999, moreover, the Economics and Finance Ministers Council had set up a 
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‘Committee of Wise Men’ led by the Hungarian central banker Alexandre 
Lamfalussy to make recommendations on streamlining the regulatory process. The 
Committee recommended a four-level procedure in which the negotiation of high-
level regulations (level 1) and lower level technical specification of those regulations 
(level 2) would be separated. (Level 3 consisted of guidelines issued by supervisory 
authorities; level 4 of enforcement mechanisms.) Whilst level 1 regulations would be 
designed by the European Commission and were to be approved by the Council and 
Parliament, specialised committees would lead the development of level 2 
regulations. The recommendations of the Committee were adopted in 2001 and 
facilitated the negotiation of a series of directives, including the influential Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive in 2004. The Lamfalussy process helped speed up 
the regulatory process by turning what were previously political issues into technical 
ones (e.g. Mügge, 2006). 
Solvency II was the first piece of insurance regulation following the 
Lamfalussy procedure. Although early work on insurance solvency regulation had 
started in the late 1990s, the project ‘really only started in 2004’, Karel Van Hulle, 
head of the Insurance and Pensions unit at the European Commission between 2004 
and 2013, said (Van Hulle interview). In prior years, it had become clear that reforms 
of the solvency regime would take time. The Commission therefore decided to 
‘detach’ some early wins (adopted in the Solvency I directive, which mostly 
consolidated already existing directives) and initiated a more fundamental review of 
solvency requirements (interviewee BC; François, 2015). In 2004, the Committee of 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS) was set up, 
which together with the European Commission started drafting a new regime. 
In the years prior to 2004, however, important decisions had already been 
made. Particularly influential were two reports commissioned by the European 
Commission: the ‘Sharma report’ by the Conference of European Insurance 
Supervisors (2002), the predecessor of CEIOPS, which was headed by Paul Sharma 
of the UK’s Financial Services Authority; and the KPMG report. The Sharma report 
was based on an analysis of insurance failures and near failures and concluded that 




standards. It implied that new solvency regulations should not just establish 
quantitative requirements, but also improve insurance governance. The KPMG 
report, on the other hand, focused on practical recommendations. As one of its 
authors remembers, the report was not ‘strikingly original, but it drew quite heavily 
on Basel concepts’ (Creedon interview). The report proposed a three-pillared 
structure similar to the Basel regime for banking, in which the three pillars would 
outline respectively quantitative, corporate governance and disclosure requirements. 
The ‘pillar 1 requirements’, moreover, would be based either on an ‘internal model’ 
or a ‘standard formula’ that would be ‘scenario-based and not factor-based’ (Van 
Hulle interview). Both reports provided the basic contours of the Commission’s 
‘framework for consultation’ ‒ a document with draft regulations that would be 
updated along the way ‒ and thus had helped set the policy agenda (Van Hulle 
interview).  
 A central aspect of Solvency II’s design (well established by 2004) was that a 
European regime, like the UK’s domestic regime, should be ‘market-consistent’ (see 
chapter 5). For Quaglia, this similarity was evidence that the British had successfully 
‘uploaded’ their domestic regulatory template to the European level. Indeed, ‘British 
policymakers chaired key committees and were regarded as points of reference in the 
debate’ (Quaglia, 2011, p. 115). The choice for market-consistency, however, also 
articulated well with broader international developments in banking regulation, 
accounting standards and, indeed, nascent efforts towards international insurance 
solvency standards by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors. Again, 
as noted in chapter 5, market-consistency thus gained broad support from actors 
across different professional ecologies, which endowed it with critical force. Market-
consistency, moreover, was regarded as a necessary precondition for an ‘explicit’ 
risk-based capital regime. It thus quickly became one of the few principles from 
which the European Commission ‘was not willing to diverge’ (Van Hulle interview; 
cf. Mügge, 2011). Nevertheless, what market-consistent valuation meant in practice 
was the focus of extensive debate and political negotiation (as discussed below).  
Thus, at the core of Solvency II is a market-consistent balance sheet that may 
look different from one day to the next (were it to be calculated on consecutive days, 
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which in reality it is not). It is a ‘breathing balance sheet’ of the type that some 
supervisors had previously rejected. For the European Commission’s regulators, this 
‘breathing’ was a good thing: ‘We work with living animals. Not with dead things, 
you know,’ Van Hulle (2014) remarked. Solvency II was designed to stimulate active 
risk management, on behalf of both insurance companies as well as their supervisors. 
In contrast to Solvency I, for instance, it contained an ‘early warning system’. 
Solvency requirements comprised two components: ‘minimum capital requirements’, 
calculated as the amount needed to remain solvent on a market-consistent basis in 
85% of one-year scenarios; and the higher ‘solvency capital requirements’ that 
should provide sufficient capital for 99.5% of the same scenarios. The solvency 
capital requirements were intended as ‘soft’ requirements: breaching these 
requirements would lead to extra regulatory scrutiny and the need for a recovery 
plan; only when the minimum capital requirements were breached would the 
company be forced into ‘run-off’ (i.e. to close its doors to new business).  
Rules, Paradigms and the Micro-Politics of Regulation  
Whilst it was established early on that Solvency II would be market-consistent and 
risk-based, it was less clear what this would mean in practice. Indeed, I argue, much 
of the politics surrounding Solvency II revolved around the meaning of market-
consistency. In this section, I seek to describe this form of politics by looking at the 
ways in which actors may seek to influence what it means to comply with the general 
principles of market-consistent valuation and risk-based capital calculation.  
To claim that much of the politics can be understood as shaping the meaning 
of market-consistency may be surprising considering that, as noted in chapter 5, one 
of the attractions of market-consistency was precisely that it would be more 
‘objective’. A regulatory system that would better reflect the ‘true’ economic 
substance (as defined by the hegemonic paradigm of no-arbitrage modelling) of 
insurance products would thus provide an apolitical (or, at least, a less political) basis 
for the legitimacy of capital regulation. At the same time, it would be a means to 
reduce opportunities for ‘regulatory arbitrage’ (Swain and Swallow, 2015) – the 




and the regulatory representations thereof or between the regulatory treatment of 
functionally equivalent products across different fields (Fleischer, 2010; Riles, 
2014).  
Indeed, regulatory arbitrage was an important motivation for Solvency II, 
which promised to reduce the discrepancies between capital regulation regimes 
across the increasingly integrated adjacent fields of banking and insurance. Since the 
1980s, for instance, the business model of ‘bancassurance’ – the sales of insurance 
products through bank branches – became increasingly widespread, not so much in 
the UK but more so in Portugal, Italy, Spain and France (Sterzynski, 2003). By 
reducing the gap between insurance and banking capital regulation, Solvency II 
promised to foreclose opportunities for bancassurers to exploit differences in how the 
balance sheets of insurance entities and banking entities were treated in distinct 
regulatory regimes (European Central Bank, 2007). For those countries in which 
bancassurance became a dominant model of insurance provision (countries in which 
the fading of the boundaries between the insurance and banking fields had been most 
pronounced), the promise to foreclose this regulatory loophole at the very least 
weakened the opposition of insurance regulators towards market-consistent 
valuation.  
Thus, apart from the hegemonic status of market-consistent valuation itself, 
Solvency II also promised to circumvent some of the problems of ‘competition 
politics’ by aligning regulatory representations of value and risk with hegemonic 
economic representations thereof. However, I argue, attempts at doing so irrevocably 
leave gaps and fissures – ‘rough edges’ in the words of Andrew Smith (Smith 
interview) – that constitute a space for politics. These gaps and fissures are, in part, 
the result of the indeterminacy of rules, but are also constituted by a tension between 
paradigmatic and rule-based knowledge. As noted in chapter 2, paradigmatic 
knowledge (conveyed through exemplary problem solutions) is often seen as 
irreducible to an explicit set of rules, which is partly because the criteria for how a 
paradigm should be extended to new problems are contingent on the setting in which 
the paradigm is to be applied. The meaning of a paradigm is ‘relational’ (Daston, 
2016; Hacking, 2016) and its extension requires decisions, either implicit or explicit. 
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The translation of market-consistent valuation into an explicit set of rules thus 
involves two moments in which social and political factors may play a role: 1) the 
extension of paradigmatic knowledge into a set of rules; and 2) decision making 
about what constitutes rule conforming behaviour. 
The tension between regulatory (rule following) and economic (paradigmatic) 
representations of value and risk thus brings to the fore the question of micro-
politics, which, I suggested in chapter 2, refers to subterranean struggles over 
seemingly technical issues. Actors may seek to influence not only the wording of 
rules but also the scope of behaviours that are accepted as complying with those 
rules. In so doing, actors may argue that a particular instance is an exception that 
falls outside the intended scope of the rule. If successful, regulators may be forced to 
rewrite the rules to reflect this renewed meaning – they may be forced, in other 
words, to take a step into the Wittgensteinian ‘infinite regress’ (see chapter 2). This 
regress is potentially infinite because rules in themselves are incapable of 
determining their application and it is thus impossible to ‘fix’ their meaning simply 
by writing more rules. Only when causal factors allow implicit or explicit decisions 
to be made effectively may the infinite regress be put to a halt.  
In some cases, the micro-politics of evaluation may become overtly political. 
An example will serve to illustrate the point. In 2015, the European Commission 
published a green paper with proposals for its Capital Markets Union programme, 
which included proposals to help incentivise private investment in infrastructure 
assets. As part of this programme, the European Commission decided to amend 
Solvency II, by creating a new asset class in the standard formula for infrastructure 
investments. The capital requirements for this new asset class would be lower than 
the reserves needed to back other types of equity investment.37 For Smith, ‘the 
figures that have been come up with [for infrastructure assets] are clearly 
inconsistent with other asset classes’ (Smith interview). The political demand for 
                                                 
37 Although the standard formula is only used by some companies, it is also used as a ‘benchmark’ to 




infrastructure investment trumped the epistemic standard of consistency to which 
Smith alludes, and led to the writing of more detailed rules.  
The Distribution of Epistemic and Supervisory Authority 
Having argued in the previous section that the politics surrounding Solvency II can 
be described as a form of micro-politics that in some cases may become overtly 
political, I now turn to the locus of that politics: the actors that are involved in the 
writings of the rules and the ‘communities of interpretation’ (Thiemann and 
Lepoutre, 2017; Thiemann, 2018) that determine the scope of their appropriate 
application. More specifically, I focus on the distribution of different forms of 
‘authority’ – understood in the Barnesian (1986, 1988) sense as a delegated 
discretionary capacity (conferred by the state) to determine the appropriate 
application of a paradigm (in the case of ‘epistemic authority’) or a rule (in the case 
of ‘supervisory authority’). The more the authority to write rules and the authority to 
supervise their application coincide, the more likely rules are to enable and constrain 
the behaviour of those subject to it effectively. The more fractured this authority 
becomes, however, the more flexible the application of rules will likely be, and the 
more slippage there will be between the intention of a rule and its actual application. 
In chapter 5, I argued that the UK transition towards a market-consistent 
regime was related to broader shifts in the distribution of authority. Whilst traditional 
valuation models required actuarial judgment on the future, market-consistent 
valuation models sought to circumvent the need to forecast the future by recasting 
the question of value in no-arbitrage terms. Actuarial authority, in other words, was 
replaced by the ‘objectivity’ of no-arbitrage models. At the same time, supervisors 
started playing a more active role in judging whether firms appropriately applied 
market-consistent valuation and risk calculation techniques. The role of actuaries 
changed accordingly: they increasingly became ‘technical’ experts concerned with 
developing the techniques that allowed firms to comply with the principles of 
market-consistent valuation and risk-based capital calculation.  
With Solvency II, there were further changes in the distribution of authority ‒ 
changes that would have important implications for insurers’ knowledge machinery. 
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Among the more significant changes was that the authority to decide how things like 
value and risk should be calculated became increasingly located with supervisors, in 
particular with CEIOPS (and from 2014 onwards EIOPA, or the European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority). CEIOPS had an important influence on level 
2 regulations, which were formally ‘adopted by the European Commission’, but 
‘prepared by the supervisory authorities on the basis of a specific mandate from the 
Commission’ (Van Hulle, 2011: 296). Level 2 regulations were crucial, because, as 
Van Hulle noted, there was a ‘tendency’ at level 1 to push problems downwards’ 
(Van Hulle interview). Thus, whilst the ‘principles’ underpinning Solvency II ‘could 
be agreed rather quickly … the real debate was to be had on the elaboration of those 
principles’ (Van Hulle interview) – a debate in which supervisors played a key role.  
With supervisors who increasingly acquired ‘epistemic confidence’, the 
influence of the actuarial profession on the regulatory process declined. Indeed, the 
delegate of the Royal Dutch Actuarial Association to the Actuarial Association of 
Europe (AAE) at the time, Ad Kok, recalls that while the European Commission had 
seemed to be receptive to the AAE’s advice (‘they understood this was consultancy 
free of charge’), CEIOPS appeared rather less so. The biannual meetings of the AAE 
with CEIOPS appeared to Kok primarily as ‘one-way traffic’ (Kok interview). ‘We 
then said, we can do this, we can do that. Yes, that was heard, and, well yeah, many 
thanks. That was that’ (Kok interview). 
Despite the fact that Solvency II was, in some sense, a continuation of the 
UK’s domestic regime, there were also important differences. In the UK’s domestic 
regime, both the authority to write rules and to supervise their application had been 
centralised ‒ even if supervisors might have been more receptive to external advice. 
In the European context, however, the distribution of authority was layered: while 
CEIOPS did most of the rule writing, responsibility for supervising how those rules 
were applied in practice was located with domestic supervisors. Although CEIOPS 
was given the authority to supervise supervision, this nonetheless meant that 
domestic supervisors had some degree of discretion in shaping the rules. To the 




there was thus a tension between the rule-writing authority and the authority to 
supervise their application.  
The objectives of CEIOPS and domestic supervisors did indeed differ. Whilst 
‘convergence of supervisory practices’ was a key objective of CEIOPS (2006), 
domestic supervisors faced entirely different pressures. As Singer (2007) notes, 
national regulators and supervisors face two main pressures that are typically in 
tension with one another. On the one hand, the primary objective of the PRA is to 
protect policyholders by avoiding economic catastrophe. On the other hand, 
however, regulators and supervisors may also be engaged in ‘competition politics’ 
(Mügge, 2006). Apart from the fact that supervisors may have a ‘competition 
objective’ (as was the case with the Financial Services Authority and later the 
Prudential Regulation Authority or PRA), making them responsible for maintaining 
effective competition, they protect the interests of the domestic industry in the 
international field.  
Supervisors and regulators continuously face these opposing pressures – 
pressures that in some cases may become rather manifest. In the hearings cited 
earlier, for instance, the Treasury Committee wondered whether the fact that the 
competition objective of the PRA was secondary had meant that it was subdued to 
the primary objective of policyholder protection. This was what private practitioners 
and consultants had intimated in earlier hearings. When Phil Smart, partner at the 
insurance practice of KPMG, suggested that the PRA’s stringent reading of Solvency 
II had led to excessive capital requirements, the Conservative MP and then chair of 
the Committee, Andrew Tyrie, asked: ‘So the consumer is paying more than he or 
she needs in premiums, to enable the regulator to sleep more easily in his or her 
bed?’ (Tyrie in Treasury Committee, 2017a, p. 3). 
Politicians may thus be concerned about the level of stringency that 
supervisors apply in shaping how rules are applied in practice. In another instance, 
for example, the Conservative politician Jacob Rees-Mogg asked Woods: 
Can it possibly be found, on a uniform basis across the EU, that an 
industry that most of us would think was quite strong in the UK 
turns out to be the third-weakest in Europe? How would you 
188 
 
explain the figure that comes out of 142% solvency ratio in the 
UK, 272% in Germany and in Italy—Italy—a 243% solvency 
ratio. … If you take the Italian figure and the UK figure, if you did 
it on the same basis for both countries, you may find that the 
difference is not 101% between the solvency ratios of the UK and 
Italy. (Rees-Mogg in Treasury Committee, 2017b, p. 14) 
Rees-Mogg suggested, in other words, that UK supervisors applied the rules 
relatively strictly, putting UK insurers at a structural disadvantage vis-à-vis other 
insurers. In addressing Rees-Mogg’s query, Woods suggested that even if the 
application of the rule had not been ‘absolutely universal’, the PRA had stuck to 
epistemic standards in determining the appropriate application of the rules. ‘We have 
just said what our view of longevity is, being reasonable about it’, he claimed, 
suggesting that a weakening of the standards would unduly subject the primary 
objective of policyholder protection to the competition objective. Supervisors may 
thus refer to epistemic standards to fence-off political pressure to weaken regulatory 
standards.  
The efficacy of regulation may thus depend on the balance between the 
different pressures that are exerted on supervisors. Another important factor is the 
relation between the supervisor and the supervised (Thiemann and Lepoutre, 2017; 
Thiemann, 2018). Regulators may be well aware of this. Consider, for instance, this 
extract from a speech by Van Hulle: 
Today, many countries when they do insurance supervision, it’s 
basically somebody sitting behind a desk and reading lots of 
reports and things and filings and whatever. Not anymore in the 
future. In the future, insurance supervisors will actually have to 
know who they are supervising. And establish a dialogue. … the 
insurance industry should look at the supervisor as their friend. Not 
their enemy. That’s the logic of Solvency II. No organised war 
between the supervisor and the supervised. … And because we are 
fully transparent ‒ pillar 3 ‒ we can actually talk to each other, 
because we know each other. … Ladies and gentlemen, these 
companies are your lifeline. You make money from them. So you 
better take care of them. … And it is this trust that is very 
important in the philosophy of Solvency II. (Van Hulle, 2014)  
Van Hulle was thus advocating for closer ties and more trust between 




the one hand, the exchange between supervisors and firms intensified under 
Solvency II. A good indication of this is the cost of supervision: HM Treasury 
estimated, for instance, the one-off cost of Solvency II incurred by the UK’s 
Prudential Regulation Authority at £105m, while the ongoing costs of IT 
maintenance and increased supervisory resources were estimated at £3.3m per year 
(Regulatory Policy Committee, 2015). But while the interactions between 
supervisors and supervisees proliferated, the nature of the relation, according to Van 
Hulle, did not appear to be based on trust. ‘The insurers didn’t trust the supervisors. 
And the supervisors themselves didn’t trust the insurers’ (Van Hulle interview). The 
absence of trust had important implications for Solvency II. 
The insurers came to me and asked me: what does this principle 
mean in this specific case? I often said to the insurers: don’t ask me 
that question, because I will then have to write a rule. Use your 
common sense. Apply this principle in the spirit of Solvency II. 
But the insurers had difficulties with this, because they said, as 
long as the principles aren’t clear, the supervisor is going to impose 
all sorts of things on me, because the supervisor is going to 
interpret the principles. I need something to hold onto. Similarly, 
insurance supervisors wanted more detail because they were afraid 
that this was the only way to enforce the principles in practice (Van 
Hulle interview) 
Insurers feared that the domestic regulator would apply the rules rather strictly, thus 
preferring CEIOPS to ‘fix’ their meaning. The competitive dimension between the 
different national industries thus powerfully pushed CEIOPS to fix the meaning of 
rules by writing them on a rather granular level.  
Thus, whilst in the UK’s domestic regime authority was centralised within the 
supervisory agency, authority at the European level was layered ‒ distributed across 
the European supervisory authority (CEIOPS) and domestic supervisors. This, I 
suggest, introduced a tension between the objectives of those who write the rules and 
those who supervise their application. Within this context, the nature of supervisor-
supervisee and supervisor-supervisor relations ‒ characterised by an absence of trust 
‒ were an important driver of the proliferation of rules. 
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Fixing Paradigms, Fixing Rules: Between Purism and 
Pragmatism 
So far in this chapter, I argued, firstly, that the translation of the paradigm of market-
consistent valuation into concrete rules involved two moments in which actors could 
seek to shape the meaning of ‘compliance’ (Edelman et al., 1999) – the translation of 
paradigms into rules and of rules into concrete (rule-following) practices. In both 
these moments, I suggested, a tension between epistemic and political considerations 
may emerge. Secondly, I argued that the structure of epistemic and supervisory 
authority in the context of European regulation provided an incentive for supervisors 
to ‘fix’ the meaning of the rules. In the rest of this chapter (divided in three 
subsections), I analyse three distinct aspects of the Solvency II regime in which the 
tension between epistemic and political considerations played an important role: the 
construction of a risk-free curve used for discounting the value of liabilities; the 
‘matching adjustment’; and the ‘risk margin’.  
Constructing a risk-free curve 
In previous chapters, I argued that discounting is a crucial aspect of insurance 
valuation. In market-consistent valuation, discounting is done with a ‘risk-free rate’ 
(see chapter 5). Although the idea may seem simple, in practice it may be difficult to 
determine when an interest rate is risk-free. ‘There is no such thing as a risk-free 
rate’, interviewee BC suggested, for instance. ‘It is a theoretical construct. It’s not 
something that exists in reality’ (interviewee BC). Interest rates on government 
bonds are often considered a close approximation of real risk-free rates, even though, 
as interviewee BC noted, ‘even sovereigns have risk’ (interviewee BC). None of the 
market interest rates thus perfectly represents the risk-free rate. Yet, considering the 
large impact that even small differences in the discount rate may have for the 
valuation of (particularly long-term) insurance liabilities, finding a common 
interpretation of the risk-free rate was considered crucial.  
The construction of a market-consistent discount curve thus requires 
important decisions. First, should the risk-free curve be derived from government 




bonds are typically regarded as the safest assets available (even if not entirely ‘safe’), 
interest rate swaps are perceived to have some distinct advantages too (Dullaway and 
Needleman, 2004; Sheldon and Smith, 2004). The use of Eurozone government 
bonds, for instance, caused idiosyncratic problems, because their yields tend to 
diverge. Discounting at the interest rate on government bonds would thus cause the 
same liability to be valued differently across member states – an outcome that would 
be clearly unpalatable to countries whose interest rates on sovereign debt are lowest 
(Smith interview). The choice between swaps and government bonds, in other words, 
involves a trade-off. 
Second, decisions needed to be made about how the risk-free curve should be 
extrapolated to maturities that were not readily available in financial markets. In 
some countries, the maturity of guarantees may exceed the maturity of actively 
traded (or ‘liquid’) government bonds or interest rate swaps. In Germany for 
instance, David Hare, a consulting actuary and former president of the IFoA, 
explained, some insurers ‘sell pension policies to 30-year olds that look very similar 
to a deferred annuity to us’ (Hare interview). In that case, the maturity of the 
guarantee may be 60 to 70 years into the future. What, then, should be the market-
consistent risk-free rate to value this guarantee? How should the risk-free curve be 
extended beyond the maturity of instruments available in the market? And if there 
were instruments available, though perhaps not liquid, should these be used in the 
construction of the curve? Or should the curve be based only on ‘liquid’ instruments?  
The pressure to close the gap between the concept of the risk-free rate and 
observable market rates was eventually resolved by locating the authority to 
construct the risk-free curve with EIOPA, limiting the influence of other stakeholders 
to consultations on its methodology. When the Solvency II directive was adopted by 
the European Commission, Parliament and Council, its only prescription for the 
discounting regime had been the use of ‘the relevant risk-free interest rate term 
structure’ (Directive 2009/138/EC, p. 46). What this phrase would mean in practice 
(following Lamfalussy procedure) was left for level 2. In 2014, five years after 
Solvency II had originally been accepted, however, the European Commission 
passed a new directive, Omnibus II, which amended some of the principles laid out 
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in the original directive and introduced some additional measures affecting the 
calculative basis of Solvency II (on these latter measures: see below). Crucially, 
Omnibus II provided that the risk-free curve should be determined by European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), which succeeded CEIOPS 
as the centralised supervisory organ. ‘In order to allow for the consistent calculation 
of technical provisions’, the directive motivated this decision, ‘it is necessary for a 
central body to derive, publish, and update certain technical information relating to 
the relevant risk-free interest rate term structure on a regular basis’ (Directive 
2014/51/EU, p. 5; emphasis added).  
The centralisation of epistemic authority rendered the subterranean conflicts 
around discounting manifest, resulting in a debate ‘with EIOPA on one side, and the 
industry on the other side’ (Creedon interview). In the debate about the risk-free 
curve, two main strands of argument were prevalent: one perceived as pragmatic, the 
other more theoretical. Those favouring the theoretical approach appealed to 
epistemic standards of consistency and argued that the curve should be based on as 
much market information as possible, even if some assets were in reality hardly 
traded. Whilst some argued that only liquid interest rates should be used (typically up 
to a maturity of about 20 years), others argued that also illiquid prices beyond those 
20 years should be taken into account. Indeed, according to Smith, ‘a theoretically 
pure perspective will be to say: “we’ll just use the market curve. Why are we kidding 
ourselves that the market prices beyond 20 years are perfectly relevant for valuing 
assets [valued at ‘market value’], but not for valuing liabilities [when valued at an 
extrapolated rate of interest]? That doesn’t really make any sense”’ (Smith 
interview).  
The pragmatists, however, pointed out that doing so might be problematic. 
‘There’s not a [liquid] 60-year Euro market’, Hare noted. Indeed, many considered 
market liquidity to be limited at around 20 years of maturity. ‘So what are you going 
to do for the other 30 or 40 years [needed to value liabilities like those in Germany]? 
If you extrapolate out constant spot rates or something like that, then you could just 
create solvency issues for a number of foreign insurance companies - and potentially 




The choice made by EIOPA was to construct a curve using three key 
concepts: 1) the last liquid point or the last point at which interest rates were 
considered ‘liquid’; 2) the ‘ultimate forward rate’, or the rate to which the curve 
would converge at infinite maturity, which for euros was initially set at 4.2%38 (a 
reflection of inflation expectations and a projection of real interest rates); and 3) a 
method used to extrapolate the curve beyond the last liquid point (see figure 7.1). 
EIOPA’s approach was pragmatic because it ignored some of the available market 
data for less liquid instruments.  
 
Figure 7.1  The risk-free curve as constructed by EIOPA (2016). The figure shows what 
the curve would look like for three different values of the ultimate forward 
rate. The size of the ultimate forward rate is respectively 4.4% (green), 4.2% 
(red), and 4.0% (blue).   
Critics of EIOPA’s approach argued that it introduced inconsistencies that 
were theoretically indefensible, in particular with respect to the ultimate forward rate. 
                                                 
38 Many considered this rate too high, especially as interest rates continued to decline. EIOPA (2016) 
therefore proposed a new methodology for deriving the ultimate forward rate on an ongoing basis. As 
before, the derivation was based on central banks’ inflation target (different for different currencies) 
and a historical average of real rates. For euro-denominated liabilities, the new ultimate forward rate 
was calculated at 3.65%, significantly lower than the previous ultimate forward rate. To limit the 
impact on the balance sheets of companies with long-term guarantees on their books, the rate of 
change was capped at 15 basis points annually (which meant, e.g., that in 2018 ‒ the first year in 
which the new methodology was applied ‒ the ultimate forward rate was 4.05%). 
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The rate, Hare explained, was supposed to represent ‘what the market would price on 
very long term things if the yields existed’ (Hare interview). To the extent that this 
resulted in a risk-free curve diverging from available, albeit perhaps ‘illiquid’ market 
data, a new problem was introduced: ‘those yields don’t exist. So how do I do my 
asset and liability matching when I’m pretending that I’m getting yields which I’m 
not’ (Hare interview). Smith similarly noted:  
You can observe [swap] prices out to about 50 years and in current 
market conditions, a 50-year rate is about 1.5%. So insurers within 
the Eurozone will be discounting that liability at somewhere 
around 4%. But if they held those 50-year swaps, they’d value 
them at 1.5%. So you’ve got an inconsistency between the assets 
and liabilities. (Smith interview)  
Using an ultimate forward rate higher than any of the available market rates 
compromised what some perceived as the ‘theoretical purity’ of market consistent 
valuation by permitting the use of different valuation rates at the asset and liability 
side of the balance sheet – an inconsistency that prevented (particularly German) 
insurers with long-term guarantees from appearing ‘bust’, but also potentially 
complicated insurers’ ‘matching’ investment strategies. Nevertheless, EIOPA clung 
to its methodology - a compromise between political consideration of insurers’ 
balance sheets and epistemic arguments about market consistency and the ‘matching’ 
or ‘hedging’ rationale. 
When is an interest rate risk-free? 
The debate surrounding the ultimate forward rate was essentially a calibration 
problem. Although opinions differed on what a market-consistent rate would look 
like on the long term, the meaning of ‘risk-free’ remained relatively undisputed on 
shorter terms. In another debate, however, the meaning of risk-free was precisely 
what was at stake: what did risk-free mean if insurers were able to benefit from 
higher returns on their assets than implied by the interest rates on swaps and 
government bonds without running the extra risk?  
The claim that insurers were able to obtain returns on their investments higher 




theory. According to modern finance theory, there should be no such thing as a ‘free 
lunch’ (see chapter 5). Any yield in excess of interest rates on AAA-rated 
government debt was compensation for additional risk – the risk premium. If this 
was not the case, investors could profit from the price discrepancy, increasing the 
price of the instrument to such an extent that the excess spread would again be equal 
to the risk premium. Hence, in a market-consistent regime, liabilities should be 
discounted at government bond rates, or, indeed, swap rates.  
As the financial crisis unfolded, however, some insurers started seeing risk-
free discounting as problematic. Initially, this was primarily the case for UK annuity 
providers who ‘matched’ their liability cash flows with investments in corporate 
bonds. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the ‘excess spread’ on corporate 
bonds over government bonds soared. In pre-crisis years, spreads had remained 
relatively stable in the UK around 40-50 basis points for the safest of corporate 
bonds (AAA-rated), while the spread for riskier bonds (BBB-rated) varied between 
100 and 200 basis points. At the peak of the crisis, the spread for the AAA-rated 
bonds had increased to nearly 300 basis points, while the BBB-rated corporate bonds 
yielded an excess of more than 650 basis points over the risk-free yield on the UK’s 
sovereign debt (FSA, 2009). If Solvency II’s discounting regime had already been 
implemented, UK annuity providers would have been in trouble: while interest rates 
dropped and the market-consistent value of liabilities increased, the market value of 
their assets plunged. The widening spreads wreaked havoc on the market-consistent 
solvency position of annuity providers.  
Seeking to protect the annuity industry, British supervisors lobbied for 
changes in the calculative basis of Solvency II. Initially, not all countries were 
convinced. As one supervisor remembers: 
…it was the UK which originally pushed for a more market 
consistent type of system, and you had the French at the time 
screaming that they wanted to stay on a historical cost and so on. 
And then when the British changed their mind, just slightly 
changed their mind … effectively the French were fully convinced 
market consistent people. (interviewee BA) 
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The stance of other member states changed, however, with the onset of the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis. Continental European insurers like Allianz were heavily 
invested in the sovereign debt of some of the affected countries (Basse, Friedrich and 
Kleffner, 2012), similarly to ‘match’ some of their long-term promises to 
policyholders while benefitting from higher yields. The sovereign debt crisis thus 
influenced continental insurers’ willingness to change the calculative basis of 
Solvency II.  
The main justification for such changes revolved around ‘liquidity risk’ – as 
noted before, the risk that an investor is forced to sell an asset at a time when the 
demand for that asset has declined substantially. For insurers, some argued, this risk 
was negligible, even if at least part of the risk premium on illiquid assets should be 
regarded as compensation for liquidity risk. To the extent that insurers ‘match’ their 
liabilities with fixed-income investments like corporate and sovereign bonds, there 
would be no risk of the insurer being forced to sell its assets. Thus, by investing in 
‘illiquid’ assets insurers were compensated for a non-existing risk. The risk premium 
‘has an element of a free lunch for them’ (Smith interview).  
Although many agreed there was some truth in this claim, it was difficult to 
estimate the size of the illiquidity premium. Indeed, for this reason, it seems, much of 
financial economic theory has tended to abstract away from liquidity risk. The 
models in asset pricing theory discussed in chapter 5, for instance, assume that 
financial instruments are fully liquid and can be continuously traded at their ‘true 
price’. The same goes for market-consistent valuation:  
…the whole framework that we were looking at for market 
consistency just failed to have anything to say about liquidity 
effects. It was all in this theoretical world of perfect markets. And 
you buy and sell things, it doesn't move the price; you can observe 
the price, you can trade as much as you want for that price, and the 
price doesn't move as a result of your trading. And all of that is 
definitely wrong for things like residential property. If you try to 
buy a house, you realise what a complete fiction that is. (Smith 
interview).  




I think we all thought we understood how spreads worked, and we 
all understood that [you have the] risk-free rate and then you add 
on a bit for the credit risk, then there is a bit left that you can't 
explain, which is the – which you explain, it's the illiquidity risk. 
And yes this made a few basis points difference here and there. 
And then we discovered with the global financial crisis we didn't 
understand spreads at all. And actually … they could become very 
large. And we didn't have a methodology at that point to say to 
ourselves … when a spread increases significantly in size, how 
much of that is the market reappraising credit risk? How much of 
that is actually liquidity? (Interviewee BC) 
There was, in other words, no established method to measure the liquidity 
premium. Estimations of how large the liquidity premium on different assets would 
be, moreover, tended to vary. Nonetheless, with insurers and supervisors aligned, the 
European Commission set out to draft amendments to the market-consistent 
framework of Solvency II that were included in Omnibus II, the same directive as 
mentioned earlier. The so-called long-term guarantees package allowed insurers to 
use either a ‘matching adjustment’ or a ‘volatility adjustment’. With a ‘matching 
adjustment’, insurers could take credit for 65% of the spread between the return on 
eligible portfolios with matching assets; with the volatility adjustment, they could 
take credit for 35% of the spread on all portfolios.  
With these adjustments, was Solvency II still market consistent? Some 
believed this not to be the case, arguing that the adjustments were at best in tension 
with some of the basic principles of modern finance theory, even if the existence of 
an illiquidity premium might, in some cases, be plausible. As noted above, 
propositions like the efficient market hypothesis precluded the existence of a ‘free 
lunch’. According to interviewee CJ, ‘in theory, the matching adjustment can only 
contain risks that you’re not exposed to, which of course begs the question: well, 
why is the market charging a credit spread … if it’s not for risk’ (interviewee CJ). 
Similarly, Smith argued, ‘if you had sent a kind of a pure professor to go away and 
build a model, and prescribe how it was to be done, they might have come up with 
something much closer to the work we did in the 1990s and the early 2000s, which 
was sort of theoretically pure. But then you've got these rough edges about 




For others, however, Solvency II remained faithful to market-consistency, 
even with the adjustments. Indeed, they pointed out that market-consistency is an 
ambiguous concept that allows for multiple interpretations. In a press interview, for 
instance, Van Hulle stated: ‘All these people who are now shooting at these solutions 
for long-term guarantees, these adjustments, and say this is not market consistent. 
My question is what is market-consistent? Where does it say in stone, in the Bible, 
that there is only one way to deal with this issue?’ (Benari, 2013). Indeed, he argued, 
‘it’s time in insurance that people start to look beyond their plate and move away 
from the old theory and take account of what is happening in the real world’ (Benari, 
2013). At the core of this debate was the question ‘who owns the label of the risk-
free rate,’ interviewee BC posited. ‘If you have an illiquid liability, and you discount 
it using the liquid risk-free rate plus a liquidity premium, isn't that still a risk-free rate 
(interviewee BC)?’  
Pragmatic concerns for the viability of the annuity market thus led supervisors 
to reconsider the meaning of ‘risk-free discounting’, and, with that, the meaning of 
‘market-consistency’. Without the matching adjustment, capital requirements on 
annuity providers would be too onerous, they argued, increasing the cost of selling 
annuities. For those concerned with the theoretical coherence of the valuation 
practices, however, the adjustments remained unsatisfactory. In the absence of a 
method for estimating illiquidity premiums consistent with no-arbitrage pricing 
theory, the matching adjustment allowed insurers to ‘capitalise’ on parts of the risk 
premium that might not be genuine compensations for illiquidity. The matching 
adjustment, itself a compromise between the considerations of incumbents and 
internal governance units in the market and epistemic fields, could thus be seen as a 
further step in an ‘infinite regress’ (see chapter 2) to specify the meaning of ‘market-
consistency’ and ‘risk-free discounting’.  
A (temporary) halt to the infinite regress required one further step: the rule 
only applied to eligible assets that, according to the directive, should amongst other 
things produce cash flows that are ‘fixed and cannot be changed’ (Directive 
2014/51/EU, p. 22). At the Treasury Select Committee hearings, the consulting 




interpretation of ‘fixed’ was too strict. The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), 
for instance, did not permit insurers to apply the matching adjustment to liabilities 
that were backed by investments in ‘equity release mortgages’ – mortgages that 
allow borrowers to ‘release’ cash from their mortgage by ‘selling’, de facto, part of 
their equity stake to the mortgage lender. Annuity providers were keen to invest in 
these assets because their complexity and concomitant illiquidity meant they were 
yielding relatively high returns. Indeed, Chamberlain submitted, the equity release 
mortgages ‘do not have a guarantee of when the money will come out’, Chamberlain 
said. However, ‘[i]f you have sufficient of them – using the laws of large numbers – 
you have an expectation that you will get a cash flow that is pretty reliable’ (Treasury 
Committee, 2017a, p. 6).  
The PRA was thus pressed for a more ‘flexible’ interpretation of the rules by 
considering the cash flows produced by equity release mortgages as fixed. In 
response, the PRA allowed insurers to apply the matching adjustment to the senior 
tranches of securitised assets like equity release mortgages, which ‘could be 80-90% 
of the cash flows’, David Belsham, non-executive director of the PRA, said. ‘In a 
way, we are stuck with the rules as they are written, but the PRA is trying to operate 
them in as flexible a way as possible’ (Treasury Committee, 2017b, pp. 8–9). For the 
PRA, there was some flexibility as to how this could be interpreted, but it also 
perceived some clear limits to the flexibility: it argued that ‘fixed’ cash flows could 
only be produced by ‘fixed-income’ assets, not by any other assets, even if average 
cash flows were highly predictable. The interpretation of the eligibility criteria thus 
formed another step in the infinite regress, as the PRA was pushed to clarify when a 
cash flow was ‘fixed’.  
A market price for non-market risks 
Another area of contention similarly revolved around an element that was 
considered theoretically justified, but which proved harder to capture in rules capable 
of marshalling widespread agreement. The object was the so-called ‘risk-margin’, 
which, according to Victoria Saporta, Executive Director of Prudential Policy at the 
PRA, is ‘the margin above the best estimate of the liabilities … to try to make the 
liabilities market consistent’ (Saporta in Treasury Committee, 2017b, p. 16). As 
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noted in chapter 5, market-consistent valuation practices seek to assign a market 
price to the financial risks embedded in an insurance contract. For insurance-related 
risks, however, no such market price exists; for these risks, market-consistent 
valuation models use a ‘central’ or ‘best estimate’. If market-consistent models 
assigned a value to insurance liabilities that would reflect their market price, an 
additional margin was required to compensate for non-market risk. The risk margin, 
in other words, was intended to represent the market price for ‘non-hedgeable’ risks 
(Directive 2014/51/EU).  
Like the ultimate forward rate and the matching adjustment, the risk margin 
became rather controversial. To calculate the risk margin, CEIOPS recommended a 
‘cost-of-capital’ approach, which would reflect the return that shareholders require 
on solvency capital. Critique of the risk margin ranged from practical to 
epistemological arguments. As David Belsham remembers, who before becoming a 
non-executive director of the PRA in 2014 was chief actuary at Prudential, ‘we liked 
not having a risk margin. It’s not needed because you can run off the liabilities’ 
(Belsham interview). The solvency capital itself already provided sufficient capital to 
run-off liabilities confidently. Others, however, argued that the risk margin failed to 
measure what it was supposed to measure. Andrew Smith, for instance, argued that at 
least part of the risks included in the solvency capital requirements were 
‘diversifiable’; hence, following modern portfolio theory (see chapter 5), 
shareholders would not require compensation for those risks. The risk margin was 
too sweeping, Smith argued. ‘[W]hen Solvency II first came out, I argued against 
including the risk margin, and said: “the risk margin is going to end up being roughly 
proportional to your capital requirements. So why don’t you just multiply the capital 
requirement by something and require people to hold 200 percent rather than a 100 
percent”’ (Smith interview)? Doing so ‘would have the same effect and be much 
simpler’ (Smith interview). Moreover, Smith argued, other aspects of Solvency II, 
like the ultimate forward rate, had already undermined the concept of market-
consistent values reflecting the price at which insurers could sell their liabilities. ‘If 
you're trying to buy out those liabilities, you're going to find anybody who's going to 
give you credit for earning 4.2 percent beyond 20 years? Well of course you’re not. 




Despite these critiques, the risk margin became part of Solvency II, but not 
without its problems. As interest rates started to decline after the financial crisis, the 
size of the risk margin started to increase. This was because the cost-of-capital was 
measured at a flat rate, while the future cash flows thus generated were discounted at 
the risk-free rate. As interest rates declined, the size of the risk margin increased. 
Particularly affected were insurers with large ‘non-hedgeable risks’, like annuity 
providers with lots of ‘longevity risk’ on their books. In some cases, the risk margin 
made up around half of the insurer’s technical provisions (i.e. the risk margin 
doubled the value of the liabilities). Woods, moreover, estimated that a change of 50 
basis points in the risk-free rate could mean a 20% change in the risk margin 
(Woods, 2015, p. 4). Consequently, insurers argued that the risk margin introduced 
‘artificial volatility’ in their balance sheets – a point that Woods agreed with. ‘The 
risk margin is a place’, he said in front of the Treasury Committee, ‘that we all agree 
is overcooked’ (Woods in Treasury Committee, 2017b, p. 16).  
The main justification for adjustments in the risk margin was expressed in 
macroprudential vocabulary. The sensitivity of the risk margin to the risk-free rate, 
UK supervisors argued, meant that it ‘has potentially a pro-cyclical effect and the 
effect of making this risk margin much bigger than it should otherwise be at the 
moment’ (Woods in Treasury Committee, 2017b, p. 24). In the wake of the financial 
crisis, procyclical investment behaviour – investment behaviour that feeds into and 
strengthens cyclical market dynamics – became a major concern for regulators across 
the globe. The notion of procyclicality emerged in the early 2000s as part of a 
broader discourse on macroprudential regulation – regulatory efforts that focused not 
just on how individual companies were run but also on systemic issues. In 2008, 
Baker (2013) argues, macroprudential regulation rapidly became the ‘principal 
interpretative frame’ for responding to the financial crisis. Indeed, the FSA identified 
‘hard-wired procyclicality’ as one of the major underlying causes of the crisis (FSA, 
2009). In later years, the Bank of England set up a ‘Procyclicality Working Group,’ 
which among other things published a report on the investment behaviour of 
insurance companies and pension funds. The report intimated that changes in 
regulation, valuation and accounting practices potentially contributed to 
strengthening what already appeared as procyclical investment behaviour on behalf 
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of insurance companies (Haldane et al., 2014). In 2017, a Bank of England staff 
working paper explicitly linked the risk margin to procyclical investment behaviour 
(Douglas, Noss and Vause, 2017). Thus, when the risk margin requirements surged 
(for UK annuity providers in particular), macroprudential discourse provided a 
legitimate vocabulary for articulating motivations to change the risk margin 
methodology.  
In the UK, both industry and supervisors agreed on the need to change how 
the risk margin was calculated. The risk margin, however, was somewhat of an 
idiosyncratic British problem; EIOPA, therefore, perceived the need to make changes 
in the risk margin less urgent. Efforts led by the PRA to implement changes in the 
way that the risk margin would be calculated in advance of the planned Solvency II 
review in 2021 failed ‒ an outcome that was reportedly influenced by the UK’s 
decision to leave the EU (Tanner, 2018). In response, the PRA resorted to a proposal 
by Legal & General that it had rejected previously. According to the proposal, the 
PRA would allow insurers to commit to future management actions such as the 
reinsurance of longevity risk, which could reduce future capital requirements and 
therewith also today’s risk margin. The effect would be significant: the Association 
of British Insurers estimated that Legal & General’s proposal could reduce UK 
insurers’ total risk margin requirements (estimated at £50bn) by about two-thirds 
(Tanner, 2018). With such substantial interests involved and weary of conflicts with 
EIOPA, the PRA decided to postpone the implementation of this ‘fix’ until after the 
UK would have left the EU, which, at the time of writing (May 2019), is yet to 
happen. Nonetheless, what the struggles between EIOPA and the PRA show is that 
when the structure of supervisory authority changes (from ‘layered authority’ to 
‘centralised authority’), so may the rules – even if the words of the rules remain the 
same.  
Conclusion 
When I asked interviewee BC, who was involved in many of the regulatory 
initiatives described in this chapter, about the tension between the ‘scientific’ basis of 




he replied by quoting Saint Augustine: ‘make me virtuous, oh lord, but not yet’ 
(interviewee BC). According to interviewee BC, there was initially widespread 
agreement about what a good regulatory framework, consistent with the dominant 
economic paradigm, would look like. ‘And then people started getting the bill. Oh 
dear, this is a bit painful. And then, just as things were beginning to settle down, the 
financial crisis came along, and oh my goodness, that bill that we thought was going 
to be quite painful is now hugely painful’ (interviewee BC). As interviewee BC’s 
response suggests, what was understood as a ‘pure’ application of market-consistent 
valuation, by some epistemic standards, would have brought forth a reality that was 
politically unpalatable. The boundary between the epistemic field and the market 
field faded and much effort was expanded in the process of rule writing and 
following to reshape both the meaning of a ‘pure’ application of market-consistent 
valuation and risk-based capital calculation (as, e.g., in the case of the matching 
adjustment), and, moreover, to find compromises between epistemic standards and 
political considerations (as, e.g., in the case of the ultimate forward rate). The result, 
Solvency II, is thus neither purely a ‘pragmatic’ nor purely a ‘dogmatic’ product, but 








Chapter 8  
Remaking the Market for Retirement Income 
So, the brave new world has dawned: we in the insurance sector 
are now operating under a new prudential regulatory regime. 
Solvency II has become ‘business as usual’ – a regime that has 
appeared, at times, a distant, indeed receding prospect, and which 
has undoubtedly consumed enormous efforts from all of us in this 
room - and, let us be frank, as with all far-reaching regulatory 
change, significant cost - has now been in place for no less than 48 
days. (Bulley, 2016b, p. 2) 
The above are the opening lines of a speech by Andrew Bulley, Director of 
Life Insurance at the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) at the Investment and 
Life Assurance Group conference in London. In later speeches, Bulley continued to 
refer to the world of Solvency II as ‘a brave new world’, a trope that is intriguing for 
it evokes ‒ intentionally or not ‒ the dystopian world of Aldous Huxley’s novel by 
the same title. In them, Bully described the challenges for supervisors in this brave 
new world. He noted, for instance, that ‘one of the risks of a prudential regime that 
permits firms to calculate their own capital requirements is that the system, over 
time, is gamed’ (Bulley, 2016b, p. 8). Indeed, he suggested, this was what had 
happened pre-crisis in banking, where the total value of banks’ risk-weighted assets 
had steadily declined in pre-crisis years, even if leverage (the indebtedness of a bank 
relative to its capitalisation) increased. ‘[L]eft to its own devices’, Bulley claimed, 
‘competitive pressure can exert a steady and determinedly downward pressure on 
capitalisation’ (Bulley, 2016b, p. 9). It would be the task of the PRA ‘to guard 
against any pronounced downward drift’ (Bulley, 2016b, p. 9). 
One of the areas that Solvency II had already impacted was the management 
of longevity risk and the nascent market for ‘bulk annuities’ – a product typically 
sold by insurers to pension funds in which the insurer promises to pay a series of 
cash flows that perfectly match with (some of) the pension fund’s liabilities in 
exchange for a lump sum payment. Since the mid-2000s, pension schemes 
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increasingly purchased these annuities – which are structured either as an asset 
owned by the pension scheme (in the case of a ‘buy-in’) or as the issuance of 
insurance policies to individual scheme members (in the case of a ‘buy-out’) – as a 
means to rid themselves of defined-benefit pension promises. Indeed, Bulley 
observed a few months later: 
Defined Benefit (DB) pension schemes are increasingly looking for 
ways to reduce their risk exposures…. [M]any commentators have 
argued that insurers are the natural home for the long term risks 
associated with pension schemes and so have welcomed this 
development. (Bulley, 2016b, p. 4)  
Although Bulley claimed there were strong arguments that by taking over the defined 
benefit promises from companies, ‘a wider social good is done’, he also noted there 
were risks attached to this. For instance, to the extent that firms ‘struggled to price 
competitively with a corporate-bond based asset strategy’ (a typical asset strategy for 
UK annuity providers; see chapter 7), Bulley feared they ‘may succumb to the 
temptation to venture into asset classes where they have no, or limited, experience’ 
(Bulley, 2016a, p. 5). The transfer of longevity risk was another area about which 
Bulley claimed the PRA had some concerns. ‘Solvency II’, he noted, could provide 
firms with a powerful incentive to carry out trades to transfer longevity risk by way 
of reinsurance’ (Bulley, 2016a, p. 3). Such transactions allow insurers to free up 
capital to underwrite new risks. In so doing, however, new risks were also 
introduced. Insurers, for instance, would be heavily exposed to a relatively small 
number of counterparties (also known as counterparty credit risk) on whose balance 
sheets increasingly larger concentrations of longevity risk would prevail 
(concentration risk). Bulley wondered, therefore, to what extent the longevity 
transfers were really motivated by legitimate risk management considerations and to 
what extent they were driven primarily by regulatory arbitrage.  
In this chapter, I examine the emergence and evolution of the bulk-annuity 
buyout market, and the role played therein by regulatory initiatives such as Solvency 
II. In the next section, I review debates about market-consistent valuation in the 
world of pensions – a field that is closely tied to the insurance field, and, as I argue, 




insurance liabilities. In the section that follows, I then analyse the emergence of the 
bulk-annuity market within this context, by focusing on 1) the framing of differences 
and similarities between pension funds and insurance companies; 2) the development 
of longevity transfer mechanisms; and 3) the bedding down of pricing mechanisms in 
the bulk annuity market. In the penultimate section, I analyse how market 
participants compete and how competition was influenced by institutional and 
epistemic developments. In the conclusion, I return to the question of how changes in 
the evaluation machinery of insurance companies and pension schemes were 
entangled with broader developments in the field of retirement income.  
‘The Liabilities are the Liabilities’ 
Although debates about market-consistent valuation of insurance and pension 
liabilities (see chapter 5) emerged at the same time, the knowledge machinery of the 
pension field was much slower to change. Just as in insurance, the crucial aspect of 
pension valuation is the discount rate. For most of the twentieth century, pension 
scheme actuaries determined discount rates by actuarial discretion. Traditional 
actuarial valuations typically followed some sort of ‘discounted income’ approach, in 
which liability cash flows were discounted at the ‘book yield’ – the interest rate 
implied by the ‘book value’ of assets, as opposed to their market value (Turnbull, 
2017). Like the traditional valuation of insurance liabilities, pension valuations, 
actuaries applied the principle of prudence, incorporating implicit margins to deal 
with adverse events. 
Traditional actuarial valuation methods had important implications for 
pension funds’ investment decisions. If the discount rate was based on the actual 
‘asset mix’ of a pension fund, then ‘a change in the equity/bond mix could change 
the actuarial valuation of assets as well as the actuarial valuation of liabilities’ 
(Turnbull, 2017, p. 245). Within this framework, equity investment appeared 
appealing: the risk premium over gilts translated into lower funding requirements on 
the long term, even if scheme actuaries sought to counteract the extra risk by valuing 
pension liabilities prudently (Avrahampour, 2015). Equities, moreover, were also 
seen as a good ‘match’ for pension fund liabilities. They were a type of ‘real 
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investment’, actuaries agreed, the value of which ‒ in contrast to gilts ‒ would 
remain unaffected by inflation. Overall, ‘investment philosophy’ had gradually 
changed from the interwar period onwards, resulting in a large-scale shift from fixed-
income to equity investment (Scott, 2002; Turnbull, 2017). By the mid-1970s, 
equities made up two-thirds of pension fund assets (Holbrook, 1977), with some 
funds like Imperial Tobacco being exclusively invested in equities (Avrahampour, 
2015).  
The rationality of the traditional actuarial valuation approach and equity-
oriented investment strategies was increasingly disputed from the mid-1990s 
onwards. As discussed in chapter 5, a new generation of actuaries emerged who were 
familiar with modern finance theory and argued that traditional actuarial methods 
were not always appropriate. Even if traditional methods provided useful guidance 
for an assessment of long-term funding requirements, some started arguing, an 
assessment of a scheme’s self-sufficiency ‒ a question that became increasingly 
prominent from the 1970s onwards with increased corporate takeover activity ‒ 
required a ‘market-related’ methodology, which better suited the need to consider 
pensioner security (Dyson and Exley, 1995; Turnbull, 2017, p. 255).  
By the late 1990s, the issue of pension valuation had become increasingly 
controversial. Notable was the publication of a paper entitled ‘The Financial Theory 
of Defined Benefit Pension Schemes‘ (Exley et al., 1997). Jon Exley had written the 
paper together with Andrew Smith, who had worked theretofore primarily on 
insurance (see chapter 5), and Shyam Mehta, a colleague of Smith at Bacon & 
Woodrow. For Smith, the way in which pension liabilities were valued ‒ ‘the higher 
expected returns, and therefore the higher the discount rate and the lower your 
liabilities’ ‒ ‘seemed so bizarre from a finance perspective’ (Smith interview). The 
paper sought to present a coherent theory of market-consistent valuation of long-term 
liabilities and applied it to defined benefit pensions and replaced the question of the 
level of assets needed to meet expected liabilities, with the question of the level 
needed to minimise the risk of not meeting the liabilities. In so doing, a market-
consistent valuation implied a rather different way of looking at pension funding. 




the time and was an avid proponent of market-consistent valuation, it enabled you to 
‘think of [defined benefit] pension promises a bit like a debt’ (Speed interview). If a 
fund’s assets were less than the market-consistent buyout value, a scheme would fall 
short in case of sponsor bankruptcy. The difference between the market-consistent 
buyout value and the present value of a scheme’s assets could thus be seen as an 
‘unsecured loan’ from the employees to the sponsor’ (Speed interview). The paper 
was highly influential and became somewhat paradigmatic in later years. According 
to Speed, for instance, the paper ‘says it all as far as I'm concerned. The things … 
which I've been involved with in writing, to some degree, are an echo or a 
restatement of a lot of things in [that 1997 paper]’ (Speed interview). At the time, 
however, the paper ‘went down like a lead balloon’, Smith remembered. ‘Everybody 
hated it’ (Smith interview). In the face of opposition from many scheme actuaries, 
the ‘challenger’ actuaries favouring methods consistent with modern finance theory 
were less successful in finding a coalition with key actors in the pension field, thus 
having only limited success in raising market-consistency as a key objective of 
valuation – at least initially.  
The valuation debate came at a time when pension promises were under 
severe pressure, which at least partially explains the antipathy towards market-
consistent valuation. A commission set up by the government to examine the state of 
pensions argued that since the 1970s various regulatory initiatives had contributed to 
increasing the cost of pensions. The 1973 and 1985 Social Security Acts, for 
instance, improved the treatment of ‘early leavers’. In the 1980s, the government 
introduced mandatory indexation, requiring pension funds annually to increase 
pension benefits at the retail price index (capped at three and later five percent). Life 
expectancy had improved significantly as well, the Pensions Commission, which was 
led by the economist Adair Turner, reported: ‘In the 1950s, when many of the major 
corporate pensions plans were put in place, with predominantly male members, male 
life expectancy at 65 was 12 years. Today it is 19’ (Pensions Commission, 2004, p. 
121). At the same time, however, ‘exceptional equity returns in the 1980s and 1990s 
allowed many private sector defined benefit schemes to ignore the rapid rise in the 
underlying cost of their pension promises’ (Pensions Commission, 2005, p. 123). 
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Indeed, many companies had lowered their contribution rates. The 1990s, the 
commission argued, were a ‘fool’s paradise’ (Pensions Commission, 2005, p. 123). 
The relatively weak funding of pension schemes started to become 
problematic in 1995 when the government introduced a ‘Minimum Funding 
Requirement’ (MFR). It forced pension funds periodically to perform an actuarial 
assessment of the fund’s financial position. If the actuarial value of assets was below 
90% of the value of liabilities (calculated on a traditional actuarial basis), then 
companies were to produce a ‘recovery plan’. The 1995 Pensions Act, moreover, 
provided that the trustees of a scheme, in the case of sponsor solvency, could claim 
the shortfall between assets and actuarial liabilities as ‘debt’, which directly 
translated the analogy of proponents of market-related evaluation methodologies into 
law. In 2003, the government changed the basis for calculating the size of the debt 
from the relatively weak actuarial basis used for the calculation of minimum funding 
requirements into a full ‘buyout’ basis. How the company specific ‘statutory funding 
objectives’ (which replaced the minimum funding requirements in 2004) should be 
calculated, however, was largely left in the hands of the scheme actuary, which, 
according to proponents of a market-consistent basis, left the valuation vulnerable to 
‘fudging’. The legal basis of pension promises thus increasingly coincided with how 
proponents of a market-consistent approach viewed them; how the economic value of 
those promises should be calculated less so.  
In combination with regulatory changes, pension funds’ weakening financial 
position contributed to a shift in investment practice and in the form of pension 
arrangements. Firstly, to the extent that the new regulatory requirements set a floor to 
pension funds’ funding level, some pension funds sought to ‘de-risk’ their 
investment strategy, a strategy that was facilitated by market-consistent 
methodology. The belief that pension funds should invest mainly in equities persisted 
throughout the 1980s and 90s when it was still taught in actuarial exams. David 
Dullaway remembers, for instance, that one of the questions on his exam asked what 
the ‘right asset’ was ‘for a pension fund to buy to back its liabilities’. The answer 
actuaries were expected to give, Dullaway said, was: ‘you buy equities’ (Dullaway 




answer ‘clearly is nonsense from an economics perspective (Dullaway interview). 
Pension liabilities, he argued, were much more like index-linked government bonds. 
According to a market-consistent investment approach, a well-matched investment 
strategy was to invest in inflation-linked government debt, not in shares.  
At the core of the investment debate was the issue of value. As noted above, 
traditional actuarial ‘funding’ methods were based on the notion that liability values 
were contingent on the assets that backed them (Patel and Daykin, 2010). This 
implied that the value of liabilities would be lower if the assets that backed them 
were invested in higher yielding (but more volatile) assets. Even if actuaries made 
some corrections for extra ‘credit risk’, this way of viewing the problem of value 
gave preference to higher-yielding but also ‘riskier’ equity investment strategies. In a 
market-consistent world, however, the value of assets and liabilities is independent. 
In an exemplary expression of this view, proponents of market-consistent valuation 
argued that traditional actuarial valuations were ‘looking at the wrong side of the 
balance sheet’, Speed argued. ‘I don't care if I've got equities, if I've got bonds, or 
there's no assets there whatsoever. The liabilities are the liabilities’ (Speed 
interview). Because pension liabilities were similar to index-linked government 
bonds, as Dullaway argued, the liabilities should be discounted using the interest 
rates on these bonds, regardless of investment strategy. Market-consistent valuation 
thus provided a new frame for the question of investment: if the value of liabilities 
was independent of the actual investment strategy, a pension fund could either 
choose to invest in ‘low-risk’ assets, thereby reducing the risk that the fund would 
fall short of its promises (a strategy known as liability-driven investment, see: Speed 
et al., 2003), or invest in high yielding assets in an attempt to close funding gaps. In a 
market-consistent world, however, the latter strategy could be seen as a form of 
speculation. Actual investment returns might very well fall short of expected returns, 
exposing a fund to a larger shortfall than it would have had with low-risk 
investments.  
Secondly, throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, companies were 
increasingly reluctant to sustain defined benefit pension schemes. Some companies 
had already closed their defined benefit pension schemes in the 1980s, but the pace 
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of closure picked up towards the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 1995, there were 
5mln active members of open pension schemes, and another 0.2mln active members 
of closed schemes; in 2000, the numbers were respectively 4.1mln and 0.5mln; by 
2005, there were fewer than 4mln active members, equally divided across open and 
closed schemes (Pensions Commission, 2005). The fast pace at which the defined 
benefit schemes were closing raised new questions: what should happen to the legacy 
schemes that would remain in existence until their very last members had died? 
Making a Secondary Market for Retirement Income 
For insurers, the closing down of defined benefit pension schemes became a business 
opportunity. By the mid-2000s, there were few insurers active in the buyout market 
and the transfer of pension liabilities to insurance companies was rather expensive. 
The market ‘was quite a niche’, Andrew Stoker recalls. ‘You just had Legal & 
General and Pru [Prudential]. Pricing wasn’t that competitive’.  
When Cliff Speed quit his job in 2005 to become the Chief Investment Officer 
of the start-up insurance company Paternoster (headed by Mark Wood, who had left 
his job as CEO of Prudential UK, reportedly when he was not appointed as the group 
CEO [Northedge, 2008]), ‘some people said it was a surprising thing to go and do’, 
Speed recalls. ‘There's a polite way of saying, a lot of my colleagues said I was mad 
… you're going off to try and sell a product, which nobody wants’. Speed’s 
recollections capture the novelty of the buyout market, even if, considering the 
activity in the early years of the market, the surprise might not have been as big as 
the quote suggests. In its first two years, Paternoster succeeded to buyout 32 pension 
schemes with a total value of £1.7bn (Northedge, 2008). Other start-ups quickly 
followed in its tracks (see table 8.1). In 2006, the former Prudential CEO Jonathan 
Bloomer set up Lucida, while the private equity investor Edmund Truell founded 
Pension Corporation, later renamed as Pension Insurance Corporation, or PIC 
(Mariathasan, 2008). In another manifestation of the fading boundaries between the 
banking and insurance fields, investment banks and private equity firms backed the 
start-ups with significant amounts of capital. Paternoster, for instance, received 




Table 8.1  Participants in the bulk annuity market. 
 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16 ’17 
AVIVA              
Canada Life              
Just Retirement Merged with Partnership       
Legal & General              
Lucida          Acquired by L&G 
MetLife    Acquired by Rothesay  
Partnership Merged with Just Retirement       
Paternoster       Acquired by Rothesay Life 
Phoenix Life              
PIC              
Prudential  Stopped writing annuities altogether in 2015   
Rothesay Life              
Scottish Widows              
Synesis Life     Acquired by PIC 
Red indicates a challenger firm; green indicates an incumbent insurer; blue indicates a new 
entrant that is active in the individual annuity market, but is established relatively recently. 
Data sources: Barnett Waddingham, LCP and Aon. 
2008); Pension Insurance Corporation received nearly £900mln starting capital from 
JP Morgan, Lloyds Banking Group, Royal Bank of Scotland and the private equity 
firm JC Flowers (Davies, 2011b). In 2007, the investment bank Goldman Sachs set 
up its own life insurance subsidiary, Rothesay Life, as a vehicle for pension buyouts, 
reportedly to benefit from cheap funding for its investment activities. The closing of 
defined benefit pension schemes thus led to the emergence of a secondary market in 
pension liabilities, an event that the academics David Blake, Andrew Cairns and 
Kevin Dowd (2008) described as ‘the birth of the life market’. In the rest of this 
section, I will analyse the emergence of a secondary market for pension liabilities. 
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Levelling the playing field 
Crucial in the emergence of the new life market was the ‘framing’ (Fligstein, 
1996) of the role of pension buyouts in the retirement income system more generally. 
Speed (In: Speed et al., 2008, p. 238) argued, for instance, that the ‘conventional 
wisdom’ that the provision of retirement income through insurance companies was 
more ‘expensive’ than through pension funds ‒ a conception that was prevalent in the 
world of pensions ‒ was rooted in differences between how the evaluation of pension 
and insurance liabilities was institutionalised. These differences reflect differences in 
the role of evaluation in the institutional context of pensions and insurance. While 
pension funds relied on a ‘sponsor covenant’ to make up for any future shortfalls, 
insurers had no sponsor to rely on and were therefore dependent on capital buffers. 
Pension liabilities on the balance sheets of pension schemes were therefore valued on 
relatively weaker mortality assumptions and with a more forgiving discount rate. As 
a consequence, Speed suggested, if you ‘imagine a pension scheme [becoming] a life 
insurance company, which, arguably, is the same thing, you'd say it's an insolvent 
life assurer’ (Speed interview). 
In Speed’s view, a convergence of the knowledge machinery underpinning 
pensions and insurance would eventually ‘level the playing field’. The changes in 
pensions regulation mentioned above, such as the introduction of minimum funding 
requirements, contributed to this. Another important factor was the introduction of a 
new accounting standard in 2002, FRS 17. Jon Exley (2002), one of the avid 
proponents of market-consistent valuation, commented that even if the accounting 
standard had ‘flaws that have the hallmarks of compromises with traditional actuarial 
arguments’, which made the accounting valuations weaker than a market-consistent 
basis would suggest, he considered it a ‘spectacular improvement in pensions 
accounting’. The pensions consultant Ronnie Bowie noted that the accounting 
standard had an important ‘impact’ on bringing the pension problems ‘to boardroom 
attention’.  
I have been doing the job of a pensions consultant for nearly 30 
years. I have never known such boardroom and finance director 
interest in pensions, nor have I ever been to so many full board 




been told that I and all other actuaries are an entire waste of space, 
and that it is we who got them into this mess, but, more usually, to 
be invited to discuss how to manage the risks. (Bowie in Speed et 
al., 2008, p. 239). 
Changes in accounting practices and regulatory requirements for pension 
funds contributed to a narrowing of the gap between valuation in insurance and 
pensions. The gap constituted an inconsistency between pension fund and insurance 
companies that would make it expensive for pension funds heavily invested in 
equities to move their liabilities to an insurance company. As Speed argued: 
In insurance, if you're holding safe assets, you need a certain 
amount. If I then want to move some of those assets, say, from gilts 
into equities, I need more capital. I need a higher capital buffer 
because there's more risk. Seems reasonable. Ask the question 
what happens in pensions, I'm holding bonds. If I go and hold 
equities, they say I need less capital. It’s the wrong way round. 
(Speed interview) 
The institutionalised discrepancies between the ways in which pension promises 
were evaluated between the two fields thus formed important barriers for the transfer 
of liabilities from pension funds to insurance companies. 
A third factor shaping the ‘playing field’ between pensions and insurance 
were the mortality assumptions underpinning liability calculations. Actuaries in both 
pensions and insurance, as noted in chapter 5, would previously model mortality 
‘deterministically’ – that is, mortality modellers would make ‘prudent’ assumptions 
about what future expected mortality rates would look like. In the early 2000s, 
however, British actuaries increasingly sought to quantify how uncertain such 
predictions were. The Continuous Mortality Investigation ‒ a bureau run by the 
Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, which collects mortality data from insurers and 
pension funds and compiles mortality tables and projections ‒ published an 
influential working paper in 2002. The paper claimed that recent improvements in 
mortality rates had been ‘significantly faster than anticipated in the projection 
factors’ of its latest publication of mortality tables in 1992 (CMI, 2002, p. 2).  
In a canonical paper, the actuary Richard Willets (1999) had suggested that 
while mortality improvements had been more or less constant for most of the 
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eighteenth and nineteenth century, there had been a ‘cohort effect’ in the early 20th 
century. ‘For the past four decades, people born between 1925 and 1945 have 
benefited from faster mortality improvements than those born in adjacent 
generations’ (Willets, 1999, p. 5) – a generation that had now reached retirement age. 
The CMI thought the issue sufficiently pressing to update the projection factors of its 
1992 tables ahead of schedule. At the time, interviewee DB recalls, ‘there weren’t 
any tools around to [model longevity improvements stochastically]’ and the 
committee ‘couldn’t develop one in time’. The committee nevertheless thought ‘it 
was important to try and give some impression of the uncertainty’ and therefore 
produced ‘a very simple approach where we had just three different scenarios of 
future mortality improvements’, each varying in the projected duration of the cohort 
effect (interviewee DB).  
The paper was a ‘complete bombshell’, interviewee DB said. DB observed 
how the paper was received differently in the fields of pensions and insurance. 
The life insurance companies thought: ‘well, hang on, there is a 
point here; there's a risk on our balance sheet because of our future 
longevity and it is uncertain, so there's uncertainty about the risk 
that we're facing; we'd better try to understand this and learn about 
it.’ So within the life insurance companies, they reasonably quickly 
actually developed quite a lot of in-house expertise. So now any of 
the major life insurance firms … will be taking stochastic risk and 
uncertainty of the future of mortality into account. And Solvency II 
would require that anyway. But on the pension side they were just 
absolutely horrified. And they never came to terms with it, because 
the pensions actuaries in talking to their clients, they didn't want to 
present them with any uncertainty. They just wanted to say: ‘I'm 
the actuary, here's my calculation, that's the answer.’ And so they 
reacted with horror to having to consider any kind of uncertainty 
they might have to convey to a client. (Interviewee DB) 
Interviewee DB suggests, in other words, that differences in the uptake of stochastic 
longevity modelling might be explained by looking at the structural position of 
actuarial expertise.  
Even if pensions actuaries were relatively more sceptical of stochastic 
methods, however, the CMI paper suggested that longevity improvements had been 




male at the age of 60 was expected to live another 22 years; in the CMI’s 2002 
medium cohort-length scenario, a 60-year old male was expected to live another 27 
years (Jones, 2003). In 2008, the Pensions Regulator initiated a review of pension 
funds’ mortality assumptions and noted that the 1992 medium cohort scenarios had 
already become outdated; the regulator suggested that the long cohort scenario would 
be more realistic, implying a further two-year increase to the life expectancy of a 60-
year old male. Although supervisors acknowledged that different mortality tables 
might be appropriate for different schemes (as life expectancy may vary across 
occupations), they adopted the long-cohort scenario as a benchmark that could 
trigger further investigations into schemes’ mortality assumptions. The consequences 
for pension funds’ balance sheets were severe. The value of pension promises 
increased by three to four percent for each year that a worker was expected to live 
longer. For some companies, the liabilities could increase by as much as 15 to 20 
percent (Cohen, 2008).  
Crucially, the viability of the bulk annuity providers’ business models 
depended also on the adjustments to what was understood as ‘pure’ market consistent 
valuation of insurers’ liabilities permitted under Solvency II. Indeed, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, bulk annuity providers were amongst the most vocal 
proponents of adjustments in the discounting regime of Solvency II. To see why, 
remember that the valuation framework underpinning Solvency II requires insurers 
to value their liabilities at the risk-free discount rate, which should be similar (though 
not entirely the same since it is derived from swap rates) to the gilts rate. Thus, if an 
insurer would price a bulk annuity at a rate higher than the gilts rate, it suggests that 
it values the liabilities at less than the value of technical provisions in Solvency II. 
With the matching and volatility adjustment (discussed in chapter 7), the value of 
technical provisions, however, depends on the credit spread between the insurers’ 
investments and the gilts rate too. The larger this spread, the lower the value of the 
assets needs to be to cover the liabilities. The larger the matching and volatility 
adjustments are, the higher bulk annuity rates can be relative to the gilts rate. The 
matching and volatility adjustments, in some sense, aligned the valuation of 
insurance liabilities more closely with that of pension liabilities.  
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To sum up, a convergence of regulations, a new accounting standard and 
stronger mortality assumptions all contributed to the levelling of the playing field 
between pensions and insurance. This was accompanied by the reframing of the 
differences and similarities between pension funds and insurance companies. Speed 
expressed this view as follows: ‘[T]he distinction between pensions and insurance is, 
to a certain degree, fallacious because we have two economic entities which are 
essentially doing the same thing. They are trying to pay pensions, as promised, to 
people with a very high degree of certainty’ (Speed et al., 2008, p. 238). Any 
differentiation between the two fields, in other words, is simply due to the 
differences in the institutional features of the two adjacent fields – fields of which the 
functionalities overlap and that share the same internal governance unit in the form 
of the actuarial profession. Insurance companies, Speed suggested in addition, might 
well have a competitive advantage in managing those liabilities. Future ‘analysis of 
expenses,’ for instance, ‘could well tell us that … insurance is actually a cheaper 
route for delivering pension promises … because of the economies of scale which 
can be delivered’ (Speed et al., 2008, p. 238).  
Making longevity risk liquid 
As the secondary market for pension liabilities emerged, so did the perceived 
need for another secondary market: one in which longevity risk could be traded. 
Although most actors agreed on the need for a separate mechanism to trade longevity 
risk, the motivations and opinions on the most appropriate way to do so diverged. 
For Rothesay Life, for instance, the ‘hedging’ or ‘reinsuring’ of longevity risk was an 
extension of its parent company’s standard modus operandi: ‘Goldman’s very much 
works on the basis that it wants to hedge all the risks that it’s running. For them, 
longevity was just another risk’ (Stoker interview). Another motivation, however, 
was akin to regulatory arbitrage (see chapter 7). With the introduction of risk-based 
capital, insurers are required to quantify their longevity risk and to hold capital 
against it, which could be rather substantial. This was especially true with the 
introduction of the ‘risk margin’ in Solvency II (as discussed in the previous 
chapter), which was intended to represent the market value of non-market risks but 




for especially longevity risk provided an additional incentive for insurers to pass on 
this risk to third parties, which would allow insurers to free up capital that could be 
used, for instance, to underwrite new business.  
The main strategy deployed by bulk annuity providers was to ‘reinsure’ at 
least some of the longevity risk with a ‘reinsurer’ ‒ an insurance company for 
insurance companies (Jarzabkowski et al., 2015). Since the inception of the bulk 
annuity buyout market, however, there have been sustained attempts to design 
alternative, market-based instruments for trading longevity risk. Reinsurance 
solutions are highly customised, limiting the range of investors who are willing to 
invest in it. To facilitate the ability of insurers and pension funds to take longevity 
risk off their books, proponents of market-based solutions argued, it was necessary to 
draw on capital market participants by offering standardised instruments for trading 
longevity risk. Indeed, as economic sociologists have pointed out, making an object 
tradable requires the creation of ‘generalised’ risk knowledge (Carruthers and 
Stinchcombe, 1999, p. 356). ‘To construct a market transaction’, Callon (1998, p. 19) 
similarly asserts, the object being traded ‘must be decontextualized, dissociated and 
detached.’ In short, the commodity must be homogenised – a homogeneity that is 
most durable when the object or commodity has undergone processes of 
standardisation (Çalışkan and Callon, 2010).  
While standardisation may be an important aspect of making a market, too 
much standardisation may mean that the commodity being traded loses its utility for 
those buying the commodity. There was, in other words, an important trade-off to be 
made in the design of longevity instruments, proponents of market-based solutions 
noted.  
… a well-constructed hedge programme must perform a delicate 
balancing act to be effective. On the one hand, it must provide an 
exposure that sufficiently mimics the performance of the 
underlying portfolio so as not to introduce unacceptable amounts 
of basis risk; while, on the other hand, it must simplify the 
modelling and underwriting process to a level that is manageable 
by a broad base of investors. Further, the hedge transaction must 
compress the 60+ year duration of the underlying retirement 
obligations to an investment horizon that is appealing to 
institutional investors. (Michaelson and Mulholland, 2014, p. 21)  
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The viability of longevity risk as a financial market commodity, as suggested by 
Michaelson and Mulholland, thus depends on the construction of knowledge 
machinery that: 1) compresses the temporality of long-term insurance products into a 
time horizon aligned with that of prospective buyers, and 2) simplifies the evaluation 
of risk, whilst, at the same time, providing a good match for insurers and pension 
funds’ idiosyncratic longevity risk.  
Central in the strategy of proponents of market-based solutions were 
stochastic models to quantify longevity risk. Most notable are the models produced 
by Andrew Cairns, a professor of actuarial science at Heriot-Watt University, who is 
regarded as a pioneer in the field of longevity modelling. Cairns spent the early years 
of his career on interest rate modelling, repurposing models from modern finance 
theory for actuarial use. When Cairns started modelling longevity risk, a direction 
that was suggested to him by the director of the Pensions Institute, David Blake, he 
‘just blazed on’ and did his ‘own model[ling] before reading about the more classic 
work from ten years earlier by Lee and Carter’ (Cairns interview; on the Lee-Carter 
model, see chapter 6). In his first longevity model, Cairns sought to project forward 
the ‘instantaneous rate of mortality’, or ‘force of mortality’, which, he argued, could 
‘be treated in a similar way to the short-term, risk-free rate of interest’ (Cairns, Blake 
and Dowd, 2004, p. 1).39 His model, which he thus derived from the analogical 
extension of his earlier work on interest rate modelling, ‘quickly got the attention of 
people in industry’, Cairns recalled, ‘much more so than the interest rate model’ 
(Cairns interview). In subsequent years, Cairns’ longevity model (in its continuously 
updated form) would form the basis for measuring and pricing longevity risk.  
In the mid-2000s, various banks, insurers and reinsurers started experimenting 
with different configurations of market-traded instruments to see if they could 
generate sufficient interest from both the ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ side of longevity 
risk (Blake et al., 2013; Blake, Cairns and Dowd, 2019). The European Investment 
Bank and BNP Paribas, for instance, experimented with the issuance of longevity 
                                                 
39 As Cairns noted, however, ‘there were limits to how far you could go with that analogy’ (Cairns 
interview). Nevertheless, the interest rate analogy provided the starting point for his own longevity 




bonds, providing its buyers with 25 annual coupon payments, the size of which 
would be directly proportional to a ‘survivor index’ of a reference population 
(Brown, 2004). Similarly, Lucida and JP Morgan issued a ‘q-forward’ contract, the 
value of which would depend on the difference between a fixed mortality projection 
and actual mortality experience of a reference population (Coughlan et al., 2007). To 
facilitate transactions like these, various actors (notably investment banks) started 
offering longevity indexes, such as JP Morgan’s Life Metrics, that could be used as a 
reference rate for index-based contracts like these. 
The success of these instruments, however, remained rather limited. Whilst 
the EIB’s longevity bond was discontinued, JP Morgan struggled to find investors to 
take the longevity risk. From the perspective of the potential buyers of protection, the 
risk commodity had become too ‘detached’. Buyers, as a consequence, remained 
stuck with ‘basis risk’ ‒ the risk that mortality experience in the reference population 
would differ from the mortality of the population for which the buyer sought 
protection. For insurers and pension funds, however, longevity protection is ‘all 
about managing down … capital requirements’ (Cairns interview). Even if an 
instrument would provide some protection against longevity risk, the advantages of 
the instrument would thus remain limited if the protection did not translate into 
‘capital relief’. For regulators, the existence of basis risk remained problematic, 
which limits the potential of index-based instruments as providers of capital relief. 
Unsurprisingly, ‘basis risk’ became an epistemic object – an object that proponents 
of index-based solutions seek to describe, quantify and manage.  
Whilst the success of market-based instruments remained limited, another 
type of instruments did become increasingly widespread: longevity swaps (see figure 
8.1). In a longevity swap, the party buying protection (the pension fund or insurer) 
promises to pay its counterparty (typically, though not always, a reinsurer) a fixed set 
of payments based on a best-estimate projection of its liabilities plus fees. In 
exchange, the counterparty promises to pay the actual benefits that a pension fund or 
insurer owes its members or policyholders. Longevity swaps are thus highly 
‘bespoke’; they require insurers and reinsurers to perform a detailed analysis of the 
underlying portfolio of pensioner annuities. However, as the broker/consultant 
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Tiziana Perrella explained, the market for longevity swaps has ‘grown enormously 
… in standardisation over a short period of time’ (Perrella interview). 
Although the longevity swaps that are written now are fairly 
bespoke, there is a clear understanding as to what the product does 
and, at a high level as to how it should be administered. And then 
you work around some quirks around that menu if you like of 
potential choices. (Perrella interview)  
One of the ways in which longevity swaps were standardised was that 
broker/consultants started offering platform-like services that ‘streamlined’ the 
preparation process. Apart from standardisation, the market also had grown in 
‘sophistication’, according to Perrella. A typical longevity swap transaction would be 
intermediated by an insurer, allowing a pension fund to ‘access’ the balance sheet of 
a reinsurer. Since 2014, however, broker/consultants like Willis Towers Watson, 
PWC and Mercer started offering pension schemes to use an ‘incorporated cell 
company’ based in Guernsey to pass on the longevity risk directly to reinsurers 
without the need for intermediation by insurance companies or investment banks.  
Although longevity swaps were considered to provide pension funds and 
insurers with fairly well-matched protection against longevity risk (even if it 
introduces new risk, like ‘counterparty exposure’ to the provider of the swap), they 
did not provide a ‘capital markets solution’ favoured by those looking to expand the 
supply of longevity protection. Longevity risk thus increasingly ended up on the 
books of a relatively small number of reinsurance companies that were situated at the 
end of a sometimes rather long chain of intermediation. Even if current levels of 
concentration were not yet problematic, further amassing of longevity risk on these 
balance sheets might increasingly become so, Andrew Bulley (2016a) suggested in 
one of the speeches referred to at the start of this chapter. In April 2016, £150bn of 
defined benefit liabilities had already been transferred to insurance companies; total 
liabilities of defined benefit pensions in the UK, however, amount to £1.8trn, with 





Figure 8.1 Transaction volume in the bulk annuity and longevity swap market. The data 
excludes transactions among insurers. Source of data: Willis Towers Watson 
(2019). 
The price of a buyout 
A crucial aspect of any market is the price discovery mechanism. In financial 
markets, quantification of the risk-reward trade-off plays an important role in 
structuring the price discovery process, even if prices may be affected by various 
non-quantifiable factors. Indeed, option-pricing theory contributed to the success of 
options trading because it established a mathematical relation between the risk and 
pay-off of an option, which helped frame derivatives as legitimate risk management 
instruments (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003). The modelling of financial instruments is 
a means to represent potential future outcomes, and thereby to provide an indication 
of and to inspire confidence in the value of an instrument (cf. Svetlova, 2018b). 
Quantification, however, is not all there is to a price discovery mechanism. Such 
processes are also influenced by the structure of the market: how deals come about 
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and how power differentials among actors may pull the price discovery mechanism 
in their favour.  
The trading of pension risk, whether in the form of a bulk annuity buyout, 
buy-in, or a longevity swap, is intermediated by firms that play the dual role of 
broker/consultants: they advise pension schemes on bulk annuity transactions and at 
the same time intermediate between buyers and sellers. As Tiziana Perrella, who is 
an experienced broker/consultant of bulk annuity transactions explained, ‘being a 
broker is a by-product of me being a consultant… Once you get to the broking stage, 
that’s the easier bit. It’s the preparatory work that is the complicated bit’ (Perrella 
interview). Indeed, the construction of a deal can be a rather lengthy affair.  
…from the first meeting that we have with the trustees ‒ just 
explaining what bulk annuity is ‒ to actually then completing a 
transaction can easily be years. Sometimes … they want to move 
quickly … and we can complete the transaction in a matter of say 
six months. (Perrella interview)  
Much of this time is spent on preparatory work: the collection and ‘cleansing’ of data 
such as postcode information and information on spouses, and a legal review of the 
‘benefit specifications’. Once the relevant data have been obtained, the 
broker/consultant will assess the types of transactions that are ‘feasible’, to see, for 
instance, whether a scheme is sufficiently funded for a full buyout, or, if not, whether 
it has access to alternative funding or whether an alternative solution such as a buy-in 
or longevity swap would be preferable.  
If the broker/consultant and scheme trustees decide that a full buyout is 
feasible, they will ‘then try to derive a yield that would be acceptable’ (Perrella 
interview). The price of a bulk annuity transaction is expressed as a spread over the 
interest rate on gilts, or UK government bonds (e.g. gilts plus 50 basis points). As 
Perrella explained, this is because ‘you can look at bulk annuity a bit like a gilt, but 
it’s a better gilt, because it matches your longevity’. A bulk annuity, in other words, 
can be seen as an investment that yields a constant stream of payments, not, as in the 
case of gilts, at a constant coupon rate, but at a rate that perfectly matches the payout 




how large future pensioner benefits will be. If the bulk annuity rate ‘looks like gilts 
plus, great. If it looks like gilts minus, not so great’ (Perrella interview).  
An important aspect of the orchestration of the buyout transaction is the 
apparatus that visualises the market (cf. Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2002). The bulk 
annuity providers feed price quotes (expressed as ‘gilts +/- X basis points’) to broker 
firms, which then construct a price curve to visualise ‘what the market is looking 
like’ (Perrella interview; see figure 8.2). If a quoted price is too far off the ‘target 
price’, the broker might advise the scheme to wait. If the broker/consultant thinks 
that ‘the pricing also works based on the evidence that we’ve seen in the market’, the 
transaction will proceed to the next phase. Thus, in a way, the broker/consultants 
serve as ‘gatekeepers’ to the ‘market place’ in order to balance the supply and 
demand for bulk annuities.  
 
Figure 8.2  A graphic representation of the price evolution of bulk annuities. The green 
area indicates a bulk annuity rate higher than the current gilts rate; the amber 
area indicates a rate between the gilts rate and 20 basis points below the gilts 
rate. The red area indicates a price higher than 20 basis points below the 
gilts rate. Source: Aon.  
The price quotes, however, are generic quotes and do not refer to any specific 
book of liabilities. This is where the insurer’s modelling apparatus becomes 
important: the insurer takes the pension scheme’s data and models the future benefits 
of the scheme using its own best estimate assumptions of things like future mortality. 
The insurer then models ‘the capital that you’re required to hold against those 
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benefits’ (Stoker interview). This, again, will differ across companies: whilst some 
companies calculate their capital requirements using the standard formula provided 
by Solvency II, other companies use their internal capital model. The insurer then 
does ‘a calculation to say what return do I need to make on the capital, and, 
therefore, what premium do I need to charge for it’ (Stoker interview). The 
competing insurers then simply give the broker a price for the liabilities that they are 
willing to take them on for. ‘And then it’s our job and the trustee’s job to work out 
whether that 100m looks reasonable, cheap or expensive’, Perrella said.  
In the bulk annuity market, the price of a transaction is determined mainly 
through the competition among insurers and is structured by the epistemic machinery 
and regulatory requirements. Pension funds have little influence on the price 
formation process and are generally ‘price takers’, Speed suggested. When a pension 
trustee agrees with the management of the scheme sponsor to take the scheme to 
market, the decision to buy out the scheme has already been made. This is also 
influenced by the motivation to initiate a buyout procedure. Companies may, for 
instance, perceive pension funds as a ‘barrier’ to corporate strategy, e.g., when it 
seeks to merge with or acquire other companies, or when it intends to split off parts 
of the business, ‘so you have to deal with pension schemes to allow business to 
progress and do things’. For most companies, buyouts are about ‘affordability’, 
Speed said: ‘sometimes you get a sponsor who says: if you can get it off balance 
sheet and I have to pay less than X to do it, I’m just happy to do that’ (Speed 
interview).  
Competing in the ‘New Life Market’ 
In the preceding section, I showed how the emergence of the buyout market was 
facilitated and shaped by the framing of insurance companies and pension funds (and 
the differences among them) and the concomitant changes in the regulatory treatment 
of pension schemes, the emergence of conduits for passing longevity risk to 
reinsurance companies, and the establishment of pricing conventions. This section 




In the years preceding the financial crisis, there were strong competitive 
pressures among insurers participating in the buyout market. The new, ‘monoline’ 
bulk annuity providers sought to challenge the privileged status of the incumbent 
insurers by undercutting their pricing. For the challenger firms to become viable, 
they needed ‘scale’. Anecdotal evidence suggests that competitive pressures amongst 
participants in the buyout market were strong. The challenger firm Synesis Life, for 
instance, failed to sell a single bulk annuity (Essen, 2008). Others pursued rather 
aggressive acquisition strategies. Pension Corporation, for instance, acquired several 
companies with the intention to replace their pension scheme’s trustees with its own 
directors and to strip off the company’s pension liabilities before re-selling the 
company’s other assets (Davies, 2009). 
In late 2007, Pension Corporation’s acquisition strategy met with regulatory 
resistance. When the challenger firm acquired the telecoms company Telent, the 
latter’s pension trustees registered their concerns with the Pensions Regulator that the 
takeover would lead to ‘conflicts of interest’ (Bandel, 2007). The company, which 
had in 2006 been split off from the Marconi Group, which was itself being acquired 
by Ericsson, held claims on a £490mln escrow account as a provision for future 
shortfalls in the pension scheme; the trustees of the scheme worried that Pension 
Corporation was after this sum (Davies, 2009). The Pensions Regulator decided to 
intervene and appointed three independent trustees to the scheme. Even if Pension 
Corporation did eventually come to an agreement with the regulator about the 
contributions that it would make to the fund, the regulatory challenge had made the 
company wary of the acquisition strategy.40 Indeed, Pension Corporation refrained 
from buying companies. The regulatory intervention, in other words, had set limits to 
the strategies that the new buyout firms would pursue. 
By late 2008, moreover, competitive pressure started to decline, which was 
partly due to consolidation. In some cases, the consolidation was a direct 
consequence of the financial crisis. Due to the widening spread between corporate 
                                                 
40 The CEO of Pension Corporation, Edmund Truell, however, argued, based on the company’s own 
modelling, that the company’s pension scheme was underfunded, even when including the sum held 
in the escrow account (Davies, 2009). 
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bonds and the risk-free rate (see chapter 7), for instance, regulatory capital 
requirements for bulk annuities increased substantially. For Paternoster, this meant 
trouble. The company was unable to raise new funds from its investors and 
subsequently stopped writing new business. The company was later acquired by 
Rothesay Life, who paid half of what the original investors had put in it (Davies, 
2011a). Similarly, Lucida stopped writing new business due to capital strain and was 
later bought by Legal & General. In other cases, the consolidation was more directly 
related to competitive pressures. Pension Corporation, for instance, acquired Synesis 
Life, which, as noted above, had failed to sell a single bulk annuity. 
The structure of competition in the buyout market was also influenced by 
institutional changes in the market for retirement income more generally. In 2014, 
for instance, George Osbourne, who was chancellor of the exchequer then, 
announced new plans to grant pensioners ‘new freedoms’ by allowing them to 
convert (part of) their pension savings in cash rather than an annuity (which had up 
to that point been mandatory). When the new freedoms were implemented in 2015, 
this caused an immediate drop in the sales of individual annuities. In an attempt to 
sustain their annuity business, traditional annuity providers like Scottish Widows and 
Canada Life entered the bulk annuity buyout market. Similarly, in anticipation of the 
reforms, Partnership and Just Retirement merged to form JRP Group and started 
competing more aggressively in the buyout market too. Prudential, in contrast, 
decided to stop writing annuity business altogether. In the early years of the market, 
the incumbent had already been ‘selective’ in its deal-making, refusing to participate 
in strong price competition. (As a result, the company had written no new bulk 
annuity business for some time between 2010-2013). With Osbourne’s pension 
reforms, it did not seem that the profitability of the old buyout market would return.  
Various mechanisms allowed participating firms to avoid direct competition 
(Fligstein, 2001). One mechanism was that of product differentiation. Although it 
might seem that a bulk annuity is a relatively homogeneous product, in practice this 
is not the case. An important aspect of product differentiation is ‘insurers’ ability to 
access specific assets’, Perrella noted. When specific investment opportunities arise, 





Figure 8.3  Asset allocations of bulk annuity providers. Source: Hymans Robertson 
(2016).  
of a full buyout, when the insurer receives both the liabilities and the assets from a 
pension scheme, it will seek to re-invest the assets in a way that it thinks better 
matches the liabilities. This process, as Speed explained, can be rather hectic, and 
thus influences the willingness of an insurer to price competitively. 
In insurance, you have the case where you must be solvent, which 
includes having enough money and dealing with your value at risk 
on a continuous basis, at least every day. So you measure that. 
That’s comparatively easy in the steady-state. But then imagine a 
transaction where you have a new liability that hits your balance 
sheet with a load of assets, which materially increases your asset-
base and those assets aren't necessarily in the right shape. You've 
got one day to put that into the right position. That's pretty 
challenging. Getting all that executed, going through a process 
trying to make sure you’re getting best value for money, you've got 
good execution, all that is consolidated, so that by the close of the 
play you can go and stand in front of the regulator and say: yep, 
that's all I executed. We've hedged our liabilities, we know where 
we are, and we can survive all those shocks. (Speed interview) 
One way in which competition between insurers is regulated is the differentiation of 
investment strategy. Figure 8.3, for instance, provides an indication of the degree of 
differentiation of insurers’ investment strategies. As opportunities for specific types 
of investment arise at different moments, different insurers may be able to quote 




Figure 8.4  Average annual improvement rate over the previous 5 years, 1925-45 birth 
cohort, England & Wales (Gordon et al., 2017). 
Apart from investment strategy, there were other factors shaping competition 
among insurers too. One is, for instance, the size of the schemes that buyout 
providers are willing to take on. While AVIVA, Canada Life and Just Retirement 
aim specifically for relatively small schemes (up to £500m), Rothesay Life and PIC 
aim specifically at larger schemes (no smaller than £100m). Another important factor 
is whether an insurer focuses on mortality or investment-related risk. While 
established insurers tend to focus on mortality risk and may have access to 
underwriting capacity, offering the possibility to conduct medical surveys, the new 
entrants tend to focus on operational efficiency and investment. Paternoster, for 
instance, performed most of its modelling and back-office work in India (Northedge, 
2008). Thus, the position of insurers in the buyout field is partially shaped by the 
access that they have to the knowledge machinery of a traditional life insurance 
operation and whether they have access to specialised investment management.  
While the financial crisis showed the importance of expectations surrounding 
insurers’ ability to source capital and high-yielding assets, the post-2014 decline in 
market volume indicated the significance of quite another sort of expectation: that of 




isn’t a significant disconnect between the consultants, the trustees and sponsors’ 
view of longevity versus the insurers and reinsurers’ view’ (Perrella interview). By 
the early 2010s, however, it appeared that the pace of mortality improvements had 
declined substantially, bringing back to the fore the question of how future mortality 
improvements should be modelled. The issue was debated in a meeting at the Staple 
Inn Actuarial Society, where there was a ‘high turnout … with some having to 
stand’, Jon Palin (2017), a member of the CMI Mortality Projections Committee 
observed. ‘There seems to be a growing consensus that we have seen a genuine slow-
down in general population mortality improvements rather than just a blip.’ At the 
meeting, the actuary who had introduced the concept of the ‘cohort effect’ nearly two 
decades earlier, Richard Willets, illustrated the slow-down dramatically with a graph 
depicting historical mortality improvements for both males and females (see figure 
8.4). The drop in mortality improvements, Willets suggested, could be seen as a 
reversion of historically more typical ‘rates of change’ and could be linked to ‘the 
impact of economic austerity’ (Willets in Gordon et al., 2017). This ‘reversion’ 
added significantly to profit expectations of business written in preceding years. In 
March 2019, just four insurers announced £1.5bn in profits with expectations of 
future profits exceeding £2bn (Ralph, 2019).  
As the trend started to change in the post-crisis years, a ‘disconnect’ emerged 
between pension funds’ and insurers’ expectations of future mortality improvements. 
While pension funds (and particularly the consultants on which they relied) started to 
believe relatively early on that the trend was reversing, insurers and particularly 
reinsurers (with whom the longevity risk ultimately ends up) were more sceptical, 
suspecting that the dramatic changes in mortality improvements were simply a ‘blip’. 
However, once the consensus emerged in the epistemic field that longevity 
improvements were a structural trend, and the CMI had published an updated model 
of future longevity improvements, mortality expectations started to converge. 
Insurers also got increasingly ‘comfortable’ with Solvency II and started to develop 
enhanced capabilities to ‘source higher-yielding assets’ eligible for the matching 
adjustment (Perrella, personal communication), which provided an impetus to the 
volume of trades in the bulk annuity buyout market (see figure 8.1). With £2trn of 
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defined benefit liabilities, many expect this to be just the start (e.g. Willis Towers 
Watson, 2017).  
Conclusion 
To conclude, four ways in which the evaluation machinery was entangled with or 
shaped the field of retirement income can be distinguished. First, modern finance 
theory’s notion that instruments generating similar cash flows should also be valued 
similarly contributed to the perception that there is no economic difference between a 
pension liability on the balance sheet of an insurance company and a pension 
scheme, thereby reducing the perceived significance of institutional boundaries 
between the two fields. Market consistency thus paved the way for the transfer of  
defined benefit liabilities to insurance companies. Second, changes in the knowledge 
machinery shifted attention towards the market value of liabilities, while previous 
actuarial calculations had been geared towards questions of ‘funding’ (e.g. the 
question of what the level of employer and employee contributions should be to meet 
expected liabilities, not the market value of those liabilities when selling them to a 
third party today). Third, the development of stochastic longevity models allowed for 
the quantification and pricing of longevity trend risk and thereby facilitated the 
transfer of ‘longevity risk’ to the balance sheets of reinsurance companies located in 
offshore financial centres. Furthermore, Solvency II – and the risk margin in 
particular – incentivised the transfer of longevity risk. Fourth and finally, the extent 
of competition in the buyout market is affected by changes in mortality expectations 
and the differential access that insurers have to knowledge machinery that allow, 
e.g., medical underwriting or that are capable of performing specialised credit 
assessments.  
The above analysis of the emergence of the bulk annuity buyout market has 
further shown that changes in insurers’ and pension funds’ knowledge machinery 
were consequential. Although it is difficult to assert causality, the increased 
prevalence of market-consistent valuation practices, and the concomitant changes in 
regulation, investment practice and longevity modelling all contributed to reshaping 




employer covenant as the backstop for pension risk with the risk-based capital of an 
insurance company. This shift of responsibility for managing pensions to ‘private 
financial services providers’, some of whom may see bulk annuities as a cheap 
source of funding for direct lending (Rule, 2019), is part of a broader set of 
developments that some refer to as the financialisation of pensions (Hassel et al., 
2019). Yet, this chapter also presents an important caveat to tendencies to perceive 
such developments as part of a single process of financialisation. While the 
analogical extension of modern finance theory to the domain of pensions contributed 
to framing pension funds as ‘mini insurance companies’, the viability of the bulk 
annuity market also depended on adjustments to the market-consistent framework of 







Chapter 9  
Conclusion 
The way in which life insurance companies deal with uncertainty has changed 
significantly since the 1970s. Prior to the 1970s, insurers focused mainly on the 
making of ‘diversifiable risks’: the pooling of individual lives to create more or less 
stable outcomes on aggregate. Any remaining uncertainty was dealt with through the 
twin mechanism of actuarial prudence and discretion. The mechanism for dealing 
with uncertainty in contemporary life insurance is quite different. Insurers now 
quantify not only diversifiable but also non-diversifiable risks, such as market risk 
and longevity risk. Accordingly, the mechanism of actuarial prudence and discretion 
is replaced by market-consistent valuation and risk-based capital. There are two ways 
of looking at this shift. On the one hand, it is possible to look at the evolution of 
techniques and methods that insurers use to evaluate their insurance liabilities. On 
the other hand, we may focus on broader developments in the life insurance market, 
such as changes in the structure of contemporary life insurance arrangements, and its 
adjacent fields, such as increased financial market volatility and the increased use of 
structured financial products in the field of professional investment. The question 
that I set out to address in this dissertation is how these developments were related.  
The field-theoretical perspective developed in chapter 2 (which adopts an 
‘endogenous’ understanding of technology and law) allowed me to address this 
question by focusing on the strategic behaviour of relevant actors. It is possible to 
distinguish three ways of understanding the interrelation between the market and the 
epistemic field. First, challenges to and changes in the dominant structure of the 
market field may provide an impetus to developments in the epistemic field. In 
chapter 3, for instance, I argued that the emergence of unit-linked insurance (an 
invention by ‘challenger’ firms to undermine the strategic advantages of traditional 
life insurance companies) led to the emergence of ‘financial risk’ as an epistemic 
object in actuarial science and its explicit quantification with mathematical tools that 
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were theretofore ‘foreign’ to the field of actuarial science. Similarly, I suggested in 
chapter 5 that the declining epistemic and supervisory authority of the actuarial 
profession (at least partially a consequence of the Equitable Life debacle) contributed 
to the ascendancy of market-consistent valuation as the dominant paradigm in the 
epistemic field. In some cases, the influence was more subtle. In chapters 7 and 8, I 
argued that the politics surrounding Solvency II turned ‘liquidity risk’ and ‘longevity 
risk’ into epistemic objects in the actuarial field. The point here is not that the 
structure of the epistemic field is entirely determined by the structure of the market 
field. Rather, it is to suggest that developments in the market field may act as a social 
force in the epistemic field, which: 1) creates hierarchies among paradigms by 
providing new opportunities for actors in the epistemic field to form coalitions with 
actors in other professional ecologies, 2) opens up research in some objects and not 
others, and 3) shapes the epistemic toolkit that may be used to frame and solve 
problems.  
Second, developments in the epistemic field provide resources and constraints 
for strategic behaviour in the market field. The emergence of asset-share 
methodology as described in chapter 4 influenced the bonus policies of with-profits 
funds and ultimately reduced actuarial discretion in conventional insurance. Another 
example may be found in chapter 8, where I argued that changes in evaluation 
practices facilitated the perception of pension funds as ‘mini-insurance companies’, 
thus reducing the barriers between the market fields of occupational and private 
pensions. Similarly, the introduction of market-consistent valuation and risk-based 
capital calculation further entrenched the decline in actuaries’ epistemic authority by 
shifting responsibility for judgment about the credibility of insurers’ profit 
expectations to shareholders, whose evaluations are aided by modelling practices that 
are seen as objective (chapter 6). The exemplars that are central in the epistemic 
field, in other words, function like an institution that may operate as a ‘social force’ 
in the market field, structuring the relations among actors and shaping its boundaries.  
Third and finally, developments within the market field may affect the 
boundary between the epistemic field and the market field. The clearest example of 




regulators, market-consistent valuation and risk-based capital calculation were 
perceived as useful strategic resources for harmonising regulation across member 
states. The ostensible objectivity of market-consistent valuation and risk-based 
capital calculation endowed such efforts with the legitimacy needed to overcome the 
obstacle of competition politics. When these practices became institutionalised, 
however, boundaries between the epistemic field and the market field started to fade. 
In the specification of new rules, both epistemic and pragmatic considerations 
explicitly played a role. With the institutionalisation of evaluation practices, in other 
words, considerations that were previously considered to belong to distinct fields 
became conflated in a process of translation, from a set of exemplary problem 
solutions to a detailed set of rules.  
Implications and Contributions 
The story presented in this dissertation (and as summarised above) is essentially one 
of ‘coproduction’ ‒ a narrative structure that is prevalent in science and technology 
studies and indeed in the social studies of finance. In science and technology studies, 
the term is adopted to point to the mutually constitutive character of scientific 
knowledge on the one hand, and ‘nature’ and ‘society’ on the other. Sheila Jasanoff 
usefully summarises this view as follows:  
Briefly stated, co-production is shorthand for the proposition that 
the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature 
and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to 
live in it. … Science, in the co-productionist framework, is 
understood as neither a simple reflection of the truth about nature 
nor an epiphenomenon of social and political interests. Rather, co-
production is symmetrical in that it calls attention to the social 
dimensions of cognitive commitments and understandings, while at 
the same time underscoring the epistemic and material correlates of 
social formations. (Jasanoff, 2004, pp. 2–3) 
The performativity thesis (as discussed in chapter 2) is in a sense a particular 
variation of the co-productionist narrative; it focuses on the mutual constitution of 
socio-technical practices and the economy. In this dissertation, I have sought to take 
such a perspective further by investigating how we may integrate it with field-
theoretical approaches in economic sociology that focus on strategic behaviour to 
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explain the creation and sustenance of meso-level social orders. This approach 
allows me to make three further contributions to contemporary debates in the social 
sciences: the political economy of evaluation, the individualisation of risk, and the 
influential role of key exemplars in modern financial economics in shaping markets. 
Each will be taken in turn.  
The political economy of evaluation 
The first contribution of this dissertation is to further our thinking about the 
link between issues of political economy and evaluation practices. As this study has 
shown, evaluation is not simply a technical affair. Much may be at stake in 
evaluation, particularly so if particular practices acquire institutional force. How 
insurers evaluate insurance liabilities matters for the structure of the products that 
they sell and how they behave as participants in capital markets. In this dissertation, 
for instance, we have seen that changes in insurers’ evaluation machinery contributed 
to: 1) changes in the structure of contemporary life insurance arrangements, 2) a 
reduced willingness to provide long-term insurance; and 3) a shift in investment 
strategy, away from equities and towards derivatives and fixed-income investments, 
including forms of ‘direct lending’. Because they are consequential, evaluation 
practices may give rise to conflicts that are sometimes rather manifest and the object 
of ‘overt’ politics. This was the case, for instance with Solvency II, where differing 
opinions about the appropriate application of particular concepts gave rise to political 
negotiation and, eventually, political compromises. More often, however, evaluation 
practices are subject to a form of ‘covert’ politics in which tensions among different 
stakeholders play out on a subterranean level, hidden beneath technical vocabulary.  
Central in the political economy of evaluation practices in the context of 
insurance is the discounting regime. The long-term nature of insurance liabilities 
means that the choice of the discount rate will likely have an important impact on the 
value of insurers’ assets and liabilities. Discounting, as Derringer (2017) shows, is a 
long accepted technique to transform future cash flows into a ‘present value’, but has 
itself a history of contestation. Although the technique of discounting is now widely 
accepted, contestation remains about how the relevant discount rate should be 




the risk-free curve should be constructed, which had differential implications for the 
different European insurance industries and the viability of the products that they 
sell.  
The relevance of this perspective to other domains became clear during my 
research for this dissertation. The recent pensions dispute in UK higher education 
and the proposal to turn the Universities Superannuation Scheme into a defined 
contribution scheme provides another example of the political dimension of the 
economic evaluation of long-term financial promises. While Universities UK, the 
organisation representing university management boards, claimed that the defined 
benefit pensions had become too expensive, the labour organisation, the Universities 
and Colleges Union argued that the calculative methods used by the scheme’s 
actuaries were too stringent, making the pension promises seem more expensive than 
they really were. The dispute, then, underlines the following point: discounting 
regimes are a fundamental aspect of the political economy of long-term financial 
promises such as those entailed in insurance and pensions; they may benefit some 
stakeholder groups over others and those affected will thus have an incentive to 
attempt to move the rules in their favour. The choice of discount rate involves a 
choice about the appropriate distribution of benefits and risk among the stakeholders 
in long-term insurance arrangements. In the world of insurance as well as pensions 
this has led sometimes to manifest but often subterranean conflicts about seemingly 
technical affairs.  
Another way in which evaluation practices may be related to issues of 
political economy is that (as already noted) they contribute to creating, maintaining 
and sometimes eroding boundaries between fields. In chapter 8, for instance, I argued 
that the convergence of evaluation practices in the field of life insurance and 
occupational pensions contributed to the perception of pension funds as being similar 
to insurance companies, thus paving the way for the transfer of pension liabilities 
from defined benefit pension schemes to insurance companies. At the heart of this 
transfer, I argued, is an issue of political economy that is not frequently discussed: a 
change in the mechanism with which pension promises are secured from one based 
on the relation between the scheme sponsor and the scheme itself to the mechanism 
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of risk-based capital, which is characteristic of private insurance. This, in a way, is 
part of a broader development that may be referred to as the ‘privatisation’ of 
pension promises (cf. Hassel et al., 2019). It is not so much to say that in these new 
arrangements pension promises are by definition less secure: rather, it is to say that 
the nature of the relation between the sponsor and its pensioners is different. This 
leads me to another related issue: that of the individualisation of risk.  
The individualisation of risk 
The phrase ‘individualisation of risk’ in the context of finance is often used to 
denote the shift from defined-benefit to defined-contribution pensions in the UK and 
elsewhere (Langley, 2004, 2006, 2008; Berry, 2016) ‒ a topic that was hotly debated 
in the context of the Universities Superannuation Scheme too. In the case of defined 
benefit pensions, employees receive a guaranteed retirement income, defined as a 
percentage of their final salary or average salary. The burden of uncertainty is placed 
on the sponsor (which may have to increase its contributions), not on the individual 
worker. In the case of defined contribution pensions, this is turned upside down: the 
contributions are set, and pension benefits are contingent on the performance of 
investments made by the worker, either consciously or by default. Hence, the 
individualisation of risk. 
In this dissertation, we have seen that a similar shift has taken place in life 
insurance arrangements. In traditional with-profits arrangements, policyholder 
benefits were not directly contingent on financial market performance but are 
determined through bonus policies that are intended to ‘smooth’ policyholder 
benefits across different generations. This was done with an ‘estate’ or the assets that 
belong to the company as a whole, but to no policyholder or shareholder in 
particular: in good times, the company would add to its reserves; in bad times, it 
would take from them. The company as a whole, not individual policyholders, 
carried the burden of short-term uncertainty. This structure is inverted with unit-
linked insurance, which, as displayed in figure 4.1, has become the dominant line of 
business in the UK: policyholder benefits are directly tied to financial market 
performance and any financial guarantees are charged for separately, like financial 




financial instruments, in which the cost of financial risk is directly charged to the 
individual. 
While most studies of the individualisation of risk see it as the result of a 
‘neoliberal governmentality’ (O’Malley, 2002, 2012; Dean, 2010; Rose, 2017), the 
story in the context of private insurance arrangements appears slightly different. 
Here, the individualisation of risk was explained as the outcome of competitive 
dynamics and strategic behaviour, notably incumbent insurers’ response to the 
challenge of unit-linked insurance. While unit-linked insurance remained initially 
relatively marginal compared to conventional insurance arrangements, the latter 
nevertheless responded to the challenge of unit-linked insurance by appropriating 
some of its methods and techniques. This, however, reduced insurers’ discretionary 
space in bonus policy (once insurers used asset-share methodology as a guide for 
their bonus policy, it was difficult to argue that policyholders’ benefits should be any 
different from their asset shares), which sat uncomfortably with the traditional way 
of dealing with financial uncertainty through actuarial prudence. Conventional 
insurance, in other words, increasingly started to look like unit-linked insurance, 
placing financial market risk increasingly at the level of the individual. New ways of 
evaluating insurance policies thus operated as a force in the market field, first 
providing challenger firms with resources to challenge conventional insurance 
arrangements, then exercising an isomorphic force over unit-linked and conventional 
insurance (cf. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
The individualisation of risk is at the root of the ‘identity crisis’ mentioned in 
the introduction to this dissertation. With the explicit quantification of non-
diversifiable risk and the concomitant capital charges, insurers have increasingly 
moved away from business models in which non-diversifiable risk is kept on their 
books and towards models that pivot on the provisioning of asset management 
services. In the case of Standard Life, this shift has been wholesale: the company is 
now profiling itself explicitly as an asset manager. In other cases, however, the shift 
is more subtle. Prudential, for instance, remains among the largest life insurers in the 
UK but has stopped writing annuities. With the changes in insurers’ epistemic 
machinery, in other words, came changes in the structure of the products sold by life 
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insurance companies too. The question which drove which, however, cannot be 
answered decisively: rather, they seem to have been mutually reinforcing processes, 
characterised by the opening up of strategic opportunities that drove life insurance 
towards financial services. 
The hegemonic status of financial economics 
Why were the exemplary problem solutions of modern finance theory so 
influential in shaping insurers’ evaluation practices? What does their ‘performative 
power’ (Svetlova, 2012) consist of? Answering this question, I argue, requires 
consideration of the declining legitimacy of actuarial expertise and the capacity of 
no-arbitrage models to establish links across different professional ecologies – to 
serve as a strategic ‘hinge’ (Abbott, 2005). Actuaries had first hinted at some 
potential applications of option pricing theory in life insurance not long after the 
Black-Scholes-Merton model was published in 1973; by the late 1990s, a generation 
of actuaries had emerged who challenged the status quo in the epistemic field. 
However, only when insurance supervision was integrated with banking supervision 
and the collapse of Equitable Life had raised questions about the legitimacy of 
actuarial expertise, did the challengers become the dominant epistemic group. 
Supervisors perceived no-arbitrage modelling as more ‘objective’, which I argued 
was because it circumvents the need to forecast the future. It analyses the economic 
value of financial instruments and insurance products in a ‘synchronous’ fashion 
(Langenohl, 2018). No-arbitrage modelling (and, indeed,  the market-consistent 
modelling of insurance liabilities) thereby appears to exteriorise judgment from the 
valuation problem, and, in so doing, formally removes discretion from the equation. 
In so doing, no-arbitrage modelling articulated well with the regulatory aim to 
restructure the distribution of authority in the insurance field and successfully 
allowed for the emergence of a coalition of younger actuaries with experience in a 
range of different professional ecologies, shareholders, investment bankers and 
supervisors (some of whom had experience in the supervision of banking) who 
supported its uptake. 
This finding, I suggest, has implications for how we should understand the 




finance is the ‘performative power’ (Svetlova, 2012) of financial models: why are 
some models more influential than others? Literature in the social studies of finance 
has addressed this question by looking at the organisational and institutional 
environment in which models are deployed (Svetlova, 2012; MacKenzie and Spears, 
2014a; Wansleben, 2018). Seen from this perspective, the widespread usage of the 
Black-Scholes equation may, for example, be explained by its ‘high academic 
standing’, its practical utility in solving specific organisational problems, and its 
public availability (MacKenzie, 2007, p. 71). Model usage, however, is often rather 
creative (Svetlova, 2009, 2018a). Whether and how models have ‘performative 
power’ thus depends in this perspective on how model usage is ‘embedded’ in the 
institutional and organisational environment (Svetlova, 2012; MacKenzie and 
Spears, 2014a).  
In insurance, the exemplary models of financial economics acquired 
performative power because they became a core part of the institutional environment. 
Their academic standing, practical utility and public availability, however, seem 
insufficient to explain why they became so. Although these factors may have been 
necessary conditions, the limited use of these models prior to the 2000s suggests that 
other factors played a role too. In this study, I suggest, we have seen a dynamic at 
work that is akin to a dynamic described in the literature on the political power of 
economic ideas (Abdelal et al., 2010). Work of this kind tends to argue that ideas are 
key drivers of institutional change. In times of crisis, Blyth (2002) suggests, 
economic ideas may help reduce uncertainty by providing a framework for 
understanding the causes of the crisis and by providing a blueprint for institutional 
change. A similar dynamic was observed in UK life insurance in response to the 
annuity guarantee crisis and the demise of Equitable Life. It is difficult to overstate 
the importance of this crisis. When I asked interviewee BC why supervisors chose to 
impose market-consistent modelling (a type of modelling that had not yet been 
developed) rather than using the real-world stochastic approaches to valuation 
developed in the 1970s (see chapter 3), he replied: ‘I think … there wasn't so much a 
rejection of the real-world stochastic approaches. It was more a rejection of the 
actuarial approaches that existed previous to that. … The motivation is Equitable 
Life, Equitable Life, Equitable Life’ (interviewee BC).  
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No-arbitrage models thus provided a convincing interpretative framework for 
understanding the crisis and was seen as a ‘blueprint’ for addressing its causes. 
Proponents of market-consistent modelling perceived actuarial discretion as the 
problem, not the solution. But as the above quote suggests, this interpretative lens 
need not imply a rejection of the real-world stochastic simulation models. I argued 
that it was the capacity of no-arbitrage models (chapter 5) and risk management 
techniques (chapter 6) to rally together a coalition of actors across different 
professional ecologies – a process facilitated by the fading of boundaries between the 
insurance field and the adjacent field of banking (as reflected e.g. in the integration 
of banking and insurance supervision) – which proved to be a crucial contributing 
factor in their ascendancy to the dominant exemplar in the epistemic field of actuarial 
science (Abbott, 2005; Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009). Without the support from 
supervisors with a banking background and investment bankers, who perceived 
market-consistent modelling as a necessary condition for the introduction of new 
(derivatives-based) risk management techniques, the shift towards techniques 
borrowed from modern finance theory would likely have been slower and/or less 
wholesale.  
It is important not to exaggerate the ‘power’ of modern finance theory. Even 
if theoretical models may play an important role in formatting economic calculations, 
the source of constraint should always be traced back to particular causes, not to the 
models’ intrinsic meaning. This is a direct implication of the finitist perspective on 
economic knowledge on which the analysis in this dissertation relies. The extension 
of an exemplary problem solution to new instances inevitably requires implicit or 
explicit decisions that are contestable in principle. To understand the influence of a 
particular set of exemplary problem solutions, it is, therefore, necessary to 
investigate how those decisions are made and how particular applications are 
enforced. The authority of the key exemplars of modern financial economics does 





Limitations and prospects 
To conclude this dissertation, I make some concluding remarks on the limitations of 
this study and point at some potential avenues for future research. The first limitation 
is that this study has focused on quite a narrow geography. The choice to do so was 
motivated by the fact that regulatory changes at the European level were preceded 
and in part driven by developments in the UK. In order to understand EU-wide 
developments, it is thus necessary to look in more detail at UK-specific 
developments. The UK life insurance market is of interest of itself, especially 
considering its long history and its sheer size. It would also be worthwhile, however, 
to compare its evolution to that of industries in jurisdictions where the shift towards 
market-consistent valuation and risk-based capital has been less pronounced. This is 
the case, for instance, in the two largest life insurance markets globally, the US and 
Japan (the UK market being the third largest). A comparison of the historical 
trajectories of evaluation practices across these jurisdictions would allow for an 
examination of factors contributing to the relative stability of evaluation practices. 
How is it that in some countries the emergence of unit-linked insurance triggered a 
series of events that led to a radical overhaul of insurers’ epistemic machinery, while 
in others it did not? Do actuaries have a stronger jurisdictional claim in those 
countries, or should these differences be explained differently?  
The scope of this study was not only constrained geographically but also in 
terms of its focus on the life insurance market rather than focusing more broadly on 
the market for long-term savings products. This, again, was the result of a conscious 
choice: the transition towards market-consistent valuation and risk-based capital 
calculation in insurance preceded similar developments in the world of pensions. 
This study, however, could not entirely ignore the world of pensions, because it is 
intricately entangled with the world of insurance, not only because insurance 
companies are amongst the most important pension providers, but also because many 
of my interviewees have worked in both fields. With the changes in the epistemic 
machinery across both fields, moreover, we saw that differences between pension 
funds and insurance companies faded, paving the way for the transfer of pension 
liabilities to insurance companies. Nevertheless, the worlds of insurance and 
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pensions are not entirely the same and there is much space left for an investigation of 
the social and political dynamics around the changing evaluation practices in the 
world of pensions. The controversy around the actuarial valuation of the Universities 
Superannuation Scheme provides a case in point. 
A third and final limitation is that this study has focused primarily on the 
relation between evaluation practices and the structure of competition among life 
insurers, but less so on the interface between life insurers and their customers. This 
was a strategic choice, partly because limitations in time and space forced me to 
make analytical choices and partly because literature in the sociology of insurance 
has already provided excellent insights in the role of marketing and underwriting 
practices in the making of risks (van Hoyweghen, 2007, 2014; McFall and 
Dodsworth, 2009; Lehtonen and Liukko, 2010; Lehtonen, 2014; McFall, 2015). This 
literature tends to emphasise the importance of ‘attachments’ in the constitution of 
markets for life insurance, more so than the calculative procedures that underpin 
them (e.g. McFall, 2011). Nevertheless, the findings of this dissertation suggest that 
the institutionalisation of market-consistent valuation and risk-based capital 
calculation has presented new opportunities and obstacles for the making of markets 
in insurance risks, such as mortality, morbidity and longevity. An open question 
remains whether and how the institutionalised evaluation practices permeate not just 
insurers’ financial management and ‘board level’ strategic decision making but also 
life insurers’ marketing, underwriting and claims management practices ‒ a question 
that becomes all the more interesting with the recent move towards ‘personalised’ 
insurance schemes (Meyers and van Hoyweghen, 2018; McFall, 2019).  
On a final note, I want to stress that the history of evaluation in life insurance 
is far from over. There are a number of developments that are likely to affect 
insurers’ evaluation practices in the years to come and therewith the nature of 
insurance arrangements in the UK and elsewhere. The prospect of Brexit, for 
instance, has initiated renewed attention to the politics of Solvency II. Presently both 
UK supervisors and insurers are unhappy with some of the core features of Solvency 
II, such as the risk margin (see chapter 7). The tension between traditional actuarial 




whether Brexit will be seized by UK actors as an opportunity to diverge from the 
prescriptions of modern financial economics. Another crucial development, which 
has currently reached the stage of implementation, is a new international accounting 
standard for insurance liabilities, IFRS 17, which has been long in the making (its 
development preceded that of Solvency II – see chapters 5 and 7), and diverges in 
some important respects from Solvency II, even if it was similarly designed along 
market-consistent lines. Similarly, the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors is working on the development of global insurance capital standards, 
based on principles of market-consistent valuation and risk-based capital calculation 
‒ a project that seems even more complicated than the development of Solvency II, 
for it multiplies the number of jurisdictions with diverging practices. In other words, 
to understand how the institutionalisation of market-consistent valuation and risk-
based capital calculation will shape the structure of insurance markets in the future, it 








Appendix A: List of Interviewees 
Name Place Date interview 1 Date interview 2 
David Belsham London 01 November 2017  
David Blake London 19 February 2018  
Paolo Cadoni London 20 June 2017  
Andrew Cairns Edinburgh 26 April 2017  
Andrew Chamberlain London 21 February 2018  
John Cliff London 20 February 2018  
Gavin Conn Edinburgh 09 November 2015*  
Maggie Craig Edinburgh 08 May 2018  
Seamus Creedon London 23 June 2017  
David Dullaway London 22 February 2018  
Nick Dumbreck London 24 June 2017  
Adrian Eastwood Edinburgh 14 September 2017  
David Forfar Edinburgh 15 May 2017  
Kamran Foroughi London 22 February 2018  
Paul Fulcher London 22 February 2018  
Stewart Gray Edinburgh 09 November 2015  
David Hare Edinburgh 03 April 2017  
John Hibbert Edinburgh 07 April 2017 18 December 2017 
Karel Van Hulle Phone 05 March 2019  
Parit Jakhria London 21 February 2018  
Malcolm Kemp London 31 October 2017  
Robert Kipling London 30 October 2017  
Ad Kok Phone 04 October 2018  
Angus Macdonald Edinburgh 26 May 2017  
Stephen Makin Edinburgh 19 June 2017  
Steven Morrison Edinburgh 15 May 2017  
Martin Muir Phone 03 May 2018  
Tiziana Perrella London 17 May 2018  
Andrew Reid Phone 18 June 2018  
Paul Sharma London 01 November 2017  
Sandy Sharp Edinburgh 09 November 2015* 18 June 2018 
Nick Silver Phone 13 June 2018  
Andrew Smith London 21 June 2017  
Cliff Speed London 23 February 2018  
Andrew Stoker London 15 May 2018  
Philip Tervit Edinburgh 28 October 2015 13 June 2017 
Craig Turnbull Edinburgh 04 April 2017 24 November 2017 
Elliot Varnell London 31 October 2017  
David Wilkie Woking 09 August 2017  
Colin Wilson London 22 June 2017  
Rob Yuille London 16 May 2018  
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